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ABSTRACTS

Committee Decision Making in the Soviet Union

By E. JONES

Most Soviet committees, from Politburo to local government executive committee, use procedures designed to encourage broad organizational participation in policy making. These procedures help to minimize capricious policy making and ensure the cooperation of officials responsible for implementing policy. Most importantly, the broad representation of institutional interests in collegial forums reflects the need for institutional checks and balances. The cost of committee procedures is inefficiency. Committee decision making also tends to produce policy that works well in an era of economic prosperity and international stability, but less well during periods of economic shortfall or foreign crisis.

Soviet Politics and Strategy toward the West: three cases

By T. N. BJORKMAN and T. J. ZAMOSTNY

Western observers remain fundamentally divided on the motives behind Soviet policy toward the West. An examination of these motives must be based on understanding elite opinion in the U.S.S.R. on East-West issues, as well as the scope of political conflict and consensus. The writings and public comments of prominent Soviet foreign policy officials over the last decade reveal a broad spectrum of views and persisting signs of political tension on issues of arms control policy, foreign trade and economic ties, and competition with the West in the Third World. Reform-minded officials have pressed for expansion of cooperation with the West as a matter of practical self-interest in the age of nuclear weapons and advanced technology. More conservative officials have resisted efforts to mute competition and have sought to preserve more insular policies. Proponents of expanded ties to the West openly pressed their case when détente flourished in the early 1970s, and many of their arguments found reflection in statements by the Soviet leadership. The arguments of conservative spokesmen have resonated anew, however, as East-West tensions have mounted since the late 1970s.

Firms and Tariff Regime Change: explaining the demand for protection

By T. J. McKEOWN

Although it is commonly argued that there is a connection between tariff levels and business conditions, this hypothesis has not been subjected to systematic empirical analysis or given any theoretical basis. The author presents two complementary theories of the movement of tariff levels in response to changing business conditions. Both explain tariff changes in terms of the changing political demands of business firms, and both rely on the business cycle to drive these changing demands. One theory is a conventional argument about changing opportunities for entry and exit; the other treats firms as satisficers. The theories yield similar predictions. Preliminary empirical analysis, while consistent with both, does not differentiate between them.

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Some Conventional Orthodoxies in the Study of Agrarian Change

By R. H. BATES

The paper presents a critical review of two major approaches to the analysis of agrarian societies in light of evidence taken from the scholarly literature on Africa. The first approach posits the existence of "natural" societies; the second, of "peasant" societies. The existence of such "precapitalist" societies is often invoked to account for patterns of change in contemporary rural societies. The author argues that these approaches are overly culturally and economically determined, and that they undervalue the importance of the state. Many of the so-called precapitalist features of these societies are themselves found to be products of the societies' encounter with agents of capitalism. Moreover, many result from the efforts of states to secure domination and control over rural populations.

Human Rights and Development: complementary or competing concerns?

By J. DONNELLY

The conventional wisdom of the sixties and early seventies held that, except in the very long run, rapid development and human rights are competing concerns. Needs satisfaction, income equality, and civil and political rights were regularly held to be luxury goods. An examination of the development experiences of Brazil and South Korea, however, shows much of this conventional wisdom to have been mistaken. Rapid growth and development can be achieved without sacrificing social and economic equity. Furthermore, theoretical considerations suggest that even civil and political rights are more compatible with sustained rapid development than is frequently recognized.

The Study of Chinese Politics: toward a third generation of scholarship

By H. HARDING

Research on contemporary Chinese politics can be divided into two distinct generations since its initiation in the early 1960s. The first, produced before the Cultural Revolution, was characterized by general description rather than systematic comparison or sophisticated conceptualization. The second generation, which appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s, assigned greater attention to describing the variation of Chinese politics over space and time, identifying the informal norms and mechanisms by which Chinese politics operates, and developing general theories of the Chinese political process. In a third generation, which is just now beginning to emerge, we should see efforts to absorb the new sources of information now available about China; to sort, test, and amalgamate the competing models produced by the second generation; to integrate the analysis of Chinese politics with the rest of comparative politics; and to study Chinese politics in an interdisciplinary fashion.

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COMMITTEE DECISION MAKING IN THE SOVIET UNION

By ELLEN JONES*

VIRTUALLY all polities, from primitive tribes to postindustrial political systems, employ mechanisms to regularize and systematize representation in the policy-making process. In predominantly democratic societies, individuals as well as organizations participate in policy formation; individuals can influence public policy making either as autonomous actors (that is, through the electoral system) or as members or leaders of organizations. In predominantly authoritarian societies, organizations are the primary political actors; the participation of individuals is largely limited to the influence they are able to exert through organizations.[1]

In the U.S.S.R., as in other authoritarian systems, the role of individuals (excluding the top Communist Party leadership) is very limited. Most students of Soviet politics concur that, to the degree that the top political elites share their authority in policy making at all, they share it with organizational participants. Although there is considerable agreement about the existence of organizational participation in the U.S.S.R., there is much less agreement on the degree to which organizational participants affect outcomes. An examination of how policies are made and implemented in the Soviet system inevitably becomes, explicitly or implicitly, a study of organizational participation (or lack thereof) in policy making. Those scholars who favor a bureaucratic-pluralist or corporatist model of the Soviet system tend to assign a relatively important role to organizational participation, casting the top Party leadership as political brokers who mediate between competing organizational interests.[2] By contrast, those who favor a "directed society" model of the U.S.S.R. place heavier emphasis on the ability of the top Party leadership to

* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

The author would like to thank Barbara Ann Chotiner, Timothy J. Colton, Fred W. Grupp, Jerry F. Hough, Peter Hauslohner, and Linda Lubrano for their helpful comments and assistance.

[1] Cyril E. Black and John P. Burke, "Organizational Participation and Public Policy," *World Politics* 35 (April 1983), 393-425.

[2] See, for example, Valerie Bunce and John M. Echols, III, "Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era: 'Pluralism' or 'Corporatism'," in Donald R. Kelley, ed., *Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era* (New York: Praeger, 1980), 1-26; and Jerry F. Hough, "The Brezhnev Era: The Man and the System," *Problems of Communism* 25 (March/April 1976), 1-17.

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impose decisions from above.[3] In both cases, the crucial element in the analysis is the extent to which the participation of bureaucratic entities in the formulation of public policy shapes policy outcomes.

The findings drawn from the Soviet case are of great interest to students of comparative politics. If the "directed society" models of Soviet decision making are correct, then a major generalization drawn from the study of Western politics—that postindustrial political systems are characterized by a high degree of organizational participation—is not applicable to a "mature socialist" system. If either the "bureaucratic pluralist" or the "corporatist" model is correct, then the Soviet pattern can be seen as more consistent with Western experience.

The study of Soviet decision making has been dominated by two types of inquiries: case studies and institutional analyses. Case studies generally involve a single issue (i.e., environmental policy, the reorganization of the Academy of Sciences, or Khrushchev's Virgin Lands program), which is examined from its entry onto the political agenda to the decision and implementation phase.[4] The major strength of this approach is that the discussion is embedded in the context of the ongoing situation; its major weakness is the inability to generalize to other issues. The valuable descriptive material included in case studies enhances understanding of the particular issue at the expense of generalization. Case studies of Soviet policy making have yet another shortcoming: they rarely explain *how* the decision was made. For example, Gustafson's exhaustive search of Soviet sources on the fight to save Lake Baikal provided dramatic evidence of the existence of public pressure in favor of environmental concerns, but uncovered little material on how this pressure affected decision making concerning the issue within the top Soviet policy-making forums.[5] We know *what* happened, but the available sources provide very little insight into *how* it happened.

In an alternate approach, the inquiry focuses on specific institutional

[3] See, for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: Viking Press, 1964), and Allen Kassof, "The Administered Society: Totalitarianism Without Terror," *World Politics* 16 (July 1964), 558-75. For a more recent defense of the totalitarian model, see William E. Odom, "A Dissenting View of the Group Approach to Soviet Politics," *World Politics* 28 (July 1976), 542-67.

[4] See, for example, Theodore H. Friedgut, "Interests and Groups in Soviet Policymaking: The MTS Reforms," *Soviet Studies* 28 (October 1976), 524-47; Donald R. Kelley, "Environmental Policymaking in the USSR: The Role of Industrial and Environmental Interest Groups," *Soviet Studies* 28 (October 1976), 570-89; Philip D. Stewart, "Soviet Interest Groups and the Policy Process," *World Politics* 22 (October 1969), 29-50; Richard Mills, "The Formation of the Virgin Lands Policy," *Slavic Review* 29 (March 1970), 58-69; and Donald D. Barry, "The Specialist in Soviet Policy-making: The Adoption of a Law," *Soviet Studies* 16 (October 1964), 152-65.

[5] Thane Gustafson, *Reform in Soviet Politics: Lessons of Recent Policies on Land and Water* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 40-46.

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entities. Perhaps the best example is Hough's pioneering study of the *oblast* Party committee's role in industrial decision making.[6] The primary strength of institutional studies is that they provide valuable material on the wide range of issues in which a single decision-making entity is involved. Their major weakness is that such studies, particularly those that focus on one institutional actor, frequently provide little insight into the relative importance of various organizational participants in the evolution of specific decisions.

Both the case study and the institutional approaches suggest that organizational participation is an important part of the policy process. Both provide some support to the hypothesis that the current Soviet political system, like its Western counterparts, is characterized by a high degree of organizational participation in public policy making. In this article, yet a third type of evidence is brought to bear on this issue. Unlike case studies (which tend to focus on *what* happened in a specific matter) or institutional studies (which tend to focus on *which* entities and officials are involved), the present approach focuses on *how* decisions are made. It inquires whether the designers of Soviet political institutions recognize the existence and legitimacy of organizational interests, and (if so), whether they have developed mechanisms to ensure that such interests are articulated in the processes of policy formation and implementation.

The answer to the first question is "yes." Soviet Party and governmental institutions are premised on the existence of conflicting organizational interests. Soviet constitutional and management theory is essentially a series of propositions on how these interests should be represented, and how the interaction of component agencies should be regularized and controlled. The Soviet administrative vocabulary includes the terms "interested organizations," "interested institutions," and "interested officials." The legal frameworks the Soviets have developed to institutionalize the interaction of "interested organizations" are based on the concept of representation: those entities that have an interest in the outcome of a decision should have the right to an official representative (*predstavitel*) in the decision-making forum.[7]

One of the most important of the institutional devices designed to

[6] Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decisionmaking* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).

[7] See, for example, G. V. Barabashev and K. F. Sheremet, *Sovetskoye stroitelstvo* [Soviet Development] (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1981), 335, and B. M. Lazarev, "Organizatsionnyye printsipy gosudartsvennogo upravleniya" [Organizational Principles of State Administration] in *Apparat upravleniya sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstva* [Administrative Apparatus of the Socialist Government] (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1976), Part 1, 152-71.

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facilitate organizational participation is the Soviet *kollegiya* or committee—a term that covers management and decision-making committees from the Politburo to ministry collegia to local Party bureaus. Almost every link in the Soviet hierarchy has its own collegial body.[8] These committees may be either advisory or decision-making bodies. Soviet legislatures at all levels (for example, Supreme Soviets at national and republic levels and *oblast* councils) have the formal status of collegial decision-making organizations; their primary role is to formalize decisions already made. The administrators who actually determine policy choices, however, are themselves organized into collective decision-making bodies: the Council of Ministers presidium, republic Council of Ministers presidia, and local government executive committees. Party bureaus, from Politburo to factory *partburo*, are also collective decision-making bodies.[9] The Soviet Defense Council, a key organization in the formulation of national security policy, is a collegial body too.[10]

Decision-making committees play an important role as mechanisms that link separate organizations. They have evolved in areas where there is significant overlap in the responsibilities of two or more agencies. These committees are of particular importance in facilitating the cooperation of institutional actors from the two separate hierarchies involved in the formation of public policy: the Party apparatus and the government system. In theory, the Communist Party hierarchy (the network of full-time Party officials) has the authority to formulate policy and to oversee its execution. The role of the much larger number of government officials is to ratify Party policy and to implement it. In practice, however, the boundaries between the Party and state hierarchies have become blurred. One mechanism that has contributed to this blurring of institutional boundary lines is the decision-making committee. Many such committees bring together representatives from both state

[8] "Kollegiya," *Sovetskiy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar* [Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary] (Moscow: Izdatelstvo "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," 1980), 608. See also V. D. Sorokin and Yu. Ye. Shmelev, "Kollegialnost i yedinonachaliye v rabote sovetskogo gosudarstvennogo apparata," [Collegiality and One-Man Command in the Work of the Soviet State Apparatus] in *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo* (No. 6, 1955), 8-16, and Yu. M. Kozlov and others, eds., *Gosudarstvennoye upravleniye i administrativnoye pravo* [State Administration and Administrative Law] (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1978), 172-74.

[9] "Kollektivnost partiynogo rukovodstva," *Kratkiy slovar-spravochnik agitatora i politinformatora* [Short Dictionary-Handbook for Agitators and Political Information Specialists] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1977), 30-31. See also P. A. Rodionov, *Kollektivnost-vysshiy printsip partiynogo rukovodstva* [Collectivity—the High Principle of Party Leadership] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974), 49, and N. Bondarenko, "Vysshiy printsip partiynogo rukovodstva," [High Principle of Party Leadership] *Kommunist Belorussii* (No. 9, 1982), 11-19.

[10] P. T. Vasilenkov, ed., *Sovetskoye administrativnoye pravo* [Soviet Administrative Law] (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1981), 375.

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and Party hierarchies and provide a forum in which organizational participants from both can meet and work out common problems.

Advisory committees represent a second type of collegial body. The executive agencies in the Soviet state administration (i.e., Soviet ministries and their major components) are not collegial organizations at all. They operate on the principle of one-man command (*yedinonachaliye*),[11] and each *yedinonachalnik* (one-man commander) has a committee to advise and assist him.[12] These advisory committees are intended to broaden participation in decision making within a single agency, and thus to guard against capricious decisions by the one-man commander. The roots of the advisory committees in modern Soviet ministries (the ministry collegia) may be traced to the tsarist ministry Councils—consultative bodies chaired by the minister and composed of deputy ministers and department chiefs.[13] The Bolshevik leadership experimented briefly with executive agencies organized on a "collegial" basis; when the administrative entities were placed on a basis of one-man command, ministry collegia were a counterpoise to the personal authority of the minister. By the early 1930s, the uneasy balance between the one-man commander and his advisory collegium had tipped decisively in favor of the collegium; in some ministries, it had preempted the administrative responsibilities of the minister. In 1934, ministry collegia were abolished, to be replaced by larger—and weaker—ministry councils.[14] This arrangement, too, had its drawbacks; ministers often made important decisions without consulting other top officials in their ministries. In 1938, the ministry collegium was resurrected, with several provisions to ensure that the minister would not be eclipsed by his collegium.[15] In the post-Stalin era, however, the role of the ministry collegium was

[11] G. V. Atamanchuk, *Sushchnost sovetskogo gosudarstvennogo upravleniya* [The Essence of Soviet State Administration] (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1980), 198-200.

[12] See, for example, the legal charter for ministries, "Obshcheye polozheniye o ministerstvakh SSSR," July 10, 1967, in *Resheniya partii i pravitelstva po khozyaystvennym voprosam* [Decisions of the Party and Government on Economic Questions] (*1917-1967 g*) Vol. II (Moscow: Politizdat, 1968), 494-517. The relevant portions of the statute are Numbers 13-18.

[13] *Svod zakonov Rossiyskoy Imperii* [Code of Laws of the Russian Empire] (St. Petersburg, 1912), Vol. I, Part 2, Book 5. See also N. M. Korkunov, *Russkoye gosudarstvennoye pravo* [Russian State Law] Vol. II (St. Petersburg, 1913), 384-405.

[14] I. N. Ananov, *Ministerstva v SSSR* [Ministries in the USSR] (Moscow: Gosyurizdat, 1960), 154-61.

[15] "Postanovleniye sovnarkhoma i TsK VKP(b) ob obrazovanii kollegiy pri narkhomatakh SSSR" [Resolution of the USSR Council of Peoples' Commissars and Central Committee of the Bolshevik Communist Party on the Formation of Collegiums Attached to Peoples' Commissariats] March 13, 1938, in *Direktivy KPSS i Sovetskogo pravitelstva po khozyaystvennym voprosam. Sbornik dokumentov* [Directives of the CPSU and Soviet Government on Economic Questions. Collection of Documents] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1957), 531-32.

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strengthened as Stalin's successors moved to reinvigorate "collegiality" at all levels of the Party and state hierarchies.[16]

Most permanent Soviet committees have an official status and mission. The role of governmental committees is defined in law, legal resolution, and administrative regulation. Collegial bodies in the Party hierarchy are governed by Party rules. To ensure that decision makers work through and with their committees, the legal status and role of collegial bodies are defined by higher organizations; except for the Politburo, collegial bodies do not define their own mission and operations. Committee procedures are deliberately designed to routinize and systematize the interaction of organizational representatives. They reflect the high value that is placed on organizational participation in Soviet public policy formation.

How closely does the reality of the Soviet decision-making process correspond to the ideal of committee policy making expressed in Soviet legal and Party theory? Discussions with former participants in the Soviet policy process indicate that decision making by committee is indeed, as Soviet administrative lawyers assert, an important part of the U.S.S.R.'s political culture. Both emigrés and Soviet management specialists agree, however, that the reality of committee decision making often falls far short of the ideal. In practice, decision-making participants have developed a series of informal procedures designed to evade or manipulate committee rules.

The present examination of committee decision making surveys both formal collegial procedures and informal committee practices. It draws heavily on Soviet sources (the public administration, administrative law, and Party literatures) as well as on insights derived from Soviet and East European emigrés. The material presented is designed to highlight characteristics shared by most committees and to isolate those that distinguish decision-making from advisory committees. Many of the examples are drawn from three types of collegial organizations—local government executive committees (decision-making); Party bureaus, such as the Politburo (also decision-making); and ministry collegia (advisory organs by formal statute). The characteristics examined include membership; the process of agenda building; and procedures to build consensus, encourage compromise, and handle dissent. The goal of this survey is to assess the extent to which legal arrangements designed to facilitate access by organizational representatives have worked in practice

[16] I. L. Davitnidze, *Kolleggii ministerstv* [Ministry Collegiums] (Moscow: Yuridlit, 1972), 52-54.

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in enhancing the role of organizational participation in public policy making along lines analogous to those observed in nonsocialist political systems.

Membership

Provisions governing membership in working committees reflect an inherent tension: the need to maximize participation without sacrificing the efficiency afforded by a small group. Working collegial bodies generally consist of seven to fifteen members. Historical data suggest that those that are appreciably larger tend to become unworkable; small subgroups of core committee members begin meeting as a bureau (or presidium) of the larger committee, which gradually atrophies as a real decision-making body. In the first years after the revolution, for example, both the Central Committee and the Council of Peoples' Commissars (the predecessor of the Council of Ministers) were relatively small committees that met frequently and enjoyed real decision-making authority. Both committees, however, were gradually expanded; the frequency of meetings was reduced; and effective decision-making authority was eventually appropriated by subcommittees.[17]

Working committees (both decision-making and advisory) usually include official representatives from all "interested" agencies. Decision-making committees, however, are generally composed of a broader mix of organizational representatives. Decision-making committees within the Party hierarchy (Party bureaus) represent a series of institutional links between the CPSU and the government hierarchies, as well as between agencies at different levels in the territorial hierarchy. This objective is reflected in their membership. The Politburo, for example, consists of a mixture of Party functionaries and top state officials. Four of the eleven current Politburo members are full-time Party bureaucrats at the national level of the Party apparatus. Three are provincial Party officials. The remaining four members have full-time posts in the state hierarchy: the chair and deputy chair of the Council of Ministers (the government's top administrative body), the Minister of Defense, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The pattern of institutional representation on the Politburo is not fixed. Gromyko, for example, became Foreign Minister in 1957, but achieved Politburo status only in 1973. Membership

[17] On the role of the Central Committee, see John Löwenhardt, *The Soviet Politburo* (Edinburgh, Scotland: Canongate, 1982), 9-50; Rodionov (fn. 9), 68-133. On the Council of People's Commissars, see *Predsedatel sovnarkhoma i soveta oborony. Ocherki gosudarstvennoy deyatelnosti v iyule 1918-marte 1920 g* [Chairman of the Sovnarkhom and Defense Council. Sketches of State Activities from July 1918 to March 1920] (Leningrad: Nauka, 1980).

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on the Politburo, like that on other Soviet decision-making committees, is a function of both institutional position and personal political power.

Like their Party counterparts, governmental decision-making committees are designed to bridge the gap between the hierarchy of full-time Party agencies that establishes policy and the much larger bureaucracy of state officials that implements it. Consequently, governmental decision-making committees also include representatives from both the Party and government agencies. At the local level, the relevant governmental decision-making collegium is the *ispolkom*, or executive committee. At the *oblast* level, the executive committee (*oblispolkom*) consists of about twelve to fifteen members who meet once a week or so to conduct local government business.[18] Its Party analogue is the *oblast* Party committee bureau (the *obkom* bureau). Both of these local decision-making collegia represent a mix of full-time local government workers, key party officials, and economic managers in the area. The membership of the local governmental executive committee overlaps with that of the *oblast* Party bureau. The Party First Secretary, plus one or more additional members of the Party bureau, are members of the executive committee of the local government; conversely, the chairman, and usually the deputy chairman of the executive committee, will be members of the corresponding Party bureau.[19]

Advisory committees fulfill a somewhat different function—namely, to force the "one-man commander" to consult with other top officials in his agency. This function is reflected in the committee membership, which generally consists of twelve to fifteen key agency officials. Ministry collegia, for example, are chaired by the minister, and include deputy ministers and other "leading personnel" from ministry headquarters.[20] Advisory committees, like their decision-making counterparts, also provide an institutional link between different levels in the territorial structure—national and republic. Representatives from ministry agencies at

[18] Otdel po voprosam raboty sovetov prezidiuma verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, *Itogi i sostav deputatov trudyashchsya RSFSR 1973 g* [Results and Composition of Workers Deputies of RSFSR in 1973] (Moscow: Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1973), 212-13, 226-27.

[19] B. A. Gryaznov and N. N. Vinogradov, *Partiynaya organizatsiya stolitsy i sovety* [The Party Organization of the Capital and the Soviets] (Moscow: Moskovskiy Rabochiy, 1974), 91-92; I. M. Orlov, *Partinoye rukovodstvo mestnymi sovetami* [Party Direction of Local Soviets] (Moscow: "Vysshaya Shkola," 1982), 123; Hough (fn. 6), 333; William Taubman, *Governing Soviet Cities: Bureaucratic Politics and Urban Development in the USSR* (New York: Praeger, 1973), 49-51; Joel C. Moses, *Regional Party Leadership and Policymaking in the USSR* (New York: Praeger, 1974), 160-67; David Cattell, *Leningrad: A Case Study of Soviet Urban Government* (New York: Praeger, 1968), 38-40.

[20] "Obshcheye polozheniye . . . " (fn 12), article 15. Individual ministry charters generally follow this pattern. See, for example, "Polozheniye o ministerstve khimicheskoy promyshlennosti," February 10, 1976, *Sobraniye postanovleniy pravitelstva SSSR* [Collection of Resolutions of the USSR Government] (No. 6, 1976), 130-35.

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different territorial levels are members of the collegium. National-level collegia of union republic ministries frequently include the minister of one or more of their republic-level counterparts; for example, the R.S.F.S.R. and Ukrainian Ministers of Culture are members of the collegium of the national-level Ministry of Culture.[21]

Unlike members of decision-making committees, members of advisory committees are usually part of the organization itself—that is, full-time officials subordinate to the minister. An exception occurs in the case of ministries whose mission overlaps substantially with that of a closely related agency. The Ministry of Health collegium, for example, includes high-level management representation from the Ministry of Medical Industry, as well as the chairman of the medical workers' trade union;[22] the collegium of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Education includes the president of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences;[23] and the collegium of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Culture includes a representative from the Union of Writers, Artists, and Composers. Participation by these "non-ministerial" representatives is intended to enlarge specialists' participation in decision making, to broaden the occupational base of the ministry's leadership, and to serve as a counterweight to the in-house ministry officials on the collegium.[24]

Most members of ministry collegia, however, work directly for the minister, which suggests a more restricted role in the decision process for advisory committees. To make sure that ministry collegia do not degenerate to mere staff meetings, Soviet legal procedures governing these bodies include several mechanisms intended to strengthen the collegium. For example, the membership must be approved by the Council of Ministers (implying review by the Politburo); the minister cannot simply pack the collegium with individuals he knows to be amenable to his desires. In fact, the Council of Ministers has on occasion refused to approve the nominees presented by a minister, striking out some

[21] On representation of republic ministries in national-level ministerial collegia, see Davitnidze (fn. 16), 65-70.

[22] "Polozheniye o ministerstve zdravookhraneniye," July 17, 1968, *Sobraniye postanovleniye pravitelstva SSSR* (No. 14, 1968), 350-57; "Polozheniye o ministerstve meditsinskoy promyshlennosti," *ibid.* (No. 12, 1968), 282-88. See also P. I. Kal'yu, *Nekotoryye voprosy teorii i praktiki upravleniya zdravookhraneniyem* [Some Questions of the Theory and Practice of Health Administration] (Moscow: Meditsina, 1969), 121.

[23] "Polozheniye o ministerstve prosveshcheniya SSSR," *Sobraniye postanovleniye pravitelstva SSSR* (No. 2, 1969), 55-62.

[24] A. Ye. Lunev. "Sovershenstvovat pravovy status i koordinatsiyu deyatelnosti ministerstv" [Improve the Legal Status and Coordination of Activity of Ministries] *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo* (No. 1, 1966), 8-16; Lunev, "O dalneyshem razvitii demokratii v sovetskom gosudarstvennom upravlenii" [On Further Development of Democracy in Soviet State Administration], *ibid.* (No. 7, 1962), 25-34; Davitnidze (fn. 16), 67-70.

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individuals on the list and substituting others, regardless of his wishes.[25] In practice, these provisions have worked to expand the autonomy of some ministry collegia well beyond that implied by the legal norms governing their operations. In some cases, at least, advisory committees have evolved in the direction of decision-making bodies.[26] Former participants in the Soviet decision-making process agree that, in most cases, ministry collegia are a focal point for decision-making within ministries.

Agenda Building

Both advisory and decision-making collegia tend to have explicit rules governing agenda building, which reflect key aspects of Soviet management style. First, a high value is placed on broad participation in developing an organizational agenda. Many of the rules are designed to facilitate access to the agenda by both lower-level organizations and citizens. In practice, these procedures have allowed component organizations at all levels, as well as citizens and community groups at the local government level, to present specific, and sometimes very parochial, demands for services and other government resources. Ease of access is a strength in that it facilitates interest articulation; it is also a problem in that the demands far exceed the resources available. A second and more clearly negative consequence is that sub-elites at all levels attempt to avoid responsibility for decisions that fall within their authority—by bucking them upward. This custom is part of a larger propensity of many Soviet bureaucrats to refer issues for resolution several levels higher than is necessary from the legal standpoint or desirable from the standpoint of managerial efficiency. To keep both of these problems within manageable limits, Soviet agenda-building procedures contain a series of checks to filter out nominations for the agenda. They generally call for preliminary coordination of agenda items with all "interested" organizational parties. In practice, therefore, many proposals that impinge too heavily on too many organizational interests never make it onto the formal agenda.

A second goal of the collegial procedures is to maintain the leadership's focus on policy matters. The ideal decision-making process, as depicted

[25] *Ibid.*, 61-62.

[26] Yu. M. Kozlov, ed., *Pravovoye polozheniye ministerstv SSSR* [Legal Status of USSR Ministries] (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1971), 47. On this point, see also Davitnidze (fn. 16), 59; V. N. Yershov, "K voprosu o pravovom regulirovanii deyatelnosti ministerstv" [To the Question of Legal Regulation of Ministry Activity] *Sovestskoye gosudarstvo i pravo* (No. 3, 1967), 13-22; Yu. M. Kozlov, "Sootnosheniye kollegialnosti i yedinonachaliya v sovetskom gosudarstvennom upravlenii na sovremennom etape" [Correlation of Collegiality and One-Man Command in Soviet State Administration at the Present Stage], *ibid.* (No. 2, 1964), 24-34.

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in Soviet literature, is one that begins with a consideration of broad goals and priorities, than proceeds to discussions of overall strategies to implement these goals, and finally to the formulation of specific tactics to implement the strategies agreed upon.[27] In practice, however, decision making falls far short of the ideal. Soviet decision makers and managers at all levels routinely engage in micromanagement, neglecting overall goals and strategies, and lavishing unnecessary attention on bureaucratic detail. This is due partly to the reluctance of subordinates to take responsibility for their own actions, and partly to a tendency—apparently widespread among Soviet policy makers and managers—to avoid the larger issues in favor of the specific ones. The formal rules governing committee agenda-building are aimed at counteracting this tendency and refocusing managerial attention on larger policy issues.

Soviet agenda-building procedures are intended to maximize both values: to encourage broad participation (while maintaining ultimate control of the organizational agenda) and to maintain the leadership's focus on broad policy issues. Agenda building in advisory committees such as ministry collegia and in decision-making committees such as the Politburo begins with the formulation of a monthly and quarterly (or yearly) meeting plan. The function of this plan is to help the committee identify the most important issues facing the organization or (in the case of local committees) the *oblast* or city. For all committees except the Politburo, agenda items are generated either by directives from above or by proposals from below. For committees at all levels, participation in agenda building tends to be deliberately broad; there are usually procedures to allow working-level officials to nominate items for consideration. For example, ministry collegia generally work according to a quarterly or monthly meeting plan.[28] The core items on the agenda are those generated by orders from the Council of Ministers or the Central Committee, plus those that come up for review on a regular basis, such as annual plans. The balance of the meeting plan consists of issues generated by the ministry's component organizations. These organizations nominate items they would like to see included in the next

[27] On principles governing economic planning in socialist systems, see M. Z. Bor and G. V. Lukina, eds., *Planirovaniye narodnogo khozyaystvo SSSR* [Planning the USSR State Economy] (Moscow: Vysshaya Shkola, 1980), 5-34. On planning by administrative agencies, see I. A. Azovkin, "Politicheskiye printsipy gosudarstvennogo upravleniya" [Political Principles of State Administration] *Apparat upravleniya sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstva* [Administrative Apparatus of the Socialist Government], Part 1 (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1976), 109-52, and R. Venkh and Sh. Yelovitskiy, "Planirovaniye raboty v organe gosudarstvennogo upravleniya" [Planning Work in State Administrative Agencies], *ibid.*, Part 2 (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1977), 273-84.

[28] On rules governing Politburo agendas, see Löwenhardt (fn. 17), 90-95. The discussion of agenda building in ministry collegia is based primarily on Davitnidze (fn. 16), 122-28.

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quarterly meeting. The minister, other collegium members, and the managers of subordinate enterprises also propose items for the agenda. Citizens' proposals and press coverage of ministry performance can generate additional agenda items. In the case of a union republic ministry, the ministry's republic-level counterparts can submit proposals for agenda items. The circle of participants at this stage of agenda building is thus very broad.

Local government executive committees have adopted analogous procedures in an effort to broaden participation in the agenda-building process.[29] As in the case of ministry collegia, time must be set aside to discuss issues mandated from above—by the republic's Council of Ministers or by the executive committee's Party analogue. Other issues come up regularly on a five-year or annual basis, such as review of draft economic plans for the area.[30] The balance of the agenda is initiated by "interested" officials and citizens within the executive committee's region of jurisdiction. In executive committee agenda-building, participation by officials outside the government apparatus tends to be much broader than in ministry collegia. In addition to items forwarded by members of the executive committee and managers of local government directorates and departments, agenda items are submitted by the local government council's standing commissions, individual deputies, chairmen of lower-level executive committees, and managers of local industrial plants.

Soviet administrative specialists bestow their warmest approval on those local governments that encourage participation in agenda setting by local government council deputies.[31] An example is the group of

[29] Material on agenda building in local government executive committees is available in I. F. Butko and others, *Ispolnitelnyy komitet mestnogo soveta narodnykh deputatov (Problemy sovershenstvovaniya organizatsii deyatelnosti)* [Local Council Executive Committee] (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1980), 222-24, 284-91; M. T. Baymakhanov and others, *Gosudarstvenno-pravovoy status oblastnykh sovetov Kazakhskoy SSR* [State-Legal Status of Oblast Councils in Kazakhstan] (Alma Ata: Izdatelstvo 'Nauka' Kazakhskoy SSR, 1976), 319-31; S. M. Popova, *Organizatsiya raboty v ispolkomakh mestnykh sovetov* [Organization of Work in Local Government Executive Committees] (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1976), 72-84; M. A. Nagornaya, *Planirovaniye raboty mestnykh sovetov* [Planning Work of Local Councils] (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1977), 20-21, 26-27; N. G. Tkachenko, *Ispolnitelnyy komitet rayonnogo, gorodskogo soveta* [The Executive Committee of the Rayon and City Council] (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1973), 30-43; N. N. Demochkin, *Vlast naroda. Formirovaniye, sostav i deyatelnost sovetov v usloviyakh razvitogo sotsializma* [Power of the People. The Formation, Composition and Activity of Councils under Conditions of Developed Socialism] (Moscow: Mysl, 1979), 234-35; and N. G. Starovoytov, *Reglament soveta i yego ispolkoma* [Regulations of the Council and Its Executive Committee] (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1982), 49-61.

[30] O. Ye. Kutafin, *Mestnyye sovety i narodno-khozyaystvennoye planirovaniye* [Local Councils and Economic Planning] (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1976), 92-116.

[31] D. Ya. Bykovskiy, *Organizatsiya raboty ispolkomov mestnykh sovetov* [Organization of Work in Local Council Executive Committees] (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1968), 5-14.

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citizens of Ivanovo *Oblast* who petitioned a deputy from the *oblast* council to help them alleviate a problem with community services in their area by intervening with enterprises that had failed to provide these needed services: the deputy, in turn, submitted the problem as an agenda item on the executive committee meeting plan. In the lower-level executive committees—that is, at the village and settlement levels—the approved practice is to garner agenda items at meetings of executive committee members and citizens.

Although it is difficult to determine how widespread these procedures are, there is reason to suspect that local executive committees are more open to organizational participation in agenda building than to citizen or deputy participation. Open access for citizens to executive committee agendas would clearly mean a proliferation of endless requests for improved services, transportation, and housing. In view of the limits on local governmental resources and political power, such appeals are almost certainly to be taken less seriously than agenda items proposed by organizational management.

Both decision-making and advisory committees need mechanisms to sort out proposed items solicited in the initial stage of agenda building. The procedures for final control of the agenda vary from organization to organization. In most committees, an agenda item nominated by a lower-level official must be reviewed and approved by the appropriate executive committee deputy or, in the case of a ministry, the deputy minister. Items that pass this review are generally compiled into a draft agenda by the committee staff. In some committees, the draft agenda is approved by the committee itself; in others, the committee chairman alone reviews and approves the draft. In practice, these procedures allocate a great deal of power to the full-time bureaucrats involved in reviewing agenda proposals; these individuals function as gatekeepers, allowing some agenda proposals to make it to the committee agenda and excluding others.

The formulation of a quarterly plan for the ministry collegia provides a case in point.[32] Nominated agenda items are reviewed by the deputy minister in whose "portfolio" they fall (generally after close consultation with his opposite number at the Party's Central Committee Secretariat). Items approved by these officials are then compiled into a draft meeting plan by the collegium secretariat. This plan generally includes a notation of the agency and official responsible for preparing the report and draft decision, plus the time allotted for preparation of backup materials and for discussions at the collegium meeting. It is circulated to collegium

[32] This description of the formulation of meeting plans in ministry collegia is based on Davitnidze (fn. 16), 122-28.

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members, chiefs of lower-level directorates, and the ministry's Party Central Committee monitors. Some union republic ministries, such as the Ministry of Light Industry, circulate the draft plan to their counterpart ministries at the republic level. Finally, it is approved by either the collegium itself or the minister.

The quarterly or monthly meeting plan provides the basis for individual meeting agendas, which are drafted by the collegium secretary. Each agenda item usually calls for a draft decision to be prepared before the meeting; it is generally written by the department or directorate staff that will be most closely involved in the implementation of the decision. The agenda package (including the draft decision) must then be coordinated and approved by all interested parties—the organizations and officials that will be affected by the decision. This procedure—the ubiquitous *vizirovaniye* (literally, getting of signatures)—is designed both to elicit information and to build consensus. After the interested officials have signed the draft, it is reviewed by the deputy minister who handles the issue area involved. A typical package contains a five-to-six-page background report on the issue, a draft ministry order signed by the chiefs of the ministry directorates and departments affected by the decision, plus a list of the resources involved in implementing the decision.

Many local executive committees have adopted similar procedures.[33] Back-up materials, including draft decisions signed by the executive committee deputy chairman handling the relevant portfolio, are prepared by the secretariat and circulated to committee members three to five days prior to the meeting. Thus, the agenda package and draft decision is reviewed by the regional Party leadership as well, since the Party First Secretary and several other regional secretaries are generally committee members.[34] Draft decisions must not exceed four to five pages in length; back-up materials must not exceed four pages. The rules on back-up materials and the limitations on length are designed to provide those

[33] Baymakhanov (fn. 29), 323-24. See also "Reglament raboty apparata ispolnitelnogo komiteta moskovskogo oblastnogo soveta deputatov trudyashchikhsya," March 3, 1977, in *Sovety naraodnykh deputatov. Status. Kompetentsiya. Organizatsiya deyatelnosti* [Councils of Peoples' Deputies. Status. Competence. Organization of Activity] (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1980), 265-76.

[34] On review of executive committee agenda plans by the regional Party apparatus, see A. V. Dmitriyev, *Sekretar ispolkoma rayonnogo, gorodskogo soveta* [Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Rayon or City Council] (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1976), 24-26; V. Paputin, "Partiynoye rukovodstvo sovetami" [Party Direction of Soviets] in *Sovershenstvovat rabotu sovetov deputatov trudyashchikhsya* [Improve Work of Councils of Workers' Deputies] (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1970), 202-18; G. V. Barabashev, ed., *Ispolnitelnyy komitet mestnogo Soveta narodnikh deputatov: Pravovoye polozheniye. Osnovy organizatsii i deyatelnosti* [The Executive Committee of the Local Council] (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1983), 70-71; and Gryaznov and Vinogradov (fn. 19), 104-05.

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committee members not personally involved in the formulation of the decision with enough knowledge to make an informed choice at the meeting, while at the same time not overburdening them with more detail than necessary.

How well do these methods work in setting priorities? An examination of the issues that progress through the series of filtration procedures to become discussion items indicates that they have not been successful in avoiding an overload. The agendas of Soviet committees at all levels tend to be crowded with a large number of relatively trivial items. Two Soviet public administration specialists who analyzed local government committee agendas and meeting notes estimated that about half of the items on executive committee agendas at *oblast*, city, and *rayon* levels were minor administrative matters that should never have gotten on the agenda in the first place.[35] For example, about 20 percent of the issues facing one city executive committee involved approving the decisions of the state acceptance commissions, which pass judgment on whether a new apartment building or sewage system is ready to go into operation. Lengthy, heated debates between the management of construction agencies, their customers, safety inspectors, and other "interested" parties—debates that should have taken place within the acceptance commission—are transferred to the committee meeting room.[36] In addition, all sorts of individual issues—name changes, permission for those who are not members of a collective farm to keep a horse, the assignment of individual children to preschool facilities, the naming of guardians—are placed on the executive committee docket.

These problems are not unique to lower-level decision-making committees. Advisory committees also suffer from overload. The ideal agenda for a typical ministry collegium meeting consists of four or five major discussion items. In practice, many such meetings involve a dozen or more major items, too many to be dealt with effectively in a three- or four-hour meeting. A review of the operations of collegia in several ministries, together with the published results of studies by Soviet administrative specialists, reveals that the range of issues discussed at ministry collegium meetings covers almost every aspect of ministry business:

[35] V. A. Pertsik and A. I. Kazannik, "O povyshenii effektivnosti deyatelnosti ispolkomov mestnykh sovetov" [On Improving the Effectiveness of the Executive Committee of Local Councils], in *Voprosy sovetskogo gosudarstvovedeniya. Trudy*. [Questions of Soviet State Government. Works.] Vol. LXXI, Legal Series, No. 10 (Irkutsk: Irkutskiy gosudarstvennyy universiteta imeni A. A. Zhdanova, 1970), 14-22.

[36] The controversy generated by acceptance of commission decisions is a commonplace in Soviet administrative literature. See, for example, *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* (No. 6, 1982), 24.

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planning, R & D, interministry projects, administrative procedures and structure, personnel choice, and personnel policies.[37] For example, over half of the 253 issues discussed in 1966 at collegium meetings of the Ministry of Heavy, Energy, and Transport Machine Building concerned drafts of one-year and long-term plans, or plan fulfillment. Another 13 percent were on R & D matters, such as review of activities of research institutes and design bureaus. As in the case of local government executive committees, the chief problem for ministry collegia meetings appears to be the inclusion of too many trivial items, rather than the exclusion of important items. (At a collegium meeting of the above ministry, for instance, one of the discussion items was the provision of temporary quarters for ministry officials whose offices were undergoing repairs.) The proliferation of agenda items covering decisions that could and should have been made by individual officials at much lower levels decreases the effectiveness of committee deliberations.

The problem of bureaucratic overload appears to be endemic to nearly all committees in the U.S.S.R. Both the republic and national-level Councils of Ministers suffer from an overabundance of minor items that clog up the agenda and make it difficult to engage in meaningful discussion of the major issues.[38] In 1955, a Council of Ministers' resolution on organizational work in the Council criticized "the practice of introducing into the USSR Council of Ministers a huge number of decisions, many of which involve matters that should have been settled directly by the ministries and officials themselves."[39] The problem of an overloaded agenda is particularly acute for the Politburo. The published accounts of Politburo meetings (which began to appear soon after Brezhnev's death) indicate that from one to five major issues are addressed at each meeting. Many of the reports, however, reveal that an unspecified number of other matters were also covered; and historical data on

[37] The most comprehensive data on the subjects covered at ministry collegium meetings are provided in Davitnidze (fn. 16), 72-111. For specifics on the breakdown of items on the Ministry of Heavy, Energy, and Transport Machine Building, see pp. 86, 94, 102, 106, and 110. On issues covered by the Turkmenistan Ministry of Agriculture Collegium, see M. Tyllayev, "Organizatsiya raboty ministerstva selskogo khozyaystva soyuznoy respubliki" [Organization of Work of a Republic Ministry of Agriculture] *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta (Pravo)* (No. 4, 1975), 62-68.

[38] Davitnidze (fn. 16), 22-24. See also M. S. Smirtyukov, *Sovetskiy gosudarstvennyy apparat upravleniya* [Soviet State Administrative Apparatus] (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1982), 171-82.

[39] "Ob organizatsii raboty v sovete ministrov SSSR," USSR Council of Ministers' resolution, May 4, 1955, excerpted in *Svod zakonov* [Code of Laws], Vol. I, 643-46 (author's translation). See also "Ob organizatsii raboty v sovete ministrov kazakhskoy SSR," June 4, 1955, excerpted in *Spravochnik sovetskogo rabotnika* [Handbook of the Government Worker] (Alma Ata: Kazakhskoye Gosudarstvennoye Izdatelstvo, 1962), 14-17.

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Politburo operations reveal that many meetings covered more than a dozen items.[40]

Bureaucratic overload in committee decision making thus is the unintended result of agenda procedures designed to maximize organizational access to committee agendas. Lower-level officials routinely exploit opportunities to nominate agenda items by crowding the committee docket with decisions that they themselves are responsible for making. Eliciting the approval of a higher-level committee is a convenient way of diluting individual responsibility. Although many of these relatively trivial issues are dealt with in a quick and perfunctory way at the committee meeting itself, the effect of the overload is to decrease the efficiency of the committee's deliberations. Gatekeepers of Soviet committee agendas have been singularly unsuccessful in filtering out such bureaucratic minutiae.

Managing Dissent and Building Consensus

Procedures for excluding potentially controversial items from committee agendas have been considerably more effective. As noted above, once an agenda item has been approved, the draft decision associated with it must be coordinated and signed by the "interested" organizations before it is tabled at the committee. In ministry collegia, if the draft decision encounters significant opposition that was not resolved during the pre-meeting coordination process, the dissenting organization may append an official disagreement to the draft. This dissenting opinion becomes part of the back-up material that is circulated to collegium members. Executive committees of local governments apparently have similar procedures.[41] These practices, which are designed to build consensus during policy formulation, isolate and structure organizational conflict that arises before a final decision or recommendation is made.

[40] *Krasnaya zvezda*, December 11, 1982, p. 1; *Pravda*, December 17, 1982, p. 1; January 1, 1983, p. 1; January 15, 1983, p. 1; January 21, 1983, p. 1; January 29, 1983, p. 1; February 4, 1983, p. 1; February 13, 1983, p. 1; February 18, 1983, p. 1; February 25, 1983; p. 1; March 4, 1983, p. 1; March 11, 1983, p. 1; March 25, 1983, p. 1; April 2, 1983, p. 1; April 9, 1983, p. 1; April 15, 1983, p. 1; April 22, 1983, p. 1; April 30, 1983, p. 1; May 14, 1983, p. 1; May 20, 1983, p. 1; May 27, 1983, p. 1; June 11, 1983, p. 1; June 25, 1983, p. 1; July 1, 1983, p. 1; July 9, 1983, p. 1; July 16, 1983, p. 1; July 30, 1983, p. 1; August 6, 1983, p. 1; August 13, 1983, p. 1; August 20, 1983, p. 1; August 27, 1983, p. 1; September 3, 1983, p. 1. Historical material on Politburo operations is drawn from Löwenhardt (fn. 17), 93-95.

[41] See, for example, "O poryadke podgotovki proyektov, resheniy i rasporyazheniy ispolkoma mossoveta," October 19, 1964, *Byulleten ispolnitelnogo komiteta moskovskogo gorodskogo soveta deputatov trudyashchikhsya* (No. 21, 1964), 8-10, and V. A. Shekhovtsov, "Sovershenstvovaniye podgotovki zasedaniy ispolnitelnykh komitetov krayevykh, oblastnykh sovetov" [Improvement of Meeting Preparation of Executive Committees in Krays and Oblasts], *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta*, Series 11 (Pravo) (No. 5, 1982), 63-69.

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Former participants in Soviet and East European decision making have indicated that a great many organizational conflicts are settled in the informal bargaining process during this stage of pre-meeting coordination; only the differences that cannot be resolved at this level surface at committee meetings.[42] Many of the minor items are decided without discussion by inquiring whether any committee members object to the draft decision as prepared by a staff member from the relevant lower-level agency. Only the most important or controversial items are accorded real attention at committee meetings. Indeed, Soviet collegial procedures are formulated precisely for this purpose: to eliminate organizational disagreements that are best worked out by the participants themselves.

Another mechanism for limiting the number of disagreements actually aired before the committee is based on the widespread Soviet reliance on subcommittees and *ad hoc* commissions to iron out differences before the draft decision comes up for consideration by the committee itself. A favored strategy of the Brezhnev Politburo for dealing with matters on which no consensus could be reached was the formation of a small subcommittee to resolve the issue.[43] Ministry collegia also employ *ad hoc* subcommittees and commissions to work out problems before they are aired at collegium meetings.

A case in point is the reorganization of the Ministry of Electrotechnical Industry into production associations.[44] The reorganization was designed to increase industrial efficiency by merging related enterprises under one administrative umbrella (the production association) which would serve as an intermediate link between enterprise and ministry headquarters. The process of determining how enterprises within the ministry should be merged was, like most Soviet management decisions, an iterative process in which key organizational actors affected by the change were closely involved in the formulation of options. In line with the general Soviet practice of forming *ad hoc* subcommittees to channel much

[42] See, for example, the description of Czech and Soviet defense decision making in Jan Sejna (with Joseph Douglas), "Czech and Soviet Decision Process," unpub. (Arlington, VA, September 1, 1980).

[43] L. I. Brezhnev, "Otchet tsentalnogo komiteta KPSS XXVI s'yezdu kommunisticheskoy partii sovetskogo soyuza" [Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress] in *XXVI S'yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. Stenograficheskiy otchet* [26th CPSU Congress. Stenographic Record], Vol. I (Moscow: Politizdat, 1981), 20-99. Brezhnev's remarks on Politburo operations are on page 88. See also Theodore Shabad, "Brezhnev, Who Ought to Know, Explains Politburo," *New York Times*, June 15, 1973, p. 3.

[44] N. V. Likhova, "Organizatsiya rabot po sozdaniyu obyedineniy v otrasli," [Organization of Work for Creation of Associations in a Branch] in *Organizatsiya upravleniya* [Organization of Administration] (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1973), 107-16.

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of the dissent and the details of decision making out of the main collegial forum, the ministry collegium formed a series of special commissions and subcommittees to work out the particulars of the merger proposals. This approach was deliberately designed to minimize the amount of conflict that surfaced in the ministry collegium itself. The hierarchy of collegial bodies served as a series of filters channeling the more easily managed organizational disagreements to lower-level subcommittees.

Soviet committees also use subcommittees to settle organizational disagreements that surface during committee meetings. Such subcommittees, which generally consist of the warring parties in the dispute, are expected to come to an agreement mutually acceptable to all organizations involved. This practice tends to encourage compromise because the disagreeing officials are generally under some pressure—quite frequently explicit pressure from the committee chair—to iron out their problems in the subcommittee.

Procedures of this type are reflective of Soviet management strategies for handling dissent. They might be interpreted as operating to emasculate committee decision making by chanelling dissent into other forums, leaving the committee itself as a rubber-stamp body. This interpretation is in error. First, the procedures for channeling dissent are deliberate; they are designed to focus the committee's attention on a small number of important issues concerning which the "interested" parties truly cannot resolve the differences among themselves. This technique is by no means unique to the Soviet administrative system. Second, there is evidence to suggest that procedures in theory designed to minimize the scope of dissent raised in committee meetings don't always work well in practice. The 1955 resolution on Council of Ministers activity, which is still in effect today, included a complaint that ministries and office chiefs were routinely introducing draft decisions without first obtaining the coordination of other affected ministries, and that *oblast* and local governments were bypassing their republic governments to bring issues directly to the national-level Council of Ministers. In consequence, the Council itself was frequently the forum for organizational disagreements that could have been worked out between the interested parties themselves.[45]

The situation had not improved by the early 1980s. M.S. Smirtyukov, the chief of the Council of Ministers' Business Office, complained of the same problem; he noted that frequently the *ad hoc* committees of organizational representatives, formed to draft decisions for presentation

[45] See "Ob organizatsii . . ." (fn. 39).

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to the Council Presidium, did not even meet. Often, the chairman simply collected signatures on a hastily prepared draft that papered over areas of institutional disagreement, which were raised later (and at great length) in the presidium meeting itself.[46] These considerations suggest that committee meetings may sometimes be quite lively—far livelier, in fact, than is desirable for efficient and timely decision making.

Procedures followed during committee meetings themselves (the Soviet version of *Robert's Rules of Order*) also reflect the Soviet propensity for participatory bureaucracy. In both advisory and decision-making committees, the meeting is usually opened with approval of the agenda.[47] Each agenda item is then considered in turn. Frequently, the item will involve a formal report, often by a non-member who has been invited to attend for that purpose. At a "routine" Politburo meeting in early March 1983, for example, reports on agricultural developments were presented by deputy premier Nuriyev (chairman of the Agro-industrial Commission), the chairman of a state committee for agricultural equipment, and eight ministers.[48] Historical material on Politburo operations indicates that in many cases the invited experts were allowed in the meeting room only to make their reports and answer questions; the issue at hand was decided after the reporting specialists had been ushered from the room.[49] The reports are followed by discussions by committee members. The chair then sums up the views expressed and proposes a course of action in line with the draft decision. In practice, there is usually no formal vote.[50] The committee chairman simply asks whether any member has any problems with the proposal at hand. The extent to which the committee chairman dominates the session varies widely; in order to avoid inhibiting the other discussants, committee chairmen are urged to refrain from speaking until the end of the discussion. It is apparent however that, should the committee chairman so choose, he is in a position to dominate the procedures.

In practice, the high value placed on building consensus and promoting participation by all "interested parties" in the policy process frequently results in compromise solutions. One handbook for preparing

[46] Smirtyukov (fn. 38), 183-84, 188-89.

[47] Material on the conduct of ministry collegium meetings was drawn from Davitnidze (fn. 16), 128-51. On local government executive committee meetings, see Baymakhanov (fn. 29), 323-26; Butko (fn. 29), 284-86; "Reglament raboty . . ." (fn. 33), section III; Barabashev and Sheremet (fn. 7), 331-37; Tkachenko (fn. 29), 44-55; N. A. Volkov, *Ispolnitelnyy apparat mestnykh sovetov deputatov trudyashchikhsya (Osnovnyye voprosy organizatsii i deyatelnosti)* [Executive Apparatus of Local Councils] (Kazan: Izdatelstvo Kazanskogo Universiteta, 1968), 47-49. On Council of Ministers Presidium meetings, see Smirtyukov (fn. 38), 188-89.

[48] *Pravda*, March 11, 1983, p. 1.

[49] Löwenhardt (fn. 17), 98-102.

[50] Shabad (fn. 43).

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draft executive committee decisions declares: "If, in the course of discussion of an issue at the executive committee, it turns out that the draft was not coordinated, then usually the draft decision is withdrawn from discussion."[51] This comment suggests that a frequent byproduct of the effort to encourage wide representation of institutional interests in the committee is the avoidance of controversial items.

In cases of more serious disagreement, such as a member's disapproval of a committee decision that has already been taken, there are institutionalized procedures to communicate the conflict to the next-highest level of decision making. These procedures are particularly important for advisory collegia because the committee chair has the right to override the collective view of his colleagues. Advisory committees are generally governed by statutes requiring members to abide by the decisions of their collegium.[52] In case of a disagreement between the minister and his collegium, for example, ministerial opinion carries the day, but the disgruntled members can communicate their dissent to the Council of Ministers. The extent to which this provision is invoked in practice cannot be determined. The fact that Soviet administrative specialists report that it occurs "very rarely" is hardly surprising since most collegium members work for the minister; going over his head is bound to be risky. Still, the legal provision does have significance because it provides an institutionalized channel for dissent against unpopular decisions—a mechanism that probably serves as at least a minimal deterrent to a one-man commander determined to make policy independent of his collegium.

In practice, many of the procedures discussed above probably maximize the influence of the full-time bureaucrat on the committee at the expense of the other members. At the executive committee level, those committee members who are not full-time government or Party officials (such as enterprise managers, for example) are clearly at a disadvantage

[51] Ye. A. Ageyeva, *Formy upravlencheskoy deyatelnosti ispolkomov mestnykh sovetov* [Forms of Administrative Activity of Local Council Executive Committees] (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1973), 35; translation by the present author.

[52] On the "right of appeal" of members of the VPO councils of directors, see "Ob utverzhdenii obshchevo polozheniya o vsesoyuznom i respublikanskom promyshlennykh obyedineniyakh" [On Ratification of the General Regulations on All-Union and Republic Industrial Associations], March 2, 1973, in *Resheniya partii i pravitelstva po khozyaystvennym voprosam* [Decisions of the Party and Government on Economic Questions] Vol. IX (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974), 427-59. The relevant articles are Nos. 24-27. On the "reklama" rights of Military Council members, see "O voyennykh sovetakh sovetskoy armii i voyenno-morskogo flota," [On Military Councils of the Soviet Army and Fleet], April 17, 1958, in *KPSS o vooruzhennykh silakh sovetskogo soyuza. Dokumenty 1917-1968* [CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. Documents 1917-1968] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1969), 353, and A. A. Yepishev, ed., *KPSS i voyennoye stroitelstvo* [CPSU and Military Development] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1982), 154-63.

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because they lack the detailed information necessary to sway other committee members. The various procedures designed to promote pre-meeting circulation of draft decisions are attempts to ameliorate this problem. Still, it is the full-time official—the executive committee deputy chairman, the *obkom* bureau member whose full-time job is that of Party secretary, or the deputy minister in charge of a portfolio of ministry directorates—who is in the best position to control the agenda and the flow of information to the committee.

Conclusion

The evidence presented here suggests that collegial procedures have been successful (in some cases too successful) in promoting organizational participation in policy making. To be sure, the scope of participation varies depending on the stage in the policy process. In the agenda-building and policy-formation stages, the number and diversity of organizational participants is very broad, even though the actual entry of issues onto the committee agenda may be controlled by institutional gatekeepers—the full-time officials and staffers who review proposed agenda items and filter awkward proposals out of the agenda-building process. Participation in public policy making narrows considerably at the actual decision stage; the invited experts may advocate their preferred outcomes in their reports, but they are not allowed to vote. The importance of organizational involvement in the decision process also varies with the specificity of the decision and the nature of the issue; for some issue areas, opportunities for organizational participation are limited to a much smaller number of institutional participants than for others. Western scholars who focus on high-priority issue areas (such as national security) therefore tend to be less impressed with the importance of organizational participation than those whose work has focused on local politics or health.

These caveats notwithstanding, the findings of this study complement the conclusions of both the case-study and the institutional approaches to Soviet decision making. They provide additional support for the hypothesis that the current Soviet system, like its democratic counterparts in Western postindustrial societies, is characterized by a high level of organizational participation in public policy making. Collegial procedures designed to promote such participation have indeed operated in practice to facilitate the articulation and representation of institutional interests.

Such procedures serve several purposes in the Soviet policy-formation

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process. The involvement of committee members in all stages of decision formulation helps to minimize capricious decision making. By encouraging the participation of those who are responsible for implementing policy, committee procedures help to ensure their cooperation. In one-man-command organizations, collegia represent a counterweight (and an alternate source of information) to the one-man commander. From the standpoint of the higher-level leadership, collegial practices help to maintain control. The broad organizational involvement promoted by committee practices improves the ability of the top Party leadership to control and dominate the complex network of bureaucracies that administers Soviet policies.

Most importantly, the broad representation of institutional interests in collegial forums reflects the need for institutional checks and balances; the latter are part of a larger system that is necessary because the checks available in a democratic system do not exist. In a democratic state, wide participation in public policy formulation is facilitated by the electoral system, by the existence of independent branches of government, and by autonomous interest groups; organizational and individual involvement in decision making provides a series of checks against capricious policy choices by the executive. In the Soviet system, these checks are missing; collegial procedures have evolved as a substitute that helps to ensure that most policies will be formulated with the participation of "interested" organizations.

The cost of these procedures is inefficiency. Committee decision making is time-consuming. Needed reforms can become bogged down as institutional representatives bargain for concessions that minimize damage to their own organizational interests. Committee decision-making procedures also tend to produce compromise decisions; this fact helps to explain why Soviet policies over the last two decades or so have tended to be incremental in nature. As demonstrated by the procedures governing agenda building, controversial items are often filtered out of the agenda process. In lower-level committees, this propensity to avoid difficult issues is balanced by the authority of higher-level collegial bodies to demand the resolution of controversial issues and to referee disagreements. For the Politburo, however, no such higher authority exists—at least in the absence of an authoritarian General Secretary.

The incremental style of decision making produced by "bargaining among the country's most powerful interests in committee politics"[53] may work quite well in the absence of domestic or foreign crises. The

[53] Hough (fn. 2), 5.

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inefficiency and the tendency toward split-the-difference solutions may be reasonable costs of a high degree of organizational participation in the formulation of public policy. In an era of relative prosperity and steady economic growth, "committee politics" have probably served Soviet interests fairly well. Periods of economic scarcity or international turbulence, however, call for the kind of rapid and decisive policy change for which committee-decision procedures are generally ill-equipped, at least in the absence of a strong national consensus on the need for reform. The Andropov leadership faces a far less felicitous economic environment than that which confronted Brezhnev. What is needed in an era of growing economic scarcity is a determined leadership prepared to intervene repeatedly in committee politics in order to bring about change regardless of conflicting organizational interests. If the leadership is insecure and if it is attempting to consolidate its position among other contenders, the capacity of that leadership to make rational, rather than political, decisions may be severely impeded.

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SOVIET POLITICS AND STRATEGY TOWARD THE WEST:
Three Cases

By THOMAS N. BJORKMAN and THOMAS J. ZAMOSTNY*

THE motives behind the Soviet strategy of détente, developed under Leonid Brezhnev and adopted by Yuri Andropov, remain subject to sharply conflicting interpretations abroad. Some observers see Soviet efforts to expand economic relations and engage the West in strategic arms limitation negotiations as tactical maneuvers masking a basic continuity in underlying expansionist goals. They consider the true test of Moscow's intentions to lie in the Third World, where intervention in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan can be viewed as a calculated effort to gain strategic advantage over the West.[1] Others interpret détente as a historic shift in policy based on a gradual if grudging recognition of the practical benefits for the U.S.S.R. of cooperative arrangements to control the arms race, prevent nuclear war, and expand scientific, technological and economic interchange. They are more likely to view Soviet actions in the Third World as *ad hoc* responses to threats and opportunities rather than calculated moves designed to damage Western interests.[2]

A better understanding of the tenor of political debate underlying détente strategy in the Soviet establishment could help to resolve these uncertainties about Soviet motives and assist in anticipating future policy developments. A grasp of the spectrum of views in the U.S.S.R. is necessary, moreover, if the West is to attempt to influence Soviet behavior in the years ahead: the success of such efforts will depend on an accurate assessment of the climate of opinion in which Soviet decisions on policy toward the West are made.

* The article represents the personal views of the authors and not necessarily those of the U.S. Government.

[1] See, for example, Richard Pipes, "Détente: Moscow's View," in Pipes, ed., *Soviet Strategy in Europe* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1976), 3-44; and Morris Rothenberg, *The USSR and Africa: New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power* (Washington, D.C.: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980).

[2] See, for example, Marshall Shulman, "Toward a Western Philosophy of Coexistence," *Foreign Affairs* 52 (October 1973), 35-58; David Albright, "The USSR and Africa: Soviet Policy," *Problems of Communism* 27 (January-February 1978), 20-39; Rajan Menon, "Military Power, Intervention, and Soviet Policy in the Third World," in Roger E. Kanet, ed., *Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980's* (New York: Praeger, 1982), 263-84.

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In this article we explore the outlines of Soviet politics on three central issues of strategy toward the West in the détente era: economic relations, arms control negotiations, and competition in the Third World. We argue that Soviet officialdom has not been united in its approach to these issues, but has been divided between those elements who found an expansion of cooperation with the West to be in the Soviet interest and those who felt that the dangers outweighed the opportunities. Changes in the atmosphere of East-West relations, we maintain, have significantly influenced the direction of the political debate during this period.

The divisions we trace in the case studies below reflect longstanding cleavages in the Soviet hierarchy and, indeed, have their roots in Russian political culture. The first study makes the argument that reform-minded elements in the establishment sought to take advantage of the improved atmosphere in East-West relations in the early 1970s by introducing concepts of global economic and technological interdependence into Soviet doctrine. They considered these concepts more conducive to serious attempts at expanding East-West cooperation than the traditional emphasis on self-sufficiency. These changes met with resistance from conservative elements in the Soviet hierarchy—resistance that appeared to gain ground as détente deteriorated at the end of the decade.

The second study explores parallel developments in the realm of Soviet doctrine on issues of war and peace. It demonstrates that here, too, reform-minded officials sought to capitalize on the reduced tensions of the early 1970s to advocate concepts of nuclear overkill and strategic balance that were more conducive than traditional dogma to the pursuit of arms control arrangements with the West. These concepts, too, ran into resistance, but they survived to emerge as prominent weapons in the Soviet propaganda battle against the Reagan Administration's arms policies in the early 1980s.

The final case study suggests that U.S.-Soviet competition in the Third World remained a largely latent issue within the Soviet establishment in the 1970s. The management of superpower competition in the developing world began to draw Moscow's attention after the Afghanistan crisis at the end of the decade.

Studies of Soviet policy debate are substantially impeded by pervasive strictures on open discussion of sensitive issues. Therefore, the picture we draw of debate over strategy toward the West is admittedly incomplete. The evidence we present, however, is consistent with a number of other studies of the subject in the post-Stalin era.[3]

[3] Our findings are consistent with Stephen Cohen's argument that policy debate in the U.S.S.R. is fueled by contention between the "friends and foes of change," in *Slavic Review*

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Our study centers on an examination of activity by officials at the second levels of the Soviet policy establishment, where the constraints on open partisanship are not as all-encompassing as at the top. While traditional restrictions on the press mute debate on specific issues, the differing world views that fuel differences over questions of broad strategy are more easily discernable at this level. In particular, the unorthodox positions of reform-minded elements on issues of nuclear war and East-West cooperation often stand in sharp relief against the stereotyped themes of conventional Soviet discourse on East-West relations.[4]

We do not assume a connection between the political tensions evident at the second levels of the Soviet regime and politics in the Politburo, but we think the evidence points to a correlation. The Brezhnev regime bureaucratized foreign policy making, and in the process gave second-echelon officials a systematic role they had never achieved under Khrushchev. Many of those involved in political dialogue at the second level have been reported to be policy advisers and speechwriters for the leadership. Most importantly, statements by top Soviet leaders during the period under review here demonstrate that perspectives on strategy which had originally been expressed at the second level could eventually influence thinking at the top.

Case I: Foreign Economic Policy

Efforts to reform the U.S.S.R.'s international economic policies in the 1970s were based on the belief that Soviet economic modernization could not proceed without a decisive break with the Stalinist legacy of autarky. Challenges to traditional economic thinking began to surface in the 1950s as Soviet economists took note of the postwar scientific revolution in the West. Scientific and technological progress, which had increased global economic interdependence and promoted the internationalization of scientific thought, led Soviet reformers to question the assumptions

38 (June 1979), 187-202. Examples of Western scholarly attention to political cleavages on related issues include Alexander Dallin, "Soviet Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: A Framework for Analysis," *Journal of International Affairs* 23 (No. 2, 1969), 250-60; Lawrence T. Caldwell, "Soviet Attitudes to SALT," *Adelphi Paper* No. 75 (1971); Samuel B. Payne, Jr., "The Soviet Debate on Strategic Arms Limitation: 1968-72," *Soviet Studies* 27 (January 1975), 27; Walter Clemens, Jr., *The U.S.S.R. and Global Interdependence* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978).

[4] The advocates of reform discussed below can be found in a broad array of Soviet institutions. Some of them are well-known foreign policy officials and as such are frequent spokesmen for Soviet viewpoints in the West. While we recognize their role as regime propagandists, we seek here to isolate the part they play in internal policy deliberations. The evidence suggests that their typically well-informed perspective on the West is conducive not only to effective propaganda abroad but also to reformist thinking at home.

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of past autarkic practices. In an era of scientific revolution, they argued, no country could ensure sustained economic and scientific progress on its own, and all stood to gain from an expansion of cooperation.

The influence of reform thinking became evident at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, where First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan repudiated the prediction Stalin made in *The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* that capitalist production would inevitably decline in the postwar era. Mikoyan maintained that, largely due to the abolition of the Institute of World Economy and World Politics in the late 1940s, Soviet economists were ignorant about the Western economies.[5]

Mikoyan's speech was followed by the creation, two months later, of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), which became the primary center for Soviet analysis of Western economic systems and a voice for reform of Soviet foreign economic policies. In the 1960s, officials from IMEMO were prominent among those arguing that the world's rapidly changing production forces demanded Soviet participation in a deepening "international division of labor" with the West.[6]

Reform arguments clearly influenced the Brezhnev leadership during its early years, as reflected in its steps to expand foreign trade. But the imprint of these arguments emerged most clearly after the easing of U.S.-Soviet tensions in the early 1970s.[7] The decisions of the April 1973 Central Committee plenum opened the way for a broad effort by reform-minded elements to reshape Soviet strategy toward the West. The resolution passed by the plenum endorsed the expansion of East-West

[5] *Pravda*, February 18, 1956, p. 6. The institute as well as its director, Yevgeniy Varga, fell into disfavor for overly optimistic prognoses of Western economic trends in the postwar period. See Philip Jaffe, "The Varga Controversy," *Survey* 18 (Summer 1972), 138-60, and Paul Marantz, "Soviet Foreign Policy Factionalism under Stalin?" *Soviet Union* 3 (Part 1, 1976), 91-98.

[6] See Nikolay Inozemtsev, "Osobennosti sovremennogo imperializma i yego osnovnyye protivorechiya" [Features of Modern Imperialism and Its Basic Contradictions], *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniye* [hereafter cited as *MEMO*] (No. 5, 1970), 24, and D. Tomashevskiy, "Zakonomernaya tendentsiya obshchestvennogo razvitiya" [The Natural Tendency of Social Development] *MEMO* (No. 9, 1969), 92-95. See also P. N. Kumykin, ed., *50 Let Sovetskoy vneshney torgovli* [Fifty Years of Soviet Foreign Trade] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniye, 1967), chap. 11, and an early book by Georgiy Arbatov, *Stroitelstvo kommunizma i mirovoy revolyutsionnyi protsess* [The Construction of Communism and the World Revolutionary Process] (Moscow: Nauka, 1966), 473.

[7] The evolution of Soviet perceptions of Western economic strengths and the merits of international economic cooperation are more thoroughly examined in Philip Hanson, *Trade and Technology in Soviet-Western Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), chap. 5; Bruce B. Parrott, "Technological Progress and Soviet Politics," in John R. Thomas and Ursula M. Kruse-Vaucienne, eds., *Soviet Science and Technology: Domestic and Foreign Perspectives* (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, 1977), 305-28; Rensselaer W. Lee, III, "Political Absorption of Western Technology: The Soviet and Chinese Cases," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 15 (Spring/Summer 1982), 9-33.

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cooperation and called specifically for an "activization" of Soviet economic ties to the West.[8]

It was not until the weeks following the plenum that the cryptic formula of "activization" was decoded. As statements in support of the plenum decisions by Soviet officials made clear, the central committee had authorized a vast program of expanded commercial ties to the West that constituted a decisive assault on the legacy of autarky. The controversial nature of the new strategy was signaled by a broad campaign launched in the pages of leading Soviet papers and periodicals to provide theoretical legitimacy and a practical rationale for this turnabout.

Expansion of Soviet participation in an international division of labor with the West was posited as an imperative of national modernization in an age of rapid scientific and technical progress that required sweeping changes in traditional economic and foreign trade practices. Doctrinal legitimacy was provided by recalling Lenin's statements, after his shift to the New Economic Policy in the early 1920s, in favor of East-West economic cooperation.

President Brezhnev himself spelled out the revisionist thrust of the new strategy in a series of speeches following the April plenum. His candid description of Soviet economic strategy, in an address on West German television during a May 1973 visit to Bonn, symbolized the new mood:

> I would like to add that our plans are by no means plans designed for autarky. Our course is not toward isolating our country from the outside world. On the contrary, we proceed from the fact that it will develop under conditions of growing all-round cooperation with the outside world, and not only with socialist countries but in considerable measure with the states of the opposite social system as well.[9]

During his unprecedented meeting with U.S. corporate leaders on a visit to the United States in June 1973, Brezhnev offered further confirmation that the reformers' vision of interdependence lay behind what he described as the April plenum's decision to "greatly extend" foreign economic relations. Citing the requirements for an "increasing international division of labor" flowing from the scientific revolution, Brezhnev said that "we have all begun to abandon old notions" on the sig-

[8] The unusual nature of the plenum's business was apparent from its announced proceedings. Eight Politburo members and three candidate members addressed the plenum—by far the largest turnout at a party forum since Khrushchev. The Politburo acquired a new international dimension at the plenum, with the entry of Foreign Minister Gromyko, Defense Minister Grechko, and KGB chief Andropov into its ranks.

[9] *Pravda*, May 22, 1973, p. 1. Translations are by the present authors unless otherwise noted.

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nificance of international trade and economic ties in the "past few years." He reported that the plenum had "sharply criticized" sections of the Soviet economic bureaucracy for their "timid ways and obsolete ideas" on foreign trade.[10]

Leading reform-minded officials from the Academy of Sciences and the government were called upon to explain and defend the new program of expanded foreign ties. Typical of the press campaign were articles written by Soviet physicist Petr Kapitsa, a member of the presidium of the Academy of Sciences, and by Vladimir Kirillin, chairman of the State Committee on Science and Technology. Citing problems of environmental pollution and a threatened "exhaustion of raw materials for a range of important substances," Kapitsa argued that solutions were impossible on a national scale, but were feasible "given widespread international cooperation on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence." Kirillin offered a review of the U.S.S.R.'s plans for expanding international scientific and technical cooperation, maintaining that "historical experience confirms that no single country—even the most highly developed—can hold the leading position in all avenues of science and technology."[11]

The most candid indictment of traditional Soviet foreign trade practices to emerge in this campaign for East-West cooperation was offered by Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Nikolay Smelyakov in a 37-page article in *Novyy Mir*. Smelyakov described in detail the U.S.S.R.'s inability to compete with other industrially advanced nations on the world market—a problem he attributed to the traditional isolation of the Soviet economy from the world as well as the virtual isolation of the foreign trade sector from the Soviet economy as a whole.[12]

The most comprehensive political and economic rationale for the new strategy was provided in the authoritative party organs *Pravda* and *Kommunist* by the late Nikolay Inozemtsev, director of IMEMO. In an analysis buttressed with citations from Marx and Lenin and generalizations about current world trends, Inozemtsev argued that broad Soviet participation in the world economy was imperative to the country's modernization and national progress.

Inozemtsev endorsed the April plenum's decision to broaden foreign economic ties and asserted that the U.S.S.R's "more active participation" in global economic cooperation was dictated by the "political and eco-

[10] *Pravda*, June 24, 1973, p. 1.

[11] Kapitsa, *Pravda*, May 15, 1973, p. 3; Kirillin, *Pravda*, July 31, 1973, pp. 3-4.

[12] Smelyakov, "Delovyye vstrechi. Zapiski zamestitelya ministra vneshney torgovlya" [Business Meetings: Notes of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade], *Novyy Mir* (No. 12, 1973), 203-39.

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nomic interests of the Soviet state." In listing the practical benefits of expanded ties with the West, Inozemtsev emphasized the advantages of "production specialization" and the reality of global interdependence:

> In our age, under conditions of rapidly developing scientific and technical revolution, changes in production implements and means, materials, and manufacturing processes are taking place so rapidly that no single country, however large and powerful, can develop the production of all types of output without exception with equal success and the same effectiveness.[13]

As the decade progressed, implementation of the new strategy of expanded ties with the West was substantially blocked by a combination of internal conservative resistance and reescalating international tensions. Although the program's provision for substantial changes in traditional Soviet economic practices was clear, few of these changes actually materialized. Opposition to the program was not manifested openly at the time, but it was apparent from the conservatives' warnings of the political and ideological dangers accompanying increased contacts with the West.[14]

The domestic critics were assisted by outside obstacles to expanded trade with the West, particularly with the United States. A key setback to expanded cooperation was the amendment to the 1974 U.S. foreign trade legislation that made most-favored-nation trading status for communist countries conditional on acceptable emigration policies. Proponents of autarky became more prominent within a year of that congressional action, although the conservatives' influence over the leadership's thinking remained unclear for the time being.[15]

The U.S. decision to employ trade and technology sanctions in the late 1970s and early 1980s in an attempt to influence Soviet behavior was a more decisive foreign development affecting high-level thinking about a strategy for economic modernization through expanded foreign

[13] *Pravda*, May 16, 1973, pp. 4-5. See also Inozemtsev's articles in *Kommunist* (No. 13, 1973), 89-103, and in *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma* (No. 9, 1973), 35-34. Articles supporting the new strategy by the director of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, Oleg Bogomolov, appeared in *Izvestiya* on February 26, 1974, p. 4, and *Kommunist* (No. 5, 1974), 89-99. See also the two-part article in *Izvestiya* by Inozemtsev, Arbatov, and then-Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Vladimir Alkhimov, which launched the press campaign for the new program; it described an easing of the longstanding hostility in the United States to economic ties with the communist bloc: *Izvestiya*, May 5, 1973, p. 4, and May 8, p. 4.

[14] See, for instance, an article by the CPSU Secretary with responsibility for bloc affairs at the time: Konstantin Katushev, "Glavnoye napravleniye. O protsesse i obyektivnoy neobkhodimosti dalneyshego splocheniya stran sotsializma" [The Main Direction: On the Process and Objective Necessity of Further Integration of the Countries of Socialism], *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma* (No. 8, 1973), 3-10.

[15] See an article by K. I. Suvorov, an official of the Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences, in *Pravda*, December 18, 1975, p. 2, in which he praised the decision of the 14th Party Congress in 1925 to make the U.S.S.R. an "independent economic unit" by developing indigenous industry rather than importing equipment from abroad.

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trade. Proponents of self-sufficiency became more active within months of the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and President Carter's resulting announcement of sanctions. Shortly thereafter, in a speech on U.S.S.R. Science Day, president of the Academy of Sciences Anatoliy Aleksandrov cited the "present situation" in arguing that the U.S.S.R. should make itself "completely independent" of foreign trade, especially in key economic sectors.[16] At about the same time, articles began to appear in the popular and specialized Soviet economic literature criticizing the importation of foreign technology in place of the use of Soviet counterparts that were said to be as good if not better.

President Brezhnev's report to the 26th CPSU Congress in February 1981 revealed that skepticism about the benefits of foreign technology had reached the highest level. Brezhnev balanced support for trade with a new emphasis on developing an indigenous technological base:

> We must examine the reasons why we sometimes lose sight of our priorities and spend large sums of money on purchasing equipment and technology abroad that we are fully capable of producing ourselves, often at a higher level of quality.[17]

Attacks on imported technology grew even harsher after the United States applied sanctions as a response to the declaration of martial law in Poland in December 1981. That the issue was being debated at the leadership level was suggested in an unusually frank interview with Ukrainian party leader Shcherbitskiy, published in a leading Soviet weekly in September 1982. Shcherbitskiy gave a ritual nod to the role of international cooperation in developing the Soviet economy, but emphasized the U.S.S.R.'s "own scientific potential" for resolving "any national economic task." He then took the unusual step of criticizing unidentified "leaders" in the Soviet Union who preferred to purchase machinery, equipment, and technology abroad rather than to produce them at home. Such a "parasitical attitude," he said, has a "debilitating effect" on the U.S.S.R.'s own scientific and economic capability and "must be avoided."[18]

The issue of expanded economic ties with the West is likely to remain on the regime's agenda in the coming decade. Soviet proponents of East-West interchange have publicly drawn the correct lessons from the U.S.

[16] Aleksandrov's address was reported by Moscow radio's domestic service, translated in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service—Soviet Union Daily Report* (Washington, D.C.) [hereafter cited as *FBIS—SOV*], April 21, 1980, p. U/1. See also Aleksandrov's comments on the implications of U.S. sanctions at the annual meetings of the Academy in 1980 and 1982. *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, No. 6, 1980, p. 8, and No. 6, 1982, p. 8.

[17] *Pravda*, February 24, 1981, p. 5.

[18] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, September 29, 1982, p. 2.

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sanctions that followed the events in Afghanistan and Poland, but they have also reasserted the necessity of expanded involvement in the world economy. Oleg Bogomolov, the director of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, while conceding that the socialist countries must avoid making themselves "strategically vulnerable," and even applauding the loss of "illusions" in the U.S.S.R about the advantages of technology trade with the West, has also maintained that the socialist states are "opponents of economic isolation" and has reasserted the arguments for economic interdependence that the reformers set forth in 1973 and 1974. Nikolay Inozemtsev assessed the political impact of U.S. sanctions in similar fashion. He conceded that the U.S.S.R. should not permit key sectors of the economy to be "dependent" on imported equipment, but added that "our country has no intention of rejecting the opportunities inherent in international economic and scientific-technical cooperation" with the West.[19]

The sober assessment of global economic realities on which a persisting rejection of autarky by the reformers could be based was detailed at a major conference on the Western economy, which IMEMO had sponsored in May 1979. Theses prepared by the Institute for the conference described long-term trends in the global, Western, and Third World economies that left little room for any policy but international cooperation. IMEMO projected sustained economic growth by the West to the end of the century despite the recessions of the mid-1970s which had caused a drop from the high postwar rates. It foresaw an expanding global economic role for the Third World, but conspicuously avoided the ritual predictions of Soviet conservatives about favorable changes in the relative weight of the capitalist and socialist economies. In summarizing the conference's major conclusions, Inozemtsev underscored the strengths of the West in areas where Soviet officials concede their own shortcomings, and underlined the implications for Soviet policy:

> It would be a mistake, as the conference theses stress, to underestimate the great potential which present-day capitalism possesses. . . . One of the most important of these reserves is the potential which lies both in the further development of science and technology themselves and in the practical implementation of their achievements in the economy and in developing productive forces. . . . We cannot but take this into account in predictions and plans for the development of the world socialist economy.[20]

[19] Bogomolov, "Ekonomicheskiye svyazi mezhdu sotsialisticheskimi i kapitalisticheskimi stranami" [Economic Relations between the Socialist and Capitalist Countries], *MEMO* (No. 3, 1980), 41-51; *Trud*, July 3, 1982, p. 3; Inozemtsev, "'XXVI Syezd KPSS i nashi zadachi" [The 26th CPSU Congress and Our Tasks], *MEMO* (No. 3, 1981), 4-24. See also Dzherman Gvishiani, *Pravda*, March 27, 1981, pp. 2-3.

[20] The proceedings of the conference are reported in *MEMO*, Nos. 6-8, 1979. A guiding

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Case II: Arms Control Policy

Pressures to revise traditional doctrinal postulates on issues of war and peace emerged early in the nuclear era. Proponents of reform began to question the wisdom of viewing East and West as two irreconcilably hostile camps in an age of potential global destruction. In doing so, they challenged the assumption that security could be achieved solely through unilateral increments in military power, and established a rationale for the pursuit of East-West arms control arrangements.

Advocates of change scored a major success when Stalin's successors hastened to proclaim their understanding of the destructive potential of the nuclear arsenals that were accumulating in the 1950s, and Khrushchev revised the Stalinist dogma on the inevitability of world war. Exchanges between contending points of view on security issues erupted again after Khrushchev's fall. In the mid-1960s, the issue of mutual deterrence was implicit in this debate: whether the emerging "balance of terror" put the meaning of "victory" in doubt in case of a global war. The exchanges ended without a substantial resolution, however, as Khrushchev's successors applied renewed strictures on the discussion of public policy.

Within the Soviet elite, the beginning of strategic arms limitation negotiations with the United States produced differing views on the feasibility of seeking accord on nuclear weapons. Prominent in the discussion were officials at IMEMO and at the newly established USA Institute of the Academy of Sciences, who drew on strategic debates in the United States to air some unorthodox perspectives on security issues in the U.S.S.R. For the domestic audience, institute officials replayed arguments by U.S. authorities that pointed to the limitations of military power as a means of ensuring security, the importance of diplomacy in this connection, and the futility of attempts to achieve military superiority "under modern conditions." Although the U.S.S.R. entered SALT negotiations in 1969 and signed a treaty limiting ballistic missile defenses in 1972, Soviet leaders continued to eschew the unconventional security formulations being publicized by institute officials.[21]

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philosophy on which this relatively balanced assessment of Western weaknesses and strengths could be based was articulated by Inozemtsev in a November 1979 address commemorating the 100th birth anniversary of Yevgeniy Varga. While disciples of Varga see the "weak sides" of imperialism, Inozemtsev said, "they do not attempt to represent what they wish as what is real, they see the possibilities for development which world capitalism still possesses, and they analyze the factors that make it viable." *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR* (No. 2, 1980), 100.

[21] See the editorial, "Mezhdu Khelsinki i Venoy" [Between Helsinki and Vienna], in the first issue of *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya* [hereafter cited as *SShA*] (No. 1, 1970),

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In security policy as well as in foreign economic policy, evidence of reform pressures surfaced after the April 1973 Central Committee plenum. Proponents of reform, citing changes in the political climate in general and the arms agreements signed at the 1972 and 1973 summits in Moscow and Washington in particular, pressed openly for revision of the doctrinal underpinnings of Soviet national security policy along lines that had been suggested by reform proponents in the 1960s.

Aleksandr Bovin, an *Izvestiya* political observer with past service in the Central Committee apparatus, who was reputed to have ties to Brezhnev, emerged as a key spokesman for the reform position in the debate on security doctrine.[22] Key elements of new formulations that were eventually adopted by Soviet leaders appeared in *Izvestiya* in July 1973. In this article, Bovin hailed the results of the 1972 and 1973 U.S.-Soviet summit meetings and the "new psychological climate" in East-West relations.

Characteristic of Bovin's revisionism was his frontal attack on a favorite tenet of conservative strategists—Clausewitz's famous dictum, endorsed by Lenin, that war is a continuation of state policy by other means. Conservatives in the Soviet establishment had long cited this axiom to argue that the differences between the capitalist and socialist camps are no less significant in war than they are under conditions of peace. Bovin maintained that the development of East-West mutual deterrence had deprived the Clausewitz formula of its validity:

> Can general thermonuclear war be considered today as a 'means' of state policy, as an act of foisting one's will on a prospective enemy? It is evident that the potential of a return blow deprives such a choice of any rationality,

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60-64; V. V. Larionov, "Strategicheskiye debaty" [Strategic Debates], *SShA* (No. 3, 1970), 20-31; and Georgiy Arbatov's review of the U.S. ABM debate in *Izvestiya*, April 15, 1969, p. 5. The outlines of the debate on security issues under Khrushchev are comprehensively examined in Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964). Developments after Khrushchev's fall are discussed in Roman Kolkowicz and others, *The Soviet Union and Arms Control* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), chaps. 1 and 2, and by Wolfe, in Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson, eds., *Soviet Politics since Khrushchev* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1968), 111-27. For the establishment's differing perspectives on SALT later in the 1960s, see Caldwell (fn. 3) and Payne (fn. 3).

[22] Bovin is a more influential spokesman than his position with *Izvestiya* alone would suggest. He first established reform credentials in the domestic policy realm in the 1960s, when he was associated with *Kommunist* and the Central Commitee's socialist countries department. At the time, Bovin's articles for Moscow dailies advocated de-Stalinization, the publication of "objective and honest" statistics about social and economic conditions in the U.S.S.R., and the establishment of a discipline of political science. See *Izvestiya*, February 9, 1962, pp. 3-4, and *Krasnaya Zvezda*, February 10, 1965. Today, Bovin is a prominent spokesman on Soviet television and radio as well as in the press; he has unusual leeway to speak candidly on current events. He was elected to the Party's Central Auditing Commission at the 26th CPSU Congress.

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> and automatically transforms the means of coercing the enemy into a means of destroying the aggressor. That is why, remaining within the bounds of reason, it is impossible to consider a general nuclear-missile war as a means of attaining any sort of political objective. Here—and not only here—the interests of capitalist and socialist states meet and cross.[23]

It seems that the main target of the reformers was not the Clausewitz formula, but official doctrine on the probable consequences of nuclear war and the merits of strategic balance. The elements of a different approach to these two issues were contained in Bovin's article:

> Stocks of nuclear missile weapons are such today that it would be possible to destroy all life on our planet. The time has come to solve practically another problem—the preservation of human life. . . .
>
> At the basis of the achieved [U.S.-Soviet] agreements lie sober calculation, understanding of the catastrophic nature of a global thermonuclear conflict, awareness that under conditions of a nuclear missile balance further growth of nuclear arsenals loses political meaning and does not increase but diminishes the security of the parties.[24]

Georgiy Arbatov, in an article that appeared in *Pravda* eleven days later, suggested that the role of military power in ensuring security was at issue. Reviewing the factors that had made détente possible, Arbatov cited first the changed correlation of forces that had compelled the West to recognize the socialist world as a permanent reality. He went on to note the limitations of military power in maintaining peace:

> Of itself, power does not guarantee peace and still less détente. The growth of power at one pole can in the final analysis, as has happened quite often in the past, lead to attempts to build up power at the other—in other words, to unrestrained military rivalry entailing armed conflicts.[25]

The following month, the military daily *Krasnaya Zvezda* [Red Star] carried a rebuttal to these arguments by the head of the paper's propaganda department: Col. I. I. Sidelnikov, who had participated in the exchanges of the 1960s, criticized attempts by unnamed "military theorists and publicists" to revise doctrine in light of the easing of U.S.-Soviet tensions. He specifically defended the Clausewitz formula:

[23] *Izvestiya*, July 11, 1973 (evening edition), p. 3. The article's sensitivity is suggested by its failure to appear, as would have been customary, in the morning edition of the paper that is mailed to subscribers abroad.

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] *Pravda*, July 22, 1973, pp. 4-5. See also Arbatov's attack on the Clausewitz formula in "Tupiki politiki sily" [The Blind Alley of the Policy of Force], *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma* (No. 2, 1974), 42. Other reform spokesmen began to downgrade the role of the military factor in the global "correlation of forces." Georgiy Shakhnazarov, the deputy chief of the Central Committee's socialist countries department, argued in *Kommunist* (No. 3, 1974) that the correlation of forces was increasingly an ideological rather than a military question.

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> No weapon can change the political essence of war. It has been and remains a continuation of the policy of the state and classes by violent means. The nature of a given war, that is, whether it is a just, liberation, aggressive, or reactionary war, depends on what political aims are pursued in it. . . . These tenets remain immovable.[26]

During fall of 1973 and early 1974 several other military spokesmen weighed in with attacks on the reformers' arguments. Notable among them was Col. Yevgeniy Rybkin of the Lenin Military-Political Academy, who had also been a defender of the status quo in the debates of the 1960s. In the October 1973 issue of a prominent military journal, Rybkin attacked Bovin by name for making a "notable methodological mistake" in questioning the validity of the Clausewitz formula and failing to make a "scientific analysis of the essence of war." Abandoning a "class evaluation" of war, he argued, can lead to a weakening of "defensive vigilance." Rybkin went on to reject the idea of formally renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons in the absence of "objective guarantees" against aggression—thus raising the suspicion that a declaration like that issued in June 1982 in Brezhnev's name was being pressed by the reformers at the time.[27]

While Sidelnikov and Rybkin offered a rebuff to Bovin's underlying philosophical premise, the most direct rebuttal to his unorthodox formulations on the probable consequences of nuclear war came in another article in *Krasnaya Zvezda* entitled "Two World Outlooks—Two Views on War," by Rear Admiral V. V. Shelyag of the Lenin Military-Political Academy. Shelyag's piece confirmed that traditional formulations on the prospects for victory in a global war were at issue. Marxist-Leninists, Shelyag maintained, assess war not according to the technical means by which it is waged, but by the political aims it serves, and they reject assertions that "everything living on earth would be destroyed" in the event of war:

> If arguments about the death of civilization and about no victors in a nuclear war are to be presented in an oversimplified manner, they are based on mathematical calculations. The authors of these arguments divide the quantity of the accumulated nuclear potential in the world by the number of people living on earth. As a result it emerges that all mankind really could be destroyed. This is an oversimplified, one-sided approach to such a complex sociohistorical phenomenon as war.[28]

[26] *Krasnaya Zvezda*, August 14, 1973, pp. 2-3.
[27] Rybkin, "Leninskaya kontseptsiya voyny i sovremennost" [The Leninist Concept of War and the Present Day], *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (No. 20, 1973), 21-28.
[28] *Krasnaya Zvezda*, February 7, 1974, pp. 2-3.

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Shelyag countered arguments that weapons on both sides were part of the problem by noting that nuclear weapons in the West are indeed a threat to mankind, but that those in Soviet hands are dedicated to defense. As for the consequences of nuclear war, Shelyag reaffirmed the orthodox statement of the 1961 CPSU Program—that any war unleashed by the West would result in the demise of "imperialism," not of mankind.

The rekindled debate over the doctrinal implications of nuclear weapons came after a long period of silence on these issues by the Soviet leadership, which coincided with the U.S.S.R.'s strategic buildup relative to the United States and with the opening of SALT negotiations. In addressing the potential consequences of nuclear war in the early 1960s, Brezhnev had faithfully echoed the official compromise that recognized the devastating consequences but professed historical optimism: if the West were to start such a war, it would end in "the complete defeat of capitalism."[29]

Evidence that the second-echelon debate of 1973-1974 was having an influence on official deliberations surfaced in summer of 1974, when Brezhnev began to adopt the reformers' approach in public statements on the consequences of nuclear war. In his speech to the Polish parliament on July 21, he made precisely the mathematical calculation of overkill capacity in the world's nuclear arsenals that Bovin had posited and to which Shelyag had so recently objected:

> For centuries mankind, in striving to ensure its security, has been guided by the formula: If you want peace, be ready for war. In our nuclear age this formula conceals particular danger. Man dies only once. However, in recent years a quantity of weapons has already been amassed sufficient to destroy everything living on earth several times.[30]

Brezhnev's statement in Warsaw introduced a new emphasis on the destructive consequences of nuclear war into authoritative pronouncements from Moscow.[31]

The second step in the public redefinition of Soviet doctrine on national security issues came three years later in a series of statements by Brezhnev on the benefits of strategic balance and the futility of seeking superiority—arguments that had also been made by Bovin in 1973. The doctrinal position on the desirable balance of military forces between

[29] *Pravda*, September 9, 1964, p. 4.

[30] *Pravda*, July 22, 1974, p. 3.

[31] For typical examples of the approach followed since 1974, see a speech by the late Mikhail Suslov maintaining that an East-West conflict would "threaten human civilization" (*Pravda*, May 13, 1978, p. 2), and the Warsaw Pact's "Moscow Declaration" asserting that world arsenals were now sufficient to "call into question the very survival of man on earth" (*Pravda*, November 24, 1978, pp. 1-2).

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East and West had long been a sensitive question in the U.S.S.R. Through the mid-1960s, Soviet leaders had reiterated the traditional maxim that a superior military force was the best way to ensure world peace and national defense.[32] Although official endorsement of military superiority declined in the early 1970s, Soviet posture statements continued to pass up opportunities to support the merits of strategic balance. In responding to charges in the West that the U.S.S.R. was seeking a position of strategic advantage, Soviet officials denied harboring aggressive intentions, but sidestepped the issue of strategic capabilities. Even when Moscow agreed, at the November 1974 Ford-Brezhnev summit in Vladivostok, to equal SALT II ceilings of 2400 strategic delivery vehicles, the Soviet media publicized only the joint statement announcing that both sides would be entitled to a "certain agreed aggregate number."

Beginning with a speech by Brezhnev in Tula in January 1977, Soviet official discourse shifted openly to embrace the concept of strategic balance. Brezhnev denied that superiority was an objective of Soviet policy; in subsequent statements, he posited "parity" and "approximate equilibrium" as the goals of Soviet defense policy. During a visit to West Germany in May 1978, Brezhnev asserted that the concept of superiority had become "pointless" in the presence of "today's huge arsenals of already stockpiled nuclear weapons and means for their delivery."[33]

To a greater extent than the earlier shift on the consequences of nuclear war, the Soviets' disavowals of superiority and embrace of parity were a response to the West's growing concern about the ultimate goals of the U.S.S.R.'s military buildup. But the new posture reshaped domestic discourse on the military balance as well as the tenor of statements directed abroad. Starting in early 1977, articles by conservative military spokesmen expressly endorsed strategic balance and conceded the reality of mutual deterrence.

Most striking was the lead article in the January 1977 issue of an important military monthly, in which Col. Rybkin, the Lenin Military-Political Academy official who had attacked Bovin in the fall of 1973, directly endorsed the notion of mutual deterrence. Toward the end of a theoretical discourse on peaceful coexistence, he stated:

> The objective necessity of ending the arms race is apparent. In the first place, the quantity of nuclear weapons has reached a level whereby a further increase will in practice make no change. "In recent years," noted L. I. Brezhnev in July 1974, "a quantity of arms has already been amassed

[32] See Brezhnev's assertion in June 1966 that the U.S.S.R. would seek to "preserve the superiority" of its armed forces over those of its opponents: *Pravda*, June 11, 1966, p. 2.
[33] *Pravda*, January 19, 1977, p. 2; November 3, 1977, p. 3; May 4, 1978, p. 1.

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sufficient to destroy everything living on earth several times." In the second place, "nuclear parity," as it is called, has been established between the USSR and the United States; that is, a definite balance of power was officially recognized at the Soviet-American talks in 1972-74 with a mutual agreement not to disturb this balance.[34]

Intimations of possible future developments in the Soviet debate on security policy appeared at the U.S.-Soviet summit in Vienna (June 1979) and the signing of the SALT II treaty. An unusual series of articles by reform spokesmen from the party apparatus and the Academy of Sciences' institutes were published in Moscow papers around the time of the summit. While orchestrated Soviet media propaganda hailed SALT II as a triumph of Kremlin diplomacy, these articles approached the treaty from a different direction—as a possible opening toward a significant curtailment of defense spending.

Articles in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* by senior officials of IMEMO and the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, and in *Krasnaya Zvezda* by a deputy chief of the Central Committee's socialist countries department, detailed the economic and social costs of current levels of defense spending; they cited specific examples from Western experience, but drew general lessons that applied equally to the U.S.S.R. One article argued the feasibility of converting defense industries to civilian production; another cited the environmental damage caused by the civilian and military nuclear industry; and a third noted that relying on the "balance of terror" to maintain peace was equivalent—because of the resources diverted from other needs—to "eating one's own skin in an attempt to ward off starvation." Aleksandr Bovin offered a similar analysis in *Izvestiya*, taking another swipe at the Clausewitz formula.[35]

Equally suggestive of the reformers' political momentum was a *Pravda* report on June 23, 1979—five days after SALT II was signed—on the establishment of a new organization, headed by Nikolay Inozemtsev, to coordinate the efforts of Soviet scientists and academicians involved in arms control. The Scientific Research Council on Problems of Peace and Disarmament was created by the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences, the Board of the State Committee on Science and Technology, and the

[34] Rybkin, "XXV Syezd KPSS i problema mirnogo sosushchestvovaniya sotsializma i kapitalizma" [The 25th CPSU Congress and the Problem of Peaceful Coexistence between Socialism and Capitalism], *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* (No. 1, 1977), 3-9.

[35] Rachik Faramazyan (head of a department of IMEMO), *Pravda*, June 5, 1979, p. 4; Georgiy Shakhnazarov, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 14, 1979, pp. 2-3; Boris Gorizontov (head of a department at the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System), *Pravda*, June 22, 1979, p. 4; Oleg Bykov (deputy chief of IMEMO), *Izvestiya*, July 18, 1979, p. 5; Aleksandr Bovin, *Izvestiya*, July 1, 1979, p. 5. See also a longer and more revealing domestic radio version of Bovin's commentary, translated in *FBIS-SOV*, June 20, 1979, pp. AA/5-9.

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Presidium of the Soviet peace committee. *Pravda* reported that Georgiy Arbatov (director of the U.S.A. and Canada Institute), Oleg Bykov (deputy director of IMEMO), Dzherman Gvishiani (deputy head of the State Committee on Science and Technology), Yevgeniy Primakov (director of the Oriental Studies Institute), and M. A. Markov (a nuclear physicist) had been named to head divisions of the Council. In addressing the initial meeting, Inozemtsev said the Council should become the "center of scientific and public thought" on arms control in the U.S.S.R.; Arbatov urged the group to assist "Soviet and international communities" to understand security issues.[36]

The sharp deterioration of East-West relations that occurred within months of the Vienna summit pushed developments in Moscow in a different direction from the one that had been anticipated by the reformers. A new climate was already evident after the initial U.S. Senate hearings on SALT II and the controversy over a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba in September 1979. By early fall, Soviet officials speculated about a shift to the right in Washington and other Western capitals, and accused the United States of discarding its commitment to strategic equality, to which both countries had agreed at the Vienna summit, in favor of a quest for military superiority. The latter charge suggests that the U.S. political consensus emerging from the SALT hearings in favor of significantly enhanced levels of defense spending may have been a decisive factor in the shifting political climate. The Afghanistan crisis and NATO's decision to deploy a new generation of U.S. intermediate range missiles, which followed at the turn of the year, sealed the change in attitude.

The new mood produced conflicting currents in the Soviet security dialogue. Spokesmen for the Armed Forces General Staff have assumed a prominence in public discussion on security issues since the fall of 1979 that strongly suggests an invigorated conservative current. The most emphatic conservative note was sounded by Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff. In an article on military strategy published in Volume 7 of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia (1979), Ogarkov defends the feasibility of "victory" as an objective in a nuclear war. More recently, Ogarkov and other military spokesmen have presented unusually alarm-

[36] *Pravda*, June 23, 1979, p. 4 See also a detailed report on the proceedings of the organizational session of the council in *MEMO* (No. 7, 1979), 106-11. One Soviet scholar has indicated that the Council is directing research on defense industry conversion to civilian production; he asserts that scientists in the Soviet bloc "give growing consideration" to this problem. See G. M. Lokshin, "Rol obshchestvennosti v borbe za razoruzheniye" [The Role of Public Opinion in the Struggle for Disarmament], *Rabochiy Klass i Sovremmenyy Mir* (No. 5, 1979), p. 26.

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ist interpretations of U.S. defense plans under President Reagan, implicitly arguing for a forceful Soviet response.[37]

Reform currents continued after 1979, however, in statements by Brezhnev and his protégé on the Politburo, Konstantin Chernenko, on the sensitive issues of victory in nuclear war and the Clausewitz formula. Although the doctrinal position on victory had already been at issue when Rear Admiral Shelyag's article was published in 1974, Brezhnev addressed the question specifically for the first time in his report to the 26th CPSU Congress in February 1981. He called it "dangerous madness" for the U.S.S.R. and the United States to "count on victory in nuclear war."

A subsequent statement by Brezhnev in a front-page *Pravda* "interview" was even more forthright in questioning the feasibility of victory in a nuclear war. Responding to a reported comment by President Reagan on Soviet thinking about nuclear war, Brezhnev repeated his remarks at the 26th Congress and added that "only he who has decided to commit suicide can start a nuclear war in the hope of emerging a victor from it. No matter what power the attacker possesses, no matter what method of unleashing nuclear war he chooses, he will not attain his aims."

In 1981, Chernenko became the first Politburo member to reject Clausewitz's dictum directly. Delivering the authoritative Lenin Day address in April, Chernenko stated that it was "criminal" to consider nuclear war as a rational continuation of policy since "any responsible state figure is forced to recognize that the use of nuclear weapons places the future of mankind in doubt." Finally, in a message read to the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament in June 1982, Brezhnev made a unilateral declaration that the Soviet Union would not employ nuclear weapons first in a conflict—a statement that has evoked signs of internal resistance.[38]

These recent pronouncements were undoubtedly prompted by hopes of influencing the Western security debate; they also served, however, to reshape domestic discourse. They represent a logical culmination of

[37] Ogarkov's remarks on victory are in *Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopedia* VII (Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1979), 564. His statements on U.S. policy are in *Kommunist* (No. 10, 1981), 80-91; in *Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechestva* [Always Prepared for Defense of the Homeland] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1982), and in *Izvestiya*, May 9, 1982, pp. 1-2.

[38] For the Brezhnev and Chernenko statements, see *Pravda*, February 24, 1981, p. 4; April 23, 1981, p. 2; October 21, 1981, p. 1; and June 16, 1982, p. 1. Resistance to the Brezhnev no-first-use pledge was suggested in unusual remarks in its defense by Minister of Defense Ustinov; see *Pravda*, July 12, 1982, p. 4. See also an article in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (October 27, 1982, pp. 14-15), purportedly responding to a reader's letter on the subject.

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the shift in official posture on security issues that began in 1974 as a result of internal political pressures.

Case III: Détente and the Third World

As we have seen, during the 1970s reform elements in the Soviet elite were instrumental in moving official precepts away from the "two-camp" mentality on issues of arms control and international economic ties. In both cases this movement was based on a seemingly more realistic calculation of the common ground between Soviet and U.S. interests than had underlain Soviet thinking in the past.

An interchange with the West on the Third World—where common ground is less readily apparent—has been slower in developing. In the early 1970s, proponents of détente in the political establishment were preoccupied with critics on the left who suspected the Kremlin of turning its back on the revolutionary movement. Only at the end of the decade did they direct their attention to the West's mounting criticism of Soviet policy in the Third World and begin to address the problem of U.S.-Soviet competition.

Moscow has long been sensitive to attacks by fellow communists on its revolutionary credentials. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Khrushchev regime was forced to defend its policy of peaceful coexistence against China's efforts to denigrate the Soviet commitment to "national liberation" in the developing world.[39] As the Brezhnev regime embarked upon its own détente strategy in the late 1960s and early 1970s, resistance at home and abroad again appeared to develop over the implications of the new policy for the Third World.

Signs of domestic conflict in the Soviet Union surfaced in the spring of 1972 when the United States stepped up the air war against North Vietnam and mined Haiphong harbor on the eve of President Nixon's scheduled departure for Moscow and the signing of the SALT I accords. That there was discord within the leadership over the wisdom of welcoming the American President under such conditions became evident with the demotion of Ukrainian Party First Secretary Petr Shelest.

Shelest's Ukrainian nationalism undoubtedly played a part in undermining the confidence of his colleagues, but the circumstances and timing of his downfall suggest that the precipitating factor was his opposition to détente. The demotion occurred at a Central Committee plenum

[39] See the CPSU "open letter" of July 14, 1963, reprinted in William Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964), 289-325.

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which expressly endorsed Brezhnev's détente initiatives; it was announced by TASS the day before Nixon's arrival. The following year, at the April plenum which ratified Moscow's new strategy toward the West, Shelest was removed from the Politburo.

A public defense of the decision to invite Nixon was mounted for both international and domestic audiences; it took to task those who saw the move as incompatible with support for North Vietnam against the United States. On the eve of the summit, Vadim Zagladin, then deputy chief (now first deputy chief) of the Central Committee's International Department, published a thinly veiled rejoinder to these critics in the internationally circulated foreign affairs weekly, *New Times*. Zagladin scored "revolutionists" who persisted in doubting the wisdom of Moscow's policy of peaceful coexistence. In an obvious reference to the circumstances surrounding the upcoming summit, he stated: "At times it is said that in reply to this or that 'tough' action by imperialism, the socialist countries, and primarily the Soviet Union, should likewise harden their position." Rejecting this argument, Zagladin maintained that a flexible posture, using "diverse forms and methods of combating imperialism," was far superior to "primitive" imitation of Western methods. He added that foreign policy decisions, especially in "explosive situations," should not be guided by "considerations of the moment (for emotional or other reasons)," but by a "long-term perspective."[40]

One of the key documents signed at the Nixon-Brezhnev summit was entitled "Basic Principles of Relations between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R." Among its provisions were pledges by both sides not to seek "unilateral advantage" in the conduct of foreign affairs. Although this provision later became a subject of controversy in the West (when Soviet Third World interventions were said to have violated it), in 1972 the Basic Principles were controversial mainly within the communist world.

Sensitivity to such official sanction of collaboration with the United States in the international arena was evident in Nikolay Inozemtsev's lengthy assessment of the Moscow agreements, published in *Pravda* two weeks after the summit. Inozemtsev argued that, although anyone with "common sense" could see the benefits of East-West accord,

> attempts are being made ... to replace common sense by unscrupulous speculation about some "conspiracy between the two superpowers" to the effect that the Soviet-American agreements are allegedly detrimental to some third countries. ... The Soviet Union has been, is and will always remain a loyal friend of peoples struggling for national independence and freedom and against imperialism and colonialism.

[40] *New Times*, No. 22, May 1972, pp. 4-5.

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Like Zagladin, Inozemtsev endorsed a posture of "maximum flexibility" in dealing with the West, and underscored Lenin's own willingness to advance the revolutionary cause through compromise.[41]

As U.S.-Soviet ties expanded in subsequent months, Soviet spokesmen felt a continuing need to defend détente against criticism from the left. Prominent reformers developed the thesis that a relaxation of East-West tensions would enhance the prospects for progressive change in the Third World. This argument achieved wide circulation after the second Nixon-Brezhnev summit in June 1973, which produced the "Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War," again pledging both parties to a policy of restraint in the conduct of foreign policy.

In order to defend the emerging Soviet-American relationship against attacks from radical delegates to the nonaligned summit in Algiers early that summer, *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* published major articles describing the benefits that would accrue to the Third World from détente. An article in *Pravda* by Third World scholar Karen Brutents posited an explicit linkage between détente and social progress in the Third World. Brutents, who is now a deputy chief of the Central Committee's International Department under Zagladin, asserted that détente was creating "more favorable conditions" for the "national liberation struggle." No longer could Western powers use the developing countries as "battlefields of the cold war" in an effort to "retain their privileges and disguise their colonialist aims." Moreover, Third World nations stood to gain politically and economically because of the more cooperative international climate created by détente. Brutents specifically derided China's "noisy campaign regarding the notorious 'compact between the two superpowers' " and portrayed Beijing's militant policies as contrary to the interests of the developing countries.[42]

Two days after the close of the conference, Aleksandr Bovin published an article in *Izvestiya* attacking the "familiar figure of the 'Leftist' theorist" who maintained that détente was an "antirevolutionary policy" designed to curb the "struggle for social progress." Bovin asserted that, far from inhibiting the struggle, détente served as a powerful stimulus of progressive change by limiting the "freedom of action of the forces of militarism and aggression" and diminishing the influence of the "military-industrial complex" on the policy of the capitalist states. Bovin acknowledged that détente set "rules of conduct" for mutual relations between states, but assured readers that those rules did not extend to third areas such as Africa or Latin America.[43]

[41] *Pravda*, June 9, 1972, pp. 4-5.
[42] *Pravda*, August 30, 1973, pp. 4-5.
[43] *Izvestiya*, September 11, 1973, p. 4.

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As the decade progressed, Soviet spokesmen dismissed charges from the West that Soviet conduct in such Third World trouble spots as the Middle East and southern Africa violated Moscow's pledges of restraint; they insisted that détente was never intended to freeze the "social status quo." Moscow continued to rebut its critics on the left as much as those in the West. Soviet spokesmen were quick to find evidence in the M.P.L.A. victory in Angola, as well as in other Marxist triumphs in Africa and Southeast Asia, for justifying the Soviet policy of détente to left-wing skeptics. President Podgornyy summed up the prevailing Soviet view during a visit to Tanzania in the spring of 1977:

> "The victories won in recent years by the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, and other countries resolutely refute the false assertions that détente is incompatible with the cause of revolution and national liberation. Under conditions of détente the young states can concentrate their main efforts on resolving the tasks of strengthening their political independence and achieving economic and social progress."[44]

The virtual collapse of détente following the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 produced new currents in Soviet thinking about the link between détente and the Third World. To be sure, no Soviet official, conservative or reformer, openly criticized the intervention; on the contrary, many reformers were mobilized to defend it and to denounce the U.S. response to it. But prominent supporters of détente in Moscow were beginning to recognize that Soviet actions in the Third World had seriously eroded the political position of détente advocates in the West.

Here, too, Aleksandr Bovin was a vigorous spokesman. Writing in *Kommunist* in the summer of 1980, Bovin used the vehicle of a review of a new collection of Lenin's works on international affairs to draw some pointed lessons for present-day Soviet diplomacy toward the West. He ridiculed Western accusations that Soviet actions in the Third World had violated the "rules of the game," but obliquely acknowledged the deleterious impact of Soviet policy on Western perceptions. He argued that the struggle for peaceful coexistence required a Soviet effort to "finely differentiate political opponents, increase the isolation of the militarist, adventurist elements, and stimulate the trend toward political realism" in the West. It was on this basis, according to Bovin, that Lenin had cautioned against "ill-considered, hasty steps capable of intimidating and repelling 'reasonable capitalists' and giving the 'war party' the trump

[44] *Pravda*, March 24, 1977, p. 4.

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cards." Lenin's call for "caution, circumspection, and self-control" in dealing with the West, he concluded, had by no means lost its significance.[45]

The advent in 1981 of a new U.S. Administration espousing militant opposition to Soviet intervention in the Third World gave additional impetus to the discussion of U.S.-Soviet competition in the developing countries. It appeared that a more forthcoming Soviet approach to the problem might be at hand.

In the early days of the Reagan Administration, official Soviet spokesmen raised the issue only to denounce suggestions that some sort of "code of conduct" or "rules of the game" needed to be worked out. They insisted that existing documents, such as the 1972 Basic Principles Agreement and the 1975 Helsinki CSCE accords (neither of which touched directly on Third World issues) had already established such a code. They accused the United States of seeking a double standard of behavior—one that was permissive for itself but restrictive for the U.S.S.R.[46]

Other party and academic officials began to voice concern that conflicts in the Third World had been allowed to escalate into Soviet-American disputes. While denying any Soviet attempts to exploit regional conflicts, they argued that such disputes must be localized so as not to affect Soviet-American relations adversely.[47] In April, Aleksandr Bovin argued in an interview published in Japan that Moscow and Washington might indeed have to "work out something like rules" for competition in the Third World and "devise means of promoting the easing of tension" between them—a clear step forward from the position he had taken in 1973.[48]

A few days later, Brezhnev in effect revised Moscow's longstanding position on the Third World-détente relationship. He proposed a "code

[45] Bovin, "Neprekhodyashcheye znacheniye Leninskikh idey" [The Permanent Significance of Lenin's Ideas], *Kommunist* (No. 10, 1980), 70-81. Earlier, Bovin had published a curious essay in *Izvestiya* on the occasion of Lenin's birthday which could be read as a critique of the Kremlin's international policies. Writing at the peak of East-West recriminations over the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Bovin detailed Lenin's contempt for leaders who were ideologically inflexible and unable to admit past mistakes; he concluded that Lenin's views were applicable to foreign as well as domestic policy. See *Izvestiya*, April 19, 1980, p. 5.

[46] See the article by Soviet foreign ministry official Vladimir Petrovskiy, "Borba SSSR za razryadku v 70-ye gody" [The USSR's Struggle for Détente in the Seventies], in *Novaya i Noveyshaya Istoriya* (No. 1, 1981), 3-20, and the comments of Central Committee International Information Department head Leonid Zamyatin on Soviet television, March 28, 1981, translated in *FBIS-SOV* April 8, 1981, pp. CC/1-9.

[47] See Fedor Burlatskiy's "dialogue" with G. Parsons, "an American professor," published in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, January 28, 1981, p. 14, and Georgiy Arbatov's interview in *Der Spiegel*, March 23, 1981, pp. 128-34.

[48] *Mainichi Shimbun*, April 22, 1981, p. 7.

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of conduct" to govern actions by both East and West in the Third World. While repeating Moscow's objections to rules of international behavior which would perpetuate Western dominance of Third World areas, Brezhnev outlined specific principles of conduct which, he suggested, should apply to the U.S.S.R., the United States, and other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council:

> —Noninterference in the domestic affairs of Third World countries and the renunciation of "spheres of interests."
> —Respect for the territorial integrity of countries and inviolability of their borders, and the renunciation of support for "separatist movements."
> —Recognition of the right of Third World countries to enjoy "equal participation in international life" and to develop relations with any other country.
> —Recognition of each nation's sovereignty over its natural resources and equality in international economic relations, and support for Third World efforts to eliminate colonialism, racism, and apartheid.
> —Respect for nonalignment, and renunciation of attempts to create "military-political blocs" in the Third World.[49]

Brezhnev's "code" fell short of the system of superpower restraint envisioned by some in the West. It did not go beyond existing Soviet formulations and was clearly designed to restrain Washington's behavior more than Moscow's. Its significance lay more in the new willingness to acknowledge the problem than in the specific principles espoused. The speech marked the first official Soviet effort to identify specific rules of U.S.-Soviet behavior in the Third World.

The deteriorating international climate since the spring of 1981 has diminished public Soviet discussion of principles for superpower restraint. Soviet spokesmen have focused more on the growing military threat from the West than on opportunities for East-West cooperation. Vadim Zagladin, who had defended the need for restraint in 1972, argued in July 1981 that now was not the time to moderate Soviet policies in the Third World. On the contrary, he asserted that under current conditions of heightened East-West conflict,

> it is imperative to intensify considerably the struggle against the imperialist policy of exporting counterrevolution and the struggle for preventing interference of the imperialist, reactionary forces in the domestic affairs of other countries and peoples.[50]

During the past two years, Soviet "peace proposals," ostensibly aimed at regulating the major powers' behavior in the Third World, have been increasingly accompanied by assertions of Moscow's right and duty to

[49] *Pravda*, April 28, 1981, p. 2.

[50] *Pravda*, July 23, 1981, pp. 4-5.

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provide "defense assistance" to client regimes in the face of "imperialist" threats to their survival. The most forceful of these was the authoritative speech marking the 65th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, delivered by Moscow party leader Viktor Grishin just days before Brezhnev's death. Grishin's address, which capped a series of toughly worded statements on the status of Soviet-American relations, accused Washington of playing "world gendarme" and trying to regulate the national liberation movement. Citing alleged Western threats to Soviet clients, Grishin asserted Moscow's readiness to maintain its global involvement:

> Loyal to the principles of internationalism, the CPSU and the Soviet people have done and will continue to do all in their power to support foreign class brethren who have chosen the road of building a new society—from Cuba in the West to Vietnam in the East.[51]

It is not surprising that it has proved so difficult to find common ground between Moscow and Washington on the Third World. The practical benefits of cooperating are difficult to ascertain. In the Soviet political establishment, the commitment to change in the Third World runs deep—not only among conservatives who retain a two-camp mentality, but also among proponents of cooperation with the West.

The core issue, which has remained largely latent until now, is not Moscow's attitude toward social change *per se*, but the consequences of that change for the power and international position of the United States and the Soviet Union. The détente documents of the early 1970s were viewed in Moscow as codifying the U.S.S.R.'s strategic parity with the United States and its ability to compete on an equal basis in the Third World. Though Soviet reformers may push forward the discussion of regulating Soviet-American competition in the 1980s, they are unlikely to suggest any rules of behavior that might compromise that hard-won status.

Conclusion

We have maintained that, in order to understand Soviet policy, it is essential to establish the outlines of politics in the Kremlin. The political tensions reviewed above reveal the motives behind Soviet détente strategy under Brezhnev as well as the possibilities for policy change under Andropov. The evidence suggests several conclusions about the origins of détente:

[51] *Pravda*, November 6, 1982, p. 2.

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—The elements in the elite that pressed for an expansion of economic ties to the West sought to facilitate modernization of the domestic economy, not to forestall it, as has often been suggested. Proponents of change met with resistance from conservatives concerned about dependence on the West and bent on maintenance of a self-sufficient technological base.

—Proponents of arms control sought to change official doctrine on national security issues to justify the pursuit of negotiated arrangements with the West. These advocates of change undoubtedly believed that such a shift would facilitate Moscow's efforts to establish abroad the sincerity of its arms control diplomacy, but the internal resistance they met suggests that something more substantial was involved than an attempt to mask Moscow's military buildup.

—Finally, Moscow's reluctance to address the gathering crisis of détente prompted by its Third World interventions in the 1970s reflects the widespread support for revolution in developing countries—and for a global Soviet reach—found among both reform and conservative elements in the hierarchy. Movement toward recognition of the problem following the Afghanistan crisis suggests that, with the proper mix of incentives, Moscow can be induced to consider U.S. interests.

The prospect of new directions in Soviet strategy under the Andropov regime is now of vital concern to the West. Because of the information gaps and political uncertainties, we would be ill-advised to offer flat predictions. Still, the evidence on détente politics in the 1970s allows us to specify probable alternatives. The new leadership will be subject to several conflicting pressures in the hierarchy: from those who think the Brezhnev regime did not go far enough in pursuing trade and arms control arrangements with the West; from those who think it went too far; and, no doubt, from those who think the Brezhnev mix was about right.

Andropov's past connections to some of the reform spokesmen discussed above could suggest a predisposition toward more extensive ties abroad as well as toward economic reform at home. At the same time, there is insufficient evidence in Andropov's previous public record to determine his own policy predilections. In any event, the health of the Soviet economy and the state of the international situation will be decisive factors forcing his hand.

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FIRMS AND TARIFF REGIME CHANGE:
Explaining the Demand for Protection

By TIMOTHY J. McKEOWN*

I. Introduction

THAT tariff levels and economic growth rates tend to move in opposite directions is a venerable piece of conventional wisdom. As early as 1879, Gustav Schmoller, the famous economist of the German historical school, noted that, "The times of boom, of increasing exports, of new openings of overseas markets, are the natural free trade epochs, while the reverse is true in times of foreign slumps, of depressions, of crisis."[1] One hundred years later, Susan Strange argues that tariff politics is heavily influenced by the existence of substantial idle productive capacity.[2] She furnishes abundant evidence for this observation, but she does not provide a theory of how the existence of idle capacity leads to a surge of protectionist demands.

Histories of commercial policy commonly assert the existence of relations beteen protection and depression, or prosperity and free trade. Particularly relevant is Alexander Gerschenkron's distinction between firms that prefer protection because they are in a "structural" decline (a decline in their international competitiveness) and firms that prefer protection because of "cyclical" difficulties (low or negative profitability due to temporarily unfavorable market conditions).[3] Implicit in such a distinction is the idea that the business cycle has an effect on tariff policy which is independent of the effect of shifts in comparative advantage. Gerschenkron did not pursue the implications of this idea, however.

I will present two theories of how the level of worldwide prosperity can be related to the degree of openness of the international trading system. One is a fairly conventional argument based on microeconomic

* Helpful comments were provided by Steven Klepper and James Cassing. A special thanks to James March for inspiring this approach.

[1] Quoted in Hans Rosenberg, *Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit: Wirtschaftsablauf, Gesellschaft und Politik in Mitteleuropa* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967), 1970 (translation by the present author).

[2] Strange, "The Management of Surplus Capacity: Or How Does Theory Stand up to Protectionism 1970s Style?" *International Organization* 33 (Summer 1979), 303-34.

[3] Gerschenkron, *Bread and Democracy in Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943).

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concepts; the other is less orthodox. I will then advance some preliminary empirical evidence on the relationship between business cycles and tariff levels.

Instead of treating tariff policy as a function of governmental objectives, we can model policy as a function of the constraints imposed on governmental decisionmakers by the demands of actors in civil society. (The actors are here referred to simply as "firms" even though in some important instances—particularly in agriculture—the institutional form of economic activity is not necessarily a firm. These institutions are assumed to behave like ordinary business firms.) To model governmental policy changes in this fashion is not to argue that these constraints "force" the adoption of a given policy. Governments may choose to ignore these demands in formulating policy, but such behavior normally has high political costs for a governing coalition, particularly in a competitive political system. (The preferences of government officials are usually linked to the pattern of preferences in their societies, simply because in systems with some form of representational mechanism, the occupants of governmental posts will change along with changes in the pattern of opinions and demands.) Thus, the arguments are predictive only under "normal" conditions—i.e., when government is responsive to these societal demands.

II. Assumptions

The following assumptions are common to both of the theories:

First, governments are postulated to set tariffs in response to political demands made by firms. I abstract almost completely from supply considerations, and ignore the possibility that other interests may have a significant effect on tariff policy. I also assume that firms are indifferent to the fiscal impact of the tariff.

Second, the international system is treated as a two-person game in which the Self faces the Other. The latter stands for the rest of the world.

Third, each government is postulated to have just two policy choices: to raise all tariffs or to lower all tariffs. Governmental decisionmakers, because of demands of their time, cannot possibly attend to tariff proposals on a case-by-case basis; if they did, they could not take care of much else. Lumping all tariff items together also facilitates the trading of benefits. Each representative wants to trade away what he does not care about in order to obtain what his constituency values highly; he can do this more readily when he does not have to gamble on being able to cash in a political I.O.U. during some future tariff revision. In

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addition, the expiration of commercial treaties and existing tariff statutes can create a situation in which institutional requirements necessitate large-scale revisions (or at least reviews) of tariff policy. Finally, general histories of tariff setting support the notion that tariff revision is relatively infrequent and concerns many commodities.[4] The argument that changes are uniform in direction is implied by a postulated political norm that compels equal treatment of interests, barring some compelling reason to the contrary. Government does not want to be seen as depriving one group of a benefit while awarding more of that benefit to a different group.

The two policy choices for each of the two players generate four possible outcomes. The tree and associated outcomes (*not* payoffs) for the 2 x 2 tariff game between Self and Other (in which Other stands for the rest of the world) is as follows:

FIGURE 1
DECISION TREE FOR TARIFF GAME BETWEEN SELF AND OTHER



Note: □ denotes a choice point, where a player must opt for either high or low levels of protection. ○ denotes a chance point, where the level of another actor's protection will be beyond the player's direct control. P_A is the player's subjective assessment of the probability that the second actor will opt for low levels of protection, *if* the player opts for low levels of protection. P_B is the player's assessment of the probability that the second actor will opt for low levels of protection, *if* the player opts for high levels of protection.

Each of the four outcomes is a level of profit. The explanation for the outcomes is as follows:

[4] Percy Ashley, *Modern Tariff History: Germany, United States, France* (London: John Murray, 1920); J. B. Condliffe, *The Commerce of Nations* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950).

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1. In the (high, high) state, there are no exports or imports. The reference level of profit for this state is set at O.
2. In the (low, low) state, firms can export, but also face loss of profits due to imports. Thus, they receive the profits from exports, E, but they lose profits due to imports, I.
3. In the (low, high) state, firms lose their export markets, and they face import competition due to their own country's low tariffs. However, the foreigner's own high tariffs raise the input costs to his exporting firms, so his exports are somewhat more costly than they would be in the (low, low) system. Therefore, the loss of profits due to imports is not I, but some smaller amount, $I - c$.
4. The (high, low) state is simply the reverse of the (low, high) state: firms no longer face import competition, but their ability to export is hampered by the increase in input costs caused by their own state's tariffs. Thus, rather than gaining E, they now gain only $(E - d)$.

Fifth, three different types of firms are postulated. Each type has its own preference ordering of the outcomes:

1. Import-competitive firms, which export little and face substantial import competition, prefer any world with high domestic tariffs to any world without them. They also have a preference for high foreign tariffs, as they increase input costs for foreign exports. Their preference ordering for the set of joint tariff policies is (high, high) > (high, low) > (low, high) > (low, low).
2. Exporting firms, which are quite successful in selling their output abroad and which face relatively limited import competition, prefer that domestic tariffs be kept low so as to minimize input costs and preserve their international competitiveness. When other nations erect high tariff barriers, however, the exporters prefer to shut out whatever import competition they face in their home market. Their preference ordering is (low, low) > (high, low) > (high, high) > (low, high).
3. Mixed-interest firms, which export but face some import competition, have the standard Prisoners' Dilemma ordering: (high, low) > (low, low) > (high, high) > (low, high).

III. A Utility-Maximizing Theory of the Political Demands of Firms

A common observation about tariff politics is that, since the gains from protection are concentrated while the gains from free trade are diffuse, it is easier for protectionists to organize and achieve their political demands than it is for free-traders. Even if this were true, and protectionists were organized while free-traders were not, this circumstance would not explain the timing of protectionist measures. An organization must decide to commit resources to political activity; whatever latent political strength it possesses must be *activated*. Organizations that possess

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limited latent strength but become highly activated may triumph over those that have considerable latent strength but do not become highly activated.[5]

Since the protectionists will win only if they first become sufficiently activated, it is necessary to explain the timing of their activation; the assumption is that protectionists enjoy greater latent strength because the more concentrated nature of the benefits of protection makes organizing for political action more feasible. For protection to occur during the trough of the business cycle, there must be some relation between the benefits of protection and the time at which it is being given.

This relationship is provided by the dynamics of entry and exit. Since rates of entry into a sector tend to be positively related to that sector's rate of demand growth,[6] we would expect entry rates to be smaller during a depression than during a period of prosperity. This implies that for a given level of protection the producers' surplus created by protective measures will be bid away by new entrants more slowly during the trough of a business cycle than during the peak. As long as the interest rate is greater than zero, the expected utility of protection is therefore greater when it begins at the trough than at the peak. Moreover, since during the trough the expected utility of exit into a more remunerative line of business is lower than at the peak, firms are more likely to resort to "voice" (i.e., political action) at such a time.[7]

Even if we drop the assumption that free-traders are less well organized than protectionists, it is still possible to argue that the former are inherently less likely to prevail once the latter have become activated. For exporting firms, the variance in payoffs associated with low tariffs is greater than the variance in payoffs associated with high tariffs. (This condition follows from the postulated preference orderings for these types of firms.) If we assume that these firms are risk-averse, then the greater riskiness of the low-tariff strategy will depress the expected utility of this policy for such firms.[8] On the other hand, given the preference ordering of the import-competitive firms, which are also assumed to be risk-averse, there is no clear basis for assessing one strategy as being

[5] James G. March, "The Power of Power," in David Easton, ed., *Varieties of Political Behavior* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

[6] Dale Orr, "The Determinants of Entry: A Study of the Canadian Manufacturing Industries," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 56 (February 1974), 58-66; Larry L. Deutsch, "Structure, Performance, and the Net Rate of Entry into Manufacturing Industries," *Southern Economic Journal* 41 (January 1975), 450-56.

[7] Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

[8] R. Joseph Monson, Jr., and Anthony Downs, "A Theory of Large Managerial Firms," in Bruce Russett, ed., *Economic Theories of International Politics* (Chicago: Markham, 1968).

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riskier than the other. (For import-competitive firms, the high-tariff choice dominates the low-tariff choice in any event.)

The foregoing analysis explains tariff increases, but it says nothing about tariff decreases. If we stay strictly within the confines of the theory, tariff decreases cannot occur, because a decrease requires that the activated political strength of the tariff liberalizers exceed that of the protectionists. Since we have postulated that such a situation cannot occur, no decrease can materialize. Decreases obviously have occurred, however; therefore the next step should be to modify the theory to permit them.

One possible modification is to allow some disaggregation of tariff duties, so that only a subset of all duties can be changed at one time, or so as to permit the simultaneous lowering of some duties and raising of others. The liberalizers might then be able to capitalize upon conditions of local superiority to obtain some tariff reductions. This situation is most likely to occur when the liberalizers are consumers of a good used as an input in their production processes, and when they are organized. Organization, in turn, is more easily accomplished when the number of actors involved is small. Demand for liberalization would tend to come at the peak of the business cycle, when bottlenecks in domestic production capacity and the relative inefficiency of domestic producers would lead to high prices and long waiting periods in filling orders. The resistance of the import-competitive firms to tariff reductions would be weaker at such times because exit to a more remunerative sector would be a more attractive option for them than during conditions of slower growth.

Another alteration of the theory which would provide for the possibility of tariff decreases is to permit demands for liberalization to arise from within the government itself. Government proposals of tariff reductions, in the absence of pressure by firms, may occur when officials personally prefer low tariffs. Officials will time their proposals to fall within periods of prosperity because of the previously noted relationship between prosperity and the attractiveness to firms of exiting from economically or politically disadvantaged sectors. If exiting is easy, firms opposed to reductions will be much less likely to resist them strenuously or to seek to remove officials who propose them.

IV. A Satisficing Theory of the Behavior of Firms

The marginalist theory of the firm which motivates the utility-maximizing theory of a firm's tariff preferences is not the only approach to theorizing about decision making by firms. The behavioral theory of

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the firm[9] provides an account of firms' behavior that differs in significant ways from its marginalist counterpart. In the behavioral theory, the working assumption that actors are utility maximizers is generally rejected. Instead, goal-seeking behavior is depicted as being subject to satiation: when aspirations are satisfied, efforts to attain more of a given good are reduced. The continual satisfaction of aspirations is deemed to lead to increasing aspirations; continued deprivation to declining aspirations. In an environment that is sufficiently placid, the behavior of a satisficing actor and that of a utility-maximizing actor will eventually converge.

Satisficing is widely regarded as a relatively innocuous departure from the maximization assumption—in part because one can demonstrate the possibility of this convergence.[10] When the aspiration level changes significantly more slowly than payoffs, however, there will be prolonged periods in which the behavior of the satisficing actor and the utility-maximizing actor are not identical. In a sufficiently turbulent environment, there is no reason to believe that a satisficer *ever* succeeds in duplicating the performance of a corresponding utility-maximizing actor. Since recent empirical work demonstrates that the aspiration levels of firms shift relatively slowly compared to changes in environmental conditions and rates of return,[11] this point is of obvious relevance to attempts to analyze the actual behavior of firms.

An additional motivation for presenting a satisficing theory is provided by Oliver Williamson's theory of inter-firm behavior.[12] A number of students of international politics have noticed that this theory provides a potentially fruitful approach to the problem of modeling cycles of international cooperation and competition.[13] Williamson's finding that

[9] Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

[10] Treatments of satisficing theories by economists have generally concentrated on demonstrating that such a convergence occurs. See Richard H. Day, "Profits, Learning, and the Convergence of Satisficing to Marginalism," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 71 (May 1967), 302-11; Sidney G. Winter, "Satisficing, Selection, and the Innovating Remnant," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 85 (May 1971), 237-61. For a fuller discussion of satisficing theories, see Timothy J. McKeown, "The Rise and Decline of the Open Trading Regime of the Nineteenth Century," Ph.D. diss. (Stanford University, 1982).

[11] Philip Bromiley, "A Behavioral Investigation of Corporate Capital Investment," Ph.D. diss. (Carnegie-Mellon University, 1981).

[12] Williamson, "A Dynamic Model of Inter-Firm Behavior," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 79 (November 1965), 579-607, presents a set of simultaneous differential equations that model relations between cooperation, communication, environmental conditions, and the level of collective performance. The theory is attractive because it depicts changes in the level of cooperation as being in part endogenously determined, and as reversible.

[13] See Russett (fn. 8); Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982), 325-56.

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"the condition of the environment required to drive the system to the collusive solution is much higher than the level required to maintain it once it has achieved this position"[14] seems to be one of the few instances of a well-grounded counterintuitive insight that is applicable to international politics. The satisficing theory presented here yields predictions that are similar to Williamson's; it does so with a different set of formal assumptions and a simpler mathematical technique.

The central working assumption of the satisficing theory is the assertion that firms are satisficing actors. If we assume that firms have an aspiration level of profits, S, and that, when outcomes are certain to equal or exceed the aspired level, the utility of those outcomes is 1, then the utility of the outcomes is 0 when they fall short of that level. In its normal form, a game played by satisficing actors thus has a matrix in which all entries are either 0 or 1.

In the situation where Self moves before Other and is not certain of Other's behavior, a game in extensive form is used (the game tree presented in Section II, above). Outcomes are converted into payoffs by comparison with aspiration level S. When outcomes are certain to be greater than or equal to S, the payoff is set equal to 1. When outcomes are no longer certain but are sensitive to the probabilities of Other's various choices, the payoff from a given choice by Self is the standard expected utility expression:

$$EU = \Sigma\, p_i\, U_i$$

Note: EU denotes expected utility, and p_i and U_i denote subjective probability and utility for outcome i.

Since the utility of any outcome which does not meet or exceed Self's aspiration level is 0, the above equation reduces to the summation of the probabilities for all outcomes that meet this condition. If S is interpreted as the payoff necessary for survival of the firm, then satisficing is equivalent to choosing so as to maximize the probability of survival.

The standard justification for adopting a satisficing postulate is the bounded rationality of decision-makers and the information costs they must face in making any decision.[15] While these considerations certainly can be deemed to apply in this setting, an additional justification is provided by the relation between the tariff-supported price and the benefits to owners of firms. The tariff-supported price must exceed variable costs for the firm to derive any benefit from protection; if it

[14] Williamson (fn. 12), 583.

[15] Herbert A. Simon, "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 69 (February 1955), 99-118.

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does not, the firm can not afford to operate. On the other hand, once the tariff-supported price exceeds that required to induce the firm to operate at full capacity, the owners of the firm derive sharply diminished marginal revenues from a given increment in price. This is because price increases that occur while the firm has idle capacity raise the firm's revenues by $(P_2Q_2 - P_1Q_1)$, but price increases that occur when capacity is already fully utilized raise revenues by only $Q_1(P_2 - P_1)$. The firm could respond to price increases when capacity is fully utilized by constructing an additional plant, but uncertainty about future market conditions and government policies will affect the expected value of such an investment. For these reasons, the firm is more concerned about prices that fall between variable costs and those necessary for full capacity utilization, and less concerned about prices below or above this region.

In the satisficing theory, the expected utility for any choice depends upon the relation of possible outcomes to the aspired outcome. As the economy moves through cycles of prosperity and depression, payoffs shift up and down.[16] In particular, profits decline in depressions and rise in booms. (In this theory, fluctuations in business conditions have uniform effects on all four outcomes. As business conditions change, the set of outcomes is shifted up or down by a linear transformation.) If the expected utility of policy choices shifts sufficiently, outcomes that previously fell above (or below) the aspiration level may now fall below (or above) it. Preferences on policy might then be reversed.

Given the ordering of the outcomes specified in the discussion of types of firms in the utility-maximizing theory, we can construct a set of predictions of the policy preferences of different types of firms, depending on the relationship of the aspiration level to outcomes. Table 1 lists all of the logical possibilities; Table 2 contains predictions about conditions under which firms will defect (demand high tariffs), cooperate (demand low tariffs), or remain indifferent to tariff policy. Condition 5 is the most beneficent environment, and Condition 1 the least beneficient. The only case in which decision makers' choices are likely to be highly sensitive to the actions of the other player is Condition 3, and then only for Types One (mixed-interest firms) and Two (export-oriented firms).[17] For Type One, this condition corresponds to a Prisoners' Dilemma game

[16] Geoffrey H. Moore, "Tested Knowledge of Business Cycles," in Robert A. Gordon and Lawrence R. Klein, eds., *Readings in Business Cycles* (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1965).

[17] The difference between the expected utility of the preferred policy and the nonpreferred policy can be interpreted as an indicator of the amount of effort allotted by the firm to achieving the preferred policy (abstracting from the "free rider" problem). This amount will vary continuously as the p values vary continuously.

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where the "sucker" and "defect" payoffs are unsatisfactory, but where the "temptation" and "cooperate" payoffs are satisfactory. In this situation, Self will cooperate so long as the perceived probability that Other will reciprocate a cooperative play appears greater than the probability that Other will take advantage of such a play to win the "temptation" payoff. As in the utility-maximizing theory, tit-for-tat strategies will promote cooperation.[18] There are conditions, however, where one player's choice of strategy is not affected by the choice of the other player.

TABLE 1
RELATIONS BETWEEN ASPIRED PROFITS AND OUTCOMES FOR THREE TYPES OF FIRMS IN A SITUATION OF STRATEGIC INTERACTION

Condition	*Type One (Mixed)*	*Type Two (Exporter)*	*Type Three (Import-Competitive)*
1	$S > E-d$	$S > E-I$	$S > O$
2	$E-d \geqslant S > E-I$	$E-I \geqslant S > E-d$	$O \geqslant S > E-d$
3	$E-I \geqslant S > O$	$E-d \geqslant S > O$	$E-d \geqslant S > I-c$
4	$O \geqslant S > -I$	$O \geqslant S > -I$	$I-c \geqslant S > E-I$
5	$-I \geqslant S$	$-I \geqslant S$	$-I \geqslant S$

TABLE 2
CHOICES BY THREE TYPES OF SATISFICING ACTORS OF COOPERATION OR DEFECTION IN A SITUATION OF STRATEGIC INTERACTION UNDER VARYING CONDITIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFICENCE

Condition	*Type One (Mixed)*	*Type Two (Exporter)*	*Type Three (Import-Competitive)*
1	Indifferent	Indifferent	Indifferent
2	Defect when $P_B > 0$	Coop. when $P_A > 0$	Defect when $P_B < 1$
3	Coop. when $P_A > P_B$	Coop. when $P_A > P_B$	Defect
4	Defect when $P_A < 1$	Defect when $P_A < 1$	Defect when $P_A > 0$
5	Indifferent	Indifferent	Indifferent

[18] Robert Axelrod, "The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists," *American Political Science Review* 75 (June 1981), 306-18.

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Market Ignorance Incorporated into the Theory

Thus far, we have treated the outcomes as if they were certain events in the sense that, if Self knew which tariff policy Other would choose, he would be certain of his payoff. If, instead, we treat these payoffs as probabilistic, another twist is added to the situation. As an empirical matter, it seems safe to argue that firms that have not been doing business in an international market for long will have less knowledge of that market than of their own domestic market. For such firms, we can order the level of uncertainty associated with the various outcomes as follows:

$$(\text{low, low}) > (\text{low, high}), (\text{high, low}) > (\text{high, high}).$$

The lowest degree of uncertainty is associated with purely domestic operations; somewhat higher uncertainty is associated with facing import competition while not importing, or with exporting but not facing import competition. The highest degree of uncertainty is associated with a fully open world economy. It should be noted that the source of this uncertainty is ignorance of the market rather than the possibility of a change in foreign or domestic tariff policy. Thus, for firms with a long history of involvement in international markets, the additional uncertainty associated with international operations is near zero. It will also be near zero for firms that are import-competitive, because they know that they will export nothing in an open system.

The non-uniform distribution of uncertainty over choices has particular effects if we assume actors to be satisficing. If an outcome falls above the aspiration level, a satisficing actor will prefer it to a risky outcome of the same expected value if at least part of the lower tail of the probability distribution of the risky choice lies below the aspiration level. (If the uncertain outcome exceeds the aspiration level by a large amount, and/or if the variance in possible risky outcomes is small, the entire probability distribution may fall above the aspiration level; the satisficing actor would then be indifferent to the risk.) If an outcome falls below the aspiration level, a satisficing actor will prefer the risky outcome if a tail of its distribution lies above the aspiration level. (These results are consistent with Kahneman and Tversky's presentation of a "prospect theory" of individual decision making, in which individuals are risk-averse with respect to prospective gains and risk-prone with respect to prospective losses.[19] However, there are other aspects of prospect theory that they do not capture.)

[19] Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," *Econometrica* 47 (March 1979), 263-91.

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Thus, under conditions where an open (low, low) system yields satisfactory payoffs to firms, the greater riskiness for those who have not overcome their market ignorance will dampen their enthusiasm for such an outcome. Newly competitive industries might hesitate to press for a low tariff policy because of their uncertainty regarding the payoffs they may expect. On the other hand, when *no* outcomes are certain of yielding a satisfactory level of payoffs, the greater riskiness of the open system will offer the same actors the best chance of surviving.

Satisficing Actors and Tariff Politics

With respect to changes in tariff policy, the following propositions are suggested by the theory:

1. In an economy at the peak of the business cycle—a situation where firms are making profits that meet or exceed their aspiration levels (Condition 5 on Table 2)—the dominant attitude toward tariff policy will be one of indifference.
2. If the world is no longer so pleasant that all outcomes are satisfactory, different positions will be taken. When only the sucker's payoff (low, high) falls below the aspiration level (Condition 4), exporting and mixed-interest firms will be more inclined to defect as the probability that Other will defect first rises. However, as long as Other is perceived to be loyal to an open regime, the pressures for defection will be weak. The import-competitive firms will want to defect when Other is not locked into a high-tariff position.
3. When, for mixed-interest firms and exporting firms, the (low, high) and (high, high) payoffs both fall below the aspiration level (Condition 3), these firms will prefer an open system so long as Other is not locked into the low-tariff choice. If Other cannot retaliate, then these firms will want to grab the (high, low) payoff by raising tariffs; however, if Other is more likely to retaliate for a defection than to defect itself, these firms will prefer a low-tariff policy.
4. When, for import-competitive firms, the (low, low) and (low, high) payoffs both fall below the aspiration level (Condition 3), these firms will prefer high tariffs. When the (low, low), (low, high) and (high, low) payoffs all fall below the aspiration level (Condition 2), these firms will prefer a high-tariff system as long as there is any possibility of retaliation.
5. When, for mixed-interest firms, the sucker's payoff and the closed and open system payoffs all fall below the aspiration level (Condition 2), these firms will also prefer a high-tariff policy so long as retaliation is not certain.
6. When, for exporting firms, the sucker's payoff, the closed-system payoff, and the temptation payoff all fall below the aspiration level (Condition 2), these firms will prefer a low tariff so long as the probability that Other will not defect is less than one.

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7. In Condition 1, when all payoffs for all types of firms fall below the aspiration level, they will all be indifferent to tariff policy.

These formal deductions are simple enough; the problem is mapping theoretically defined conditions onto the observed state of the world. Condition 5 is plausibly mapped onto a period of intense prosperity; Condition 1 is plausibly mapped onto a situation close to economic collapse. (It would be impossible for an entire economy to remain in Condition 1 for long.) Condition 4 would be applicable to a period of reasonably strong prosperity; although it is formally possible for protection to emerge as the dominant firm preference under this condition, this is unlikely so long as there is little basis for supposing that Other is about to defect. (Even at times of intense prosperity or depression, it is possible that not all firms will be equally affected by the surrounding circumstances; thus, the fact that one firm is in a given Condition is no guarantee that others are, too. When economic fluctuations are less extreme and the extremes are of shorter duration, these differences become even more of a problem.)

Conditions 2, 3, and 4 seem to be most likely to provoke intense political activity by firms on the tariff issue. When the consensus of Conditions 1 and 5 breaks down, the policy preference of a firm becomes a function of whether it is import-competitive, mixed-interest, or exporting. Although Conditions 2, 3, and 4 are more complicated than Conditions 1 and 5, it is possible to make some generalizations about them.

1. Import-competitive firms will almost always prefer high tariffs; moreover, this preference is insensitive to expected foreign reaction (Condition 3), or weakened only when Other becomes nonreactive (Conditions 2 and 4).
2. As long as the exporting firms are not satisfied with their payoffs from a closed system (Conditions 2 and 3), they will support low tariffs. The intensity of that support will increase as they perceive that Other will reciprocate (Conditions 2 and 3) and that Other will not take the sucker's payoff (Condition 3).
3. Mixed-interest firms are the most difficult ones to characterize briefly. The intensity of their preference for protection is sometimes a function of whether Other is playing a perfect tit-for-tat strategy (Conditions 2 and 4); they may even prefer a low-tariff policy. When they are not satisfied with the closed system (Condition 3) and are not able to take a free ride on Other's willingness to maintain an open system (P_B is small), they will prefer a low-tariff policy.

Whether a protectionist or a low-tariff coalition will prevail where a protectionist stance by import-competitive firms is taken for granted

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depends on whether the mixed-interest firms are satisfied with their payoff from a closed system (Condition 2), or whether they want more than that (Condition 3), and how close Other comes to a pure tit-for-tat strategy.

If the mixed-interest firms are no longer satisfied with their rewards from a closed system, they will be more inclined to prefer low tariffs so long as Other is reasonably reactive to Self's choices. This preference could, as noted above, be dampened by the fact that mixed-interest firms are likely to have less experience in the international market than the established exporters; hence, the expected utility of an open system will not be so great for them. The preference could also be dampened by Other's lack of responsiveness to Self's policy. Similarly, if Other is perceived as very reactive, and approaches a pure tit-for-tat strategy, the exporters' expected payoff from low tariffs will be higher than if Other is perceived as nonreactive.

V. Comparing and Testing the Theories

The utility-maximizing and satisficing theories both explain governmental policy by asserting that political demands vary as a function of changes in business conditions. Both theories imply that depressions will lead the political balance among firms to shift toward the protectionists. There are some important differences between the theories, however.

In the utility-maximizing theory, changes in the political balance are explained simply by changes in the activation level of firms. Changes in activation arise from the greater ease with which benefits can be captured during a depression, as well as the greater difficulty of improving profitability by exiting a troubled sector and entering a more attractive one. Conversely, the greater attractiveness of exit in prosperous times tends to undercut the attractiveness of political action.

The satisficing theory presented here does not address the phenomena of entry and exit. To the extent that one believes that bounded rationality and the ambiguity of their environment will prevent decision makers of firms from detecting and understanding changes in rates of entry into their sectors, one is inclined to be skeptical regarding a theory that rests solely on such a mechanism. (Skepticism about the ability of actors to understand their lack of opportunity to exit seems considerably less warranted.) The satisficing theory offers no logical reason, however, for rejecting this explanation for cycles of protectionism. Thus, it complements the explanation of the utility-maximization theory, rather than contradicting it.

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The satisficing theory is driven by changes in the values attached to outcomes as the business cycle shifts these outcomes across the aspiration level. In utility-maximizing formulations, where outcomes are generally assumed to have a linear relationship to utilities (a common practice, but one that does not necessarily need to be followed), no linear transformation of the set of outcomes would affect the actors' choice. (This postulate conflicts with the satisficing theory's postulate of changes in preferences, as outcomes are subjected to a linear transformation that alters their relationship to the aspiration level.) However, if the utility-maximizing theory is modified to incorporate risk aversion, the disparity between the theories is lessened: satisficing actors confronting prospective gains will behave much like maximizing actors who are risk-averse.

The utility-maximizing theory does not adequately explain tariff decreases. One can append governmental action to the theory in order to account for such decreases, but that merely serves to point out the inadequacy of an explanation of policy change solely in terms of changing constraints. Allowing disaggregation of a package of tariffs permits localized victories for trade liberalizers, but it still does not explain broad movements in rates across the set of all tariffs. The satisficing theory, by contrast, can account in principle for tariff decreases as well as increases, but the explanation of decreases is more difficult than the explanation of increases even for this theory. There are many logically possible outcomes in which firms are simply *indifferent* to policy; the preferences of government personnel on policy could readily be decisive in those situations.

The utility-maximizing and the satisficing theory have certain limitations in common. Neither gives an adequate account of the composition and strength of high-tariff or low-tariff political coalitions. The artificial assumption that states choose either all high or all low tariffs precludes treatment of the bargaining involved in coalition formation, and oversimplifies the choices facing a firm. Similarly, the treatment of tariffs as if their revenue-generating aspects were inconsequential precludes analysis of those situations in which low-tariff forces capitalize on the state's revenue requirements (or the lack thereof) in order to obtain their individual policy preferences. More generally, the treatment of tariff politics in isolation from all other issue areas precludes analysis of multi-issue coalitions, as well as the use of non-tariff policy side-payments to affect the actors' positions on tariffs. It also leads to neglect of the fact that the supremacy of a political coalition that happens to support a given tariff policy may have little direct connection to the tariff issue, but may rest upon the politics of other issues.

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Some exploratory empirical analyses of the relation between business cycles and changes in tariff policy during the period of "classical" (pre-1914) capitalism are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Since reasonably reliable data on 19th-century economic activity are scarce, the available information does not allow us to discriminate between these two theories, but it does illustrate that there is indeed some empirical support for the postulated relationship between growth rates and protectionism.

Table 3 shows mean growth rates for each year prior to increases and decreases in German tariffs. Considering the low n, the results are encouraging: the difference is considerable and in the predicted direction. Table 4 shows the distribution of U.S. tariff increases and decreases

TABLE 3
MEAN GROWTH RATES IN YEARS OF TARIFF INCREASES AND REDUCTIONS: GERMANY, 1854-1914

	Reductions	*Increases*
Mean % Annual Growth Rate	5.92	3.27

$df = 6$; $t = 1.56$; $p < .10$ (one-tailed)

Sources: Dates of general German tariff increases and decreases are from Ashley (fn. 4). The following years were coded as increases: 1885, 1888, 1902. The following years were coded as decreases: 1853, 1862, 1868, 1870, 1873. Growth rates in the year prior to passage of the legislation were computed from a time series for German national income in Walter G. Hoffmann, *Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1965).

TABLE 4
TARIFF INCREASES AND REDUCTIONS BY PERIOD IN BUSINESS CYCLE: U.S.A., 1857-1914

	During Upswing	*During Downswing*
Reductions	3	2
Increases	0	4

Sources: Ashley (fn. 4) provided the dates of general American tariff increases and decreases. The following years were coded as increases: 1861, 1875, 1890, 1897. The following years were coded as decreases: 1857, 1872, 1894, 1909, 1913. Some other changes mentioned were not coded, either because they were isolated, or because it was impossible to judge from the text whether the overall effect was one of increases or decreases. The timing of the business cycles is found in Geoffrey H. Moore, "Measuring Recessions," in Robert A. Gordon and Lawrence R. Klein, eds., *Business Cycle Indicators, Vol. I: Contributions to the Analysis of Current Business Conditions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

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across business cycles. As can be seen, the relationship between tariff increases and depressions appears to be stronger than the relationship between decreases and prosperity. This difference suggests that the asymmetry in the treatment of tariff increases and decreases in the theories is matched by an asymmetry in the actual process of setting tariffs.

VI. Generalizations

The above theories were developed as part of an effort to explain the growth and decay of a low-tariff regime in Western Europe in the middle of the 19th century.[20] They would be significant if they had implications only for our understanding of that process, but their significance would be even greater if they had implications for other tariff regimes, or for regime change in general. We now consider the possibility of using these theories to explain behavior in larger domains.

National governments are often able to make decisions on contemporary national security politics, and even on low politics, without being subject to much immediate pressure from actors in their societies. The politics of tariff setting and tariff bargaining between states in the 19th century differs from this pattern in that tariffs commonly engaged domestic interests in a way that other types of foreign policy decisions did not. If constraints on government choice are weaker in other issue areas, then, in analyzing decisions in those issue areas, we can more comfortably ignore the process whereby societal demands are generated and affect government decisions. The theories presented here are less useful for explaining such decisions, because in these latter cases societal demands are less central as determinants of policy.

Unlike later eras (or earlier ones, for that matter), the period from 1848 to 1914 evinced a relative dearth of state controls on economic activity and a corresponding lack of state "policy instruments." The tariff during this era served as a key source of revenue, as an important means of dispensing political side payments to various producer (and sometimes consumer) interests, and perhaps as a crude macroeconomic countercyclical tool as well. The lack of alternative policy instruments and the heavy political burdens thus carried by the tariff imply that the stakes in tariff setting were high and that actors deprived in this issue area could not readily be compensated by payoffs in other areas. (The various non-tariff barriers to trade were probably less important then than they are now.) Tariff setting in the 19th century was therefore likely to be subjected to more political constraints than it is in the 20th.

[20] McKeown (fn. 10).

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Since the presence of additional constraints may be expected to decrease the number of points in a bargaining space that could constitute equilibrium outcomes, the general effect of the greater centrality of tariffs in the 19th century would be to reduce the likelihood of a cooperative tariff regime as compared to the current era.

A second difference between the two periods lies in the higher levels of foreign investment at present. The ability to invest behind tariff walls will generally cause exporting firms to worry less about foreign tariffs, except in situations where their production or sales strategies depend upon the free flow of goods across national boundaries. Import-competitive firms will also have less incentive to press their own governments for tariffs if barriers to direct foreign investment are not simultaneously erected. (However, if import-competitive firms believe that the advantage of foreign firms is due solely to more favorable wage rates or other lower factor prices abroad, they are less likely to worry about foreign direct investment.) As for governments, they may have little incentive to raise tariffs if they cannot or will not block capital movements, and if their purpose is to ensure national control over industry rather than to stimulate foreign investment. If governments were attempting to promote foreign investment, raising tariffs might be part of a strategy to accomplish this objective.

Thus it appears that the existence of substantial direct foreign investment increases firms' indifference to tariff policy. If this is true, then firms are less likely to seek more protection, and government is less constrained in its policy choices. The possibility of direct foreign investment may or may not affect the tariff preferences of government officials, depending on their particular policy objectives.

A third distinction between the current era and the 19th century lies in the fact that at present all the leading capitalist states are part of the same military coalition, whereas that was not the case in the 19th century. This difference is significant because tariff bargaining between members of opposing military coalitions is likely to be inhibited by the fact that the bargainers are apt to be more concerned about the distributional effects of agreements than they would be if they were bargaining as members of the same coalition. Distributional advantages could translate into disparities in capabilities, which in turn could mean shifts in influence or "power." A state's concerns about becoming dependent on imports from a potential opponent would also serve to inhibit agreement. Thus, tariff bargaining in the current era is not constrained by alliance patterns to the degree it was earlier.

A fourth difference is that during the 19th century there existed no

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international organizations. By facilitating multilateral consultations, such institutions can lower the cost of negotiations. They can also strengthen a regime by enacting international laws which regulate that regime. A state that breaks such laws incurs costs over and above those caused by the breakdown of cooperation in one issue area because it acquires a general reputation of being untrustworthy. International organizations therefore ought to promote agreement and to inhibit defections—though to what extent is difficult to judge.

The overall effect of the differences cited above is to reduce the degree to which the preferences of firms are likely to constrain a government's choices of tariff policies, and to facilitate state-to-state cooperation on the issue. Therefore, economic conditions that brought a return to protection in the 19th century may not have the same result in the 20th.

VII. Conclusion

The theories presented here offer explanations of the appearance of illiberal tariff policies in capitalist states in terms of political dynamics that are endogenous to such states. Although the available evidence is hardly more than suggestive and does not discriminate between the two theories, it provides a basis for concluding that the approach taken is at least as promising as theories based on the concept of power.

We should also note that the theories—by treating preferences in tariff policy partly as a function of the expected behavior of foreign governments—in effect fuse what Kenneth Waltz terms "second-image" and "third-image" perspectives on international politics.[21] Although the distinction among explanations in terms of between-state processes and within-state processes seems to be popular among students of international politics, it is not obvious that it serves as more than a cataloguing scheme for classifying existing studies in terms of their research emphasis. It certainly ought not to inhibit the development of theories that incorporate influence processes of both types.

[21] By "second image," Waltz refers to theories that explain international outcomes in terms of the domestic sources of state behavior. "Third image" refers to explanations in terms of properties of the international environment. See Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

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SOME CONVENTIONAL ORTHODOXIES IN THE STUDY OF AGRARIAN CHANGE

By ROBERT H. BATES

Introduction

THE purpose of this paper is to present a critical review of two major approaches to the analysis of agrarian societies, and to do so in light of evidence taken from the literature on Africa. The African data provoke considerable skepticism concerning the validity of these contemporary orthodoxies and support the following three major counter-arguments.

1. The very traits that have caused these societies to be classified as "precapitalist"—e.g., the existence of common land rights; the avoidance of market exchanges; the turning to subsistence production, reciprocity, and such social institutions as the family system for economic support—are themselves arguably products of the encounter of agrarian societies with agents of capitalism.[1]

2. Agrarian institutions represent compromises and adaptations; equally as often, they represent impositions from above by more powerful external agents. In either case, they cannot represent institutionalized expressions of agrarian values; subjectivist, value-based accounts of these institutions are therefore false.

3. Not only are the current orthodoxies overly culturally determined; they are also overly economic. Many of the distinctive traits of agrarian societies, I argue, result from the efforts of the state to secure domination and control over rural populations. Insofar as the institutions and behaviors exhibited by agrarian societies define a peasantry, in short, it is the state that creates peasants.

The Dominant Orthodoxies

Among the most prominent of the current approaches, two stand out: the "natural economy" and "peasant economy" models of rural society.

[1] By capitalism I mean an economic system in which there exists: (1) market exchange of both products and factors of production; (2) in particular, private markets for labor; and (3) economic accumulation, thus securing the reproduction and expansion of the means of production.

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The Myth of the Natural Economy

The critical elements of the model of the natural economy are presented in Table 1.

Table 1
Schematic Presentation of the Model of a Natural Economy

- Initial Conditions
  1. Agrarian economy
  2. Production for use rather than exchange
  3. Insignificance of markets
- Institutional Characteristics
  1. Communal land rights
     a. Use rights accorded to producers if, and only if, producer is a member of the community
     b. Rights to land revert to community when use rights are no longer exercised
  2. Importance of the primary community and, in particular, the village
- Social Values
  1. Self-sufficiency
  2. Status
  3. Equality
- Patterns of Change
  1. Initial opposition to "commoditization"
  2. Social disintegration in the face of markets
  3. Radicalization under the impact of capitalism
- Implications
  The preference of agrarian societies for communal forms of economic organization

Initial conditions. According to the model of the natural economy, "primitive" agrarian societies produce not for exchange but for use; as a consequence, "market exchanges are usually peripheral [and] all important output and factor flows are carried on via reciprocity and redistribution."[2] In the absence of markets, resources are not allocated in accord with their value in exchange; rather, the patterns of allocation are determined by social relationships. As Dalton states, "There is no separate economic system to be analyzed independently of social organization."[3]

[2] George Dalton, "Traditional Production in Primitive African Economies" in Dalton, ed., *Tribal and Peasant Economies* (Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press, 1967), 75.
[3] George Dalton, "Subsistence and Peasant Economies in Africa," *ibid.*, 157.

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Institutional characteristics. Nowhere is the determining influence of social organization over the allocation of economic resources more clearly seen than in the area of property rights. In precapitalist societies, according to Marx, "an isolated individual could no more own land than he could speak."[4] The acquisition of property is thus a social act; it requires membership in a community.

Particularly critical is membership in the village. Along with kin-based organizations, the village is viewed as the central social institution of agrarian societies.[5]

The two themes of communal restrictions on landed property and the pervasive significance of villages are often fused. They combine in the discussion of the corporate village. In the words of Eric Wolf, such villages "maintain a measure of communal jurisdiction over land ... restrict their membership, maintain a religious system, enforce mechanisms which ensure the redistribution or destruction of surplus wealth, and uphold barriers against the ... outside."[6] Although the initial writings of Wolf make it clear that the corporate village is but one of many forms of rural settlement, the analysis of these villages dominated much of the subsequent literature on agrarian society.[7]

Social values. The social institutions of rural society, this literature contends, facilitate the attainment of basic cultural values. One such value is a sense of membership. Another is equality. A third is an outgrowth of the first two: the value placed on guarantees of subsistence. All members of society possess an equal right to sufficient income to guarantee their survival. "It is the absence of the threat of *individual* starvation which makes primitive society, in a sense, more human than market economy, and at the same time less economic."[8]

Patterns of change. The initial condition of the natural economy is said to be the absence of markets. But, according to this model, markets inevitably penetrate into even the most isolated communities; and this alteration in the initial conditions generates characteristic patterns of change.

[4] Karl Marx, "Precapitalist Economic Formations," in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Pre-Capitalist Socio-Economic Formations: A Collection* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1979), 98.

[5] See, for example, the discussion in James C. Scott, "Protest and Profanation: Agrarian Revolt and the Little Tradition," *Theory and Society* 4 (Summer 1977), 213.

[6] Wolf, "Closed Corporate Peasant Communities in Mesoamerica and Central Java," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 13 (Spring 1957), 6.

[7] A prime illustration would be Joel S. Migdal, *Peasants, Politics, and Revolutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

[8] Karl Polanyi, quoted in James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976), 5.

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One response is to resist the market; Robert Redfield maintains that these societies attempt to keep the market "at arm's length."[9] With the inevitable triumph of the market, however, a second response arises: social disintegration. Eric Wolf states that "capitalism cut through the integument of custom, severing people from their accustomed social matrix in order to transform them into economic actors, independent of prior social commitments to kin and neighbors."[10] A third response is rural radicalism. Agrarian protest is considered radical in the sense that it asserts the entitlement of all people to subsistence, the validity of communal property as a means of securing this entitlement, and the rejection of the private market.

> It is precisely the fact that peasants and artisans have one foot in the precapitalist economy that explains why they have provided the mass impetus for so many "forward looking" movements. Their opposition to capitalism, based as it is on a utopian image of an earlier era, is as tenacious, if not more so, as the opposition of a proletariat which has both feet in the new society.[11]

Policy implications. An important implication of this theory is that rural dwellers will subscribe to collective forms of economic organization that reject private property, and thereby forestall the emergence of economic inequality and exploitation. Goran Hyden notes that the promotion of cooperative societies in Africa derives in part from the conviction of political leaders that African rural society is communitarian by preference.[12]

The Peasant Economy

A second model of agrarian society that is frequently applied to rural Africa is the model of the peasant economy. Its distinctive features are summarized in Table 2.

Initial conditions. Peasant economies are held to be precapitalist in the sense that, in peasant societies, labor is not separated from the means of production. Nonetheless, peasant societies represent a more "advanced" form of agrarian society than do natural economies. Peasant economies do not stand isolated and self-sufficient; rather, they reside within state systems and within economies that contain cities, industry, and manufacturing. They are linked to these other sectors through relations of political domination and economic exchange.

[9] Redfield, *Peasant Society and Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 46.
[10] Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 279.
[11] Scott (fn. 5), 231.
[12] Hyden, *Efficiency versus Distribution in East African Co-operatives* (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1973), 4.

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TABLE 2
SCHEMATIC PRESENTATION OF THE MODEL OF A PEASANT ECONOMY

INITIAL CONDITIONS
1. Post-agrarian economy; importance of urban industry and manufacturing
2. Fully elaborated markets both for products and factors of production
3. Production for exchange as well as for use

INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
1. Private rights in land
2. Prevalence of inequality
   a. State coercion
   b. Class formation
3. Limited participation in the markets for products and labor

BEHAVIORAL CHARACTERISTICS
1. Subsistence ethic
2. Rejection of pure profit maximization

PATTERNS OF CHANGE
1. Creation of the peasant mode: impact of capitalism on the natural economy
2. Conflicts between peasant mode and capitalism

Institutional characteristics. Nearly all discussions of peasant economies emphasize that peasant societies are "part-societies." In the cultural sphere, peasants are bearers of the "little" tradition; they define their rituals in response to the "great" tradition of the ritual centers of the larger society.[13] In the political sphere, they are part, but not governors, of the system. Not only are peasants politically subordinate to the state, but they also are politically dominated by other classes, which are often rural classes: in the context of a market economy and with the help of state power, certain elements of the rural society are able to accumulate large-scale private landholdings. This pattern of inequality is so important that Welch asks: "Without . . . landlords, could there be peasants?"[14]

In the economic sphere, peasants are "part" societies in the sense that they participate in markets and are reliant upon them to fulfill their subsistence needs—but only partially. *Limited* market participation exists where there is a tendency to consume large proportions of one's own

[13] Redfield (fn. 9), 46.
[14] Claude Welch, "Peasants as a Focus in African Studies," *African Studies Review* 20 (No. 3, 1977), 2.

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production and to rely primarily upon family, as opposed to hired, labor.[15]

Behavioral characteristics. Peasants are held to exhibit characteristically "precapitalist" or "non-market" forms of behavior. As production units, peasant households differ from profit-maximizing firms in that they are driven by the need to secure sufficient subsistence to guarantee their survival and their reproduction. As a consequence, they will, if necessary, engage in internal exploitation to cover the requirements of domestic consumption. They will work longer hours, cultivate the lands they hold more intensively, or surrender greater revenues for lands they wish to buy than purely commercial considerations would justify.[16]

Patterns of change. The origins of peasant economy, it is held, lie in the impact of market forces upon the natural economy. Under the stimulation of the market, property rights become individualistic; households are no longer self-sufficient, but become dependent on the market; and "self-sufficient communities founded largely upon kinship ties are 'turned outwards,' as it were, and made dependent ... upon external structures and forces."[17] In the third world, the primary agency for this expansion of the market is imperialism. Post contends that "the colonial powers ... greatly extended the market principle, to the point where the impersonal forces of the world market dominated the lives of millions. ... It would appear, then, that many of the conditions for the existence of a peasantry were suddenly created, but from outside."[18]

The subsequent trajectory of change in peasant societies is said to be largely characterized by protracted periods of conflict between capitalism and the peasant mode of production. Some scholars, such as Hyden, find that peasants retard the growth of capitalism by their tendency to avoid markets and by their preference for subsistence production.[19] Others, such as Williams, contend that peasants resist the growth of capitalism but nonetheless fail, for they are inherently a "transitional class, which will inevitably be displaced by the technical superiority of capitalist production."[20]

[15] Eric R. Wolf, "Types of Latin American Peasantry: A Preliminary Discussion," *American Anthropologist* 57 (June 1955), 454.

[16] A. V. Chayanov, Daniel Thorner, Basile Kerblay, and R.E.F. Smith, eds., *The Theory of Peasant Economy* (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin for the American Economic Association, 1966).

[17] Ken Post, " 'Peasantization' and Rural Political Movements in Western Africa," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 13 (No. 2, 1972), 225-26.

[18] *Ibid.*, 233. See also Wolf (fn. 10).

[19] Goran Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980).

[20] Gavin Williams, "The World Bank and the Peasant Problem," in Judith Heyer, Pepe

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The Models Reviewed in Light of the African Experience

As outlined above, the foregoing represent two of the dominant models of rural society. What is devastating is how poorly these models perform when applied to the African data.

Initial Conditions

To an Africanist, one of the most striking deficiencies in these theories is posited in their initial conditions: a world of subsistence production in which there are no markets, no buying, no trading. This assumption, it should be stressed, cannot be dismissed as a mere romantic overtone in the arguments; rather, it provides an essential underpinning. Movements away from these initial conditions precipitate the change from a subsistence-oriented, egalitarian, isolated natural society to a market-dependent, class-riven, peasant society that is inextricably tied to centers of wealth and power. The initial conditions also help to account for the growth and behavior of political forces: outrage at the loss of a "state of virtue" provides a demand for agrarian revolution, and the moral values that are threatened through the spread of capitalism provide the revolutionary ideology.

If the initial conditions of the model of the natural economy were to hold anywhere, one would expect them to hold in Africa. And yet, time and time gain, historical research reaffirms that in precolonial Africa there was trade, there was commerce, and there was the widespread use of money in exchange economies. Jack Goody, who best summarizes these findings, is worth quoting at length:

> The concept of non-monetary economics is hardly applicable to precolonial Africa, except possibly for certain hunting groups of minimal importance. Africa was involved in a vast network of wide-ranging trade long before the Portuguese came on the scene. For East Africa we have a late first-century sailors' guide, the *Periplus of the Erythrean Sea*, to the trade along the coast. Long before the Europeans arrived there were trade routes from Madagascar up the East African coast, through the Red Sea and into the Mediterranean, along the Persian Gulf to India, South-east Asia, and Indonesia. By the time the Portuguese had reached East Africa, the Chinese had already been active there; before the development of the gun-carrying sailing ship on the Atlantic seaboard, the maritime commerce of the Indian Ocean made western Europe seem an underdeveloped area. Indeed, the trade between Ethiopia, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean had much to do with the developments in the Arabian peninsula, including the rise of Muhammed.

Roberts, and Gavin Williams, eds., *Rural Development in Tropical Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981).

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> In West Africa the medieval empires of the Niger bend were built up on the trade which brought salt, cloth, and beads south from the Sahara across to West Africa and took gold and ivory and slaves back to the Barbary coast and from there into medieval Europe.[21]
>
> From the point of view of mercantile economy, parts of Africa were similar to western Europe of the same period. Metal coinage was in use on the East African coast. In the west, currencies consisted of gold, brass, and salt, but more especially cowrie shells which, coming as they did from the Maldive Islands off the south of Ceylon, filled most of the necessary attributes of money.[22]

Isolation, subsistence, and lack of involvement in an exchange economy were not commonly found in the "primitive" economies of Africa. Where they were, these traits characterized so small and insignificant a group of African societies that it would be nonsensical to base a general theory of social change upon them.[23]

Transition Arguments

The reigning orthodoxies in the study of agrarian economies are defined not only in terms of their initial conditions; they are also defined in terms of their dynamics—i.e., assertions are made concerning their characteristic patterns of change. Agrarian societies are portrayed as locked in conflict with a powerful alternative: the capitalist economy, where private property exists, where everything can be bought and sold, and where people are driven to maximize profits by the imperative of market competition. In the face of the encroachment of the capitalist economy, rural dwellers are said to attempt to keep the market at arm's length and to resist commoditization. In light of the expectations generated by these arguments, it is therefore disconcerting to find that in Africa the roles of the supposed antagonists are sometimes the reverse of what these models would lead us to expect.

Buying and selling. Despite myths to the contrary, indigenous peoples throughout much of Africa turned quickly, vigorously, and skillfully to production for colonial markets. The rapid and astonishing growth of the cocoa industry in West Africa has been told by Hill and Berry; within one generation, Ghana became the world's leading producer of cocoa; it did so on the initiative of indigenous agrarian interests.[24] Ho-

[21] Jack Goody, "Economy and Feudalism in Africa," *The Economic History Review* 23 (December 1969), 394-95.

[22] *Ibid.*, 395.

[23] There is evidence that extensive trade existed in precolonial Africa for agricultural products as well. See William O. Jones, "Agricultural Trade Within Tropical Africa: Historical Background," in Robert H. Bates and Michael Lofchie, eds., *Agricultural Development in Tropical Africa: Issues of Public Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1980), 10-45.

[24] Polly Hill, *Studies in Rural Capitalism in West Africa* (London: Cambridge University

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gendorn has shown how in Northern Nigeria indigenous entrepreneurs organized the large-scale production of groundnuts for export to colonial markets.[25] Similar histories exist for palm oil production in Nigeria and groundnut production in Senegal.[26] Giovanni Arrighi notes that in the Rhodesias change was not limited to the sphere of exchange but was also introduced in the methods of production: "Africans were equally prompt in investing and innovating in response to market opportunities."[27] The peasants acquired wagons, carts, maize mills, pumps, ox-drawn ploughs and other equipment; they radically altered their farming system; and they invested in higher-grade cattle and the fencing and dips required for their survival.[28]

Property rights. Change went even deeper: it extended to the definition of property rights. In light of the expectations formed by the orthodox treatment of agrarian change, the stunning irony of the matter is that it was often the governments of the colonial powers—the primary agents of capitalism—who advocated "communal" property rights, whereas members of the indigenous agrarian societies championed the cause of private ownership.

In order to avoid confusion on the matter of property rights, let me recall the definition outlined in Table 1. By communal land rights, I mean a system wherein

1. Use rights are accorded a producer if, and only if, that producer is a member of the community. In other words,
   (a) Community membership is a sufficient condition for rights to land: no member of the community can go without land.
   (b) Community membership is a necessary condition for rights to land: land cannot be alienated outside of the community.
2. The community holds revisionary rights in land. That is, when individuals no longer use the land, rights to it revert to the community. The land can then be reallocated to other users.

Press, 1970); Sara Berry, *Cocoa, Custom and Socio-Economic Change in Rural Western Nigeria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975).

[25] Jan S. Hogendorn, "Economic Initiative and African Cash Farming," in Peter Duignan and Lewis H. Gann, eds., *Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 283-328.

[26] Donal Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971); G. K. Helleiner, *Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in Nigeria* (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1966).

[27] Arrighi, "Labor Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Study of Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia," in Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1973), 185.

[28] See also the cases described in Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons, eds., *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977).

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Under a system of private property rights, membership in the community is no longer sufficient to guarantee access to land; nor is it a necessary condition. Thus, land can be alienated to persons outside the community. Moreover, land that is not in use does not revert to the community; it can be held for purposes of speculation, transferred to other private individuals, or bequeathed to persons of the owner's choosing. It is a consequence of this system, of course, that even in the presence of abundant land, people may starve for want of access to it; a primary attraction of a communal system of land rights is that under similar circumstances such deaths would not occur.

Conflicts between capitalist governments committed to communal rights and spokesmen for agrarian societies committed to private land rights broke out in both West and East Africa. In 1912, the British colonial government appointed the West African Lands Committee to investigate land laws in British West Africa. The Committee's report called for the reinforcement of "pure native tenure." It stressed that "legislation should have as its aim the checking of the progress of individual tenure and the strengthening of native custom," which, it held, "did not recognize the concept of individual tenure and forbade the ... sale of ... community land."[29] In these recommendations, the Committee was vigorously opposed by local interests. One expert on local practices, Sir Brandford Griffith, noted that in opposing private ownership and a free market in land, the government was in fact flying in the face of "local custom." Grier comments that

> So definite and so common a practice was the sale of land ... by the end of the nineteenth century that Griffith (whose association with the colony dated back to his father, Sir William Brandford Griffith, Governor 1886-1895) could say that he "never had occasion to consider the question."[30]

In West Africa, then, the putative agency of capitalist expansion—the government of the colonial power—actively promoted communal rights, while members of the agrarian societies demanded the unrestricted right to purchase and to alienate land. In East Africa, a similar "reversal" obtained. In opposition to the penetration of private market forces into the rural sector, for example, the postwar governor of Kenya, Sir Philip Mitchell, argued that soil degradation, environmental spoilage,

[29] Beverly Grier, "Underdevelopment, Modes of Production, and the State in Colonial Ghana," *The African Studies Review* 24 (March 1981), 35. For an excellent discussion of the issue of property rights, see also John Cohen, "Land Tenure and Rural Development in Africa," in Bates and Lofchie (fn. 23).

[30] Grier (fn. 29), 33.

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and avaricious exploitation of land inevitably followed the creation of private property. What was needed, he maintained, was "the proper control of the community. Each Native Land Unit, or a portion of a unit, was to be regarded as an 'estate of the community'; each occupier of land was to be a 'tenant of the tribe'."[31]

The indigenous people opposed the land policy of the government of Kenya. As long ago as 1912, a Kenya District Officer had investigated local tenurial practices among the Kikuyu and had found that land was held by families who occupied it unconditionally—that is, not at the pleasure of any higher communal authority. He had also found that many of these family estates had been purchased. Land was in fact bought and sold both within and between tribes.[32] It is therefore not surprising that the Kikuyu opposed the government's policy and demanded individual registration of land holdings and the enforcement of private rights to land. The urgency with which they pressed their demands was of course intensified by the insecurity they felt in the face of the uncompensated seizure of lands by the colonialists.

Characteristically, the transition arguments of the orthodox models of agrarian change have made the assumption that rural dwellers are assaulted by capitalism. They counterpoise the communal attributes of these societies against the forces of capitalism that promote private interests. They make allowance for some members of rural society to demand private property rights: rural elites, for example, are expected to seek a regime of private property rights in order to defend their economic privileges. But it could never be the case under these theories that agents of capitalism would seek to establish communal rights while the members of agrarian societies seek private ones. And yet, as we have seen, the literature on Africa documents at least two instances of this "reversal."

Our attention is thus deflected from the economist orthodoxies. In particular, the discordant set of facts suggests that *governments* may act in ways that differ from what one would expect, given their societies' "stage of development"; they may confront an independent set of political imperatives.

Ideology. In the case of the British, there existed a genuine conviction that precapitalist societies were communitarian; that Western man, in the personage of the imperialist, was introducing forces that promoted self-interested behavior; and that, because indigenous institutions were

[31] Quoted in M.P.K. Sorrenson, *Land Reform in Kikuyu Country* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1967), 56.
[32] *Ibid*, 20-21.

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scarce and inherently valuable, they should be protected by government. In his discussion of Norman Humphrey, an influential figure in the postwar development of Kenyan land policy, Sorrenson notes:

> Humphrey—and indeed a good many other officials—doubted the moral right of Europeans to impose ... a system [of economic individualism] on Africans, thus destroying the supposed communal spirit of tribal tradition. Humphrey wanted to establish a series of locational, divisional, and district councils to manage land along communal lines ... and he hoped this would lead to a 'reawakening of [the individual's] sense of duty to his fellows and his land and the instilling of a desire to abandon those false values that have been a major product of his sudden contact with our civilization.'[33]

Humphrey was, of course, echoing the sentiments of far more powerful figures in the British colonial regime: Lugard, Cameron, Perham, and Hailey, to mention but a few.[34]

Empowerment. Tactical calculations made in the course of securing political domination in Africa were also important. The colonial governments sought, and needed, political allies through whom they could secure control over Africa's largely agrarian population. A prime reason for insisting on communal land rights, it would appear, was that a system of communal rights empowered locally based confederates: it gave control over the allocation of the key resource in an agrarian economy to those who would govern the agrarian population on behalf of the colonialist powers—the tribal chiefs.

In the British case, the policy of governing through "traditional rulers" was known as "indirect rule." C. K. Meek clearly articulates the link between indirect rule and the formation of property rights; at the beginning of his semi-official treatise, *Land Law and Custom in the Colonies*, he states:

> The authority of chiefs, sub-chiefs and heads of clans and families is bound up with the land. The grant, therefore, to individuals of absolute rights of ownership would tend to disrupt the native policy, and so, too, would the indiscriminate sale of tribal lands by chiefs.[35]

So compelling is this thesis that Meek returns to it toward the end of his work, contending that "there is a political danger in allowing

[33] *Ibid.*, 58.

[34] See, for example, Lord Hailey, *An African Survey: Revised, 1956* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957); Frederick D. Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (London: F. Cass, 1965); and Margery Freda Perham, *Native Administration in Nigeria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1937).

[35] Meek, *Land Law and Custom in the Colonies* (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), 10.

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individuals to become owners of 'freeholds,' without owing any allegiance to the local Native Authorities." He concludes, "If 'indirect rule' is to continue to be a cardinal principle of British policy, it would appear to be essential that the local Native Authorities should remain the ultimate 'owners' of as much land as possible. . . ."[36]

The best system, from Meek's point of view, was one in which political loyalty to an agent of the colonial power served as a prerequisite for access to land. Robert L. Tignor, in examining the operation of this system, finds it to operate roughly as one would expect. Friends and relatives of the chief secured land; indeed, the chiefly families became the richest land owners in the districts studied, while political enemies of the chiefs lost rights to land. Tignor also notes that the more valuable the control over land—i.e., the scarcer the land in relation to the population—the greater the power which the British policy of customary land rights conferred to the chiefs. The Ibo and Kikuyu chiefs, for example, who ruled in densely populated agricultural areas, proved far more effective as "modernizing agents" of the British than did the chiefs of the Kamba or Masai, who lived in areas where population was far less dense and land therefore relatively more abundant.[37]

Counter-factual observations—that rural dwellers favor private property rights while capitalist governments favor communal property—have thus driven us to a departure from orthodox theories of rural change. We have moved instead to an approach in which key rural institutions—in this case, property law—are interpreted as political outcomes. As a corollary to this approach, it might be assumed that the institutions that were adopted in any particular situation would represent the outcome of political bargaining. Viewed in this light, there is no particular reason to expect one or another form of agrarian institution to emerge as a consequence of social change. The outcome would depend on the configuration of power.

This inference is supported by the literature. In some areas of Africa, both the colonial powers and the native chiefs were notably weak. In Zambia, for instance, the occupying forces were small and chiefly powers had been based largely upon warfare and slave raiding, both of which were abandoned following the imperial occupation. It was also true in Kenya; not only were the British forces small in number, but acephalous

[36] *Ibid.*, 193.

[37] Tignor, "Colonial Chiefs in Chiefless Societies," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 9 (1971), 350. See also Marshall Clough, *Chiefs and Politicians: Local Politics and Social Change in Kiambu, Kenya, 1918–1936*, Ph.D. diss. (Stanford University, 1978).

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societies were the rule—the institution of chieftaincy was nonexistent. From the point of view of the colonial administration in both places, the result was a need for power. In the case of Kenya, the response of the British was the virtual creation of chiefs and tribal authorities, and the assignment of the power to regulate the allocation of "native" lands to these native authorities. In the case of Zambia, the British forbade any registering of individual titles of land ownership, and created tribal rights in land; land allocation became the responsibility of the chiefs. As Gluckman states, government policy promoted tribalism.[38]

Where there was a need to create rural power, then, the colonial state promoted the establishment of communal property rights as part of its effort to elaborate systems of rural political control over an agrarian population. Where the colonial authority possessed decisive power and was not reliant upon the creation of rural elites, the situation was different. In essence, it was no longer purely political; commercial considerations could be decisive. For example, if an industrial labor force was needed, the agrarian society could be "proletarianized," as it was in some regions of southern Africa. Where food or export crops were desired, the rural population could be left in place as a free peasantry and agrarian society, a collection of smallholders working virtually within a regime of private property.

In other regions, where rural elites did exist, the outcome of the bargaining between the colonial power and the indigenous agrarian society often reflected the composition and preferences of the latter. In Ghana, for instance, indigenous commercial elites profited from the use of land. Exports of rubber, timber, and palm oil had long flourished in the territory, and the local political leaders themselves were deeply involved in commerce and trade. The colonial power, in securing the terms of the political settlement by which to govern the territory, had to concede the rights of these rural elites to exercise unrestricted control over their property. In Uganda, by contrast, the rural elite was not commercialized, and land was not exploited to secure pecuniary profits from agriculture. Rather, the elite was almost purely political and consisted of the chiefs and their administrators. In order to secure allies within the rural sector, then, the imperialists had to accommodate themselves to this structure of power. The result was yet another form of property settlement: the virtual "Junkerization" of landed relations. In return for their collaboration with the British occupying powers, the

[38] Max Gluckman, "Foreword" to W. Watson, *Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy* (Manchester: Manchester University Press for the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1958), x-xi.

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chiefs were given freeholders' rights to the best lands in Uganda; the peasants virtually became serfs. When cash crop production began, the chiefs reaped vast economic benefits through the appropriation of labor dues and other "feudal" services.[39]

The argument that African indigenous societies embodied collective property rights and that it was the influence of capitalism that led to the formation of private rights in land is an overly economist one. Rather, the form of property law was shaped by the desire of the colonial state for political domination of an agrarian population and by the nature of the political accommodations it had to make in order to secure its hegemony.

Finances. States that are driven by the need for domination thus develop land rights in efforts to create rural centers of power. In shaping their policies toward rural property, their behavior is also influenced by financial imperatives. One of the best illustrations of the influence of fiscal considerations comes from Zambia. As is well known, Zambia depends on the production of copper. The copper deposits, first located early in the 20th century, gave birth to one of the world's leading copper industries; by 1930, the mines of what was then Northern Rhodesia employed 30,000 people. As the largest industry in this small territory, and by a vast measure the most profitable, the copper industry constituted the major element in the colonial government's tax base.

When copper prices rose, both the government and the mining companies prospered; when copper prices fell, both suffered. But the costs imposed by lower prices were borne unequally: while both the government and the firms experienced decreasing revenues, the efforts of the firms to lower their costs when income declined imposed increased costs upon the government.

The mines were capitalist enterprises. When prices fell, they maximized their profits (or, equivalently, minimized their losses) by curtailing their use of the variable factor of production: labor. While it was cost-minimizing on the part of companies to release labor at times of lower prices, unemployed labor threatened to add to the costs of government. These costs might take the form of the state's providing food and shelter; or they might take the form of police protection in the face of threats posed by masses of unemployed workers. Even though both the government and the mining companies derived their revenues from mining, then, the government's need for additional funds increased just when revenues became most scarce.

[39] Henry W. West, *Land Policy in Buganda* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

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This fiscal dilemma was, in a sense, created by capitalism. Since the means of production were in private hands, production decisions were made solely with a view to private, as opposed to social, consequences. In addition, the state's revenues were subject to cyclical shocks originating from the capitalist economies. L. H. Gann quotes the Chief Secretary of Northern Rhodesia at the time of the most cataclysmic of these shocks—the depression of the 1930s:

> The wealth of the country is in the minerals which it does not own ... and direct revenue from this source is at present negligible.... The fact ... that the companies are not earning taxable profits does not diminish the services which the Government is compelled to supply to the mining areas.[40]

To deal with this dilemma, the state advocated an ironical solution: the development of communal forms of rights to landed property. The government created a form of citizenship in which rights were dependent not only on national membership, but also on membership in a subnationality, a tribe. Access to land became a function of tribal affiliation. Land could be acquired in a rural community by affiliating with its political officials and by establishing membership in a kin group that belonged to that political community. To retain rural land rights, then, urban dwellers had to be "tribalized." Rural lands could not be sold; they were retained as "tribal trusts." The reason for these policies was clear: at times of fiscal stress, the government wanted to be able to avoid the costs of large-scale unemployment. It wanted the disbanded urban labor force to reincorporate itself into the rural economy quickly and peacefully. The costs of guaranteeing subsistence were thus to be borne by the rural community.[41]

Thus, the origins of communal land rights lay at least as much in capitalism and in the fiscal problems it created for the state as they did in the inherent cultural traditions of the rural population.[42]

[40] Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1964), 253.

[41] Excellent discussions are included in Elena L. Berger, *Labour, Race and Colonial Rule: The Copperbelt from 1924 to Independence* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974); Charles Perrings, *Black Mineworkers in Central Africa* (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1979); A. L. Epstein, *Politics in an Urban African Community* (Manchester: Manchester University Press for the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1958); and Helmuth Heisler, *Urbanization and the Government of Migration* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974).

[42] For additional arguments, see Claude Meillassoux, *Maidens, Meal and Money: Capitalism and the Domestic Community* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Harold Wolpe, "Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa," *Economy and Society* 1 (No. 4, 1972), 425-56; and Palmer and Parsons (fn. 28). I differ from these approaches in my acknowledgement of the divergence of interests between the state and private enterprises, and in my conviction that the state was set upon solving *its own* fiscal problem by controlling the formation of land laws.

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Another Institution: The Village

Thus far I have employed the African data to criticize several major components of the currently orthodox theories of agrarian change—their statement of initial conditions; their specification of characteristic trajectories of change; and their analysis of a key agrarian institution, property rights. The African experience provokes a skeptical reappraisal of arguments pertaining to a second major rural institution, namely, the village.

In Africa, village dwelling was often not the basic form of rural settlement; many people preferred to live in isolated homesteads. Where villages were formed, it was often at the behest of states. Many of these states were profoundly capitalist.

At the time of the establishment of the Pax Britannica in north-eastern Rhodesia, for example, people generally resided in family homesteads. In the late 19th century, however, the British South African Company (B.S.A.C.)—the creation of that most dedicated proponent of capitalist expansion, Cecil John Rhodes—determined that the region's rural population properly belonged in villages. George Kay notes that "throughout the whole of north-eastern Zambia ruthless regrouping for administrative convenience was systematically carried out."[43] He quotes from the B.S.A.C.'s own records that "many ... resisted and were sent to prison before the order was finally obeyed."[44] In this area, then, it was the administrators who sought to form the villages. That the agents of one of the most dedicated embodiments of capitalism were the proponents of villagization adds an ironic note to our reappraisal of the orthodox position.[45]

Even today it would appear that village dwelling is preferred by the governments rather than by the rural people. Tanzania is a notable case in point. In the name of "development," the government of Tanzania has sought to group rural dwellers into communities large enough for it to provide dispensaries, clinics, schools, water supplies, agricultural inputs, marketing facilities, and other services; it thereby hopes to strengthen the productive forces of the country's agrarian society.[46] It is notable that the state legitimated its reconstruction of rural society by propound-

[43] Kay, *Social Aspects of Village Regrouping in Zambia* (Lusaka: Institute for Social Research, University of Zambia, 1967), 11.

[44] *Ibid.*, 10.

[45] In the case of Kenya, Sorrenson notes: "The Kikuyu did not live in villages, but in dispersed households. ... During the Mau Mau Emergency the Kikuyu, the Embu and some of the Meru population were concentrated in 732 villages. ..." Sorrenson (fn. 31), 3.

[46] The best studies are Michaela Von Freyhold, *Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania* (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1979); Dean E. McHenry, Jr. *Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1979); and Hyden (fn. 19).

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ing a theory of African agrarian history in which "colonialism [had] encouraged individualistic social attitudes,"[47] whereas prior to colonialism, Africans had lived cooperatively in socially integrated, mutually supportive, "village communities." Tanzanian scholars have not hesitated to question the validity of these claims.[48]

In evaluating the presumption that village-living is the natural form of agrarian settlement in Africa, we should be disposed toward caution. In some areas, villages appear not to have been the preferred mode of habitation. In other cases, where they *were* preferred, it was the states that preferred them. Some of these states were socialist, as in the case of Tanzania; in the case of the late British South Africa Company, however, the authorities were rampantly capitalist.[49]

A Behavioral Characteristic: The Preference for Subsistence

The three elements of initial conditions, institutional traits, and characteristic patterns of change help to define the orthodox models of agrarian society. So, too, does a fourth element: the psychological traits of rural dwellers. Of these traits, the one that is central to the conventional models is the preference for subsistence production.

In contradistinction to the conventional orthodoxies, I argue that the reversion to subsistence can be viewed as a rational response to prevailing conditions in the political and economic environment of the rural producers. The actions of the states that control the markets in efforts to extract resources from rural populations constitute an important source of these conditions.

Many of Africa's export crops are cash crops, pure and simple; they have no direct use in consumption and are grown purely for the market. Recently, the volume of agricultural exports from Africa has declined, creating shortages of foreign exchange; this decline has been taken by Hyden and others as evidence of the disruptive power of a precapitalist peasantry.[50] But I would argue that it should be viewed in a different light.

In Africa as a whole, over 80 percent of the population is engaged in agriculture, and over 50 percent of the gross domestic product is derived from agricultural production. Most African states therefore rely

[47] *Ibid.*, 98.

[48] See, for example, Samuel S. Mushi, "Modernization by Traditionalization: Ujamaa Principles Revisited," *Taamuli* 1 (No. 2, March 1971).

[49] For further evidence concerning "state origins" of village communities and a brilliant exposition of this argument, see Samuel L. Popkin, *The Rational Peasant* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Unversity of California Press, 1979).

[50] Hyden (fn. 19).

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on agriculture for financial resources. One way in which the industry can be taxed is by regulating the market for export crops. In many cases, the government is the sole legal buyer of these crops. By purchasing them at an administratively set price in the domestic market and selling them at prices prevailing in the world market, the government accumulates revenue generated by the difference between the domestic and world market prices. In this way, the producers of cash crops are heavily taxed.[51]

One implication of such governmental fiscal policies is that the rewards for participating in the market place are lowered for many farmers; they are certainly lowered in comparison with the returns attained by producing crops that can be consumed on the farm or sold outside of official marketing channels.[52]

A government's use of market controls to levy resources from agriculture thus lowers the returns farmers can expect from production for the market, both in absolute and relative terms. *In and of itself, this fact would account for the peasants' turning away from cash crop production.* There is therefore no need to posit the existence of an antimarket peasant mentality. Indeed, such an imputation would be wrong: withdrawal from exchange is the appropriate market response to the economic conditions that at present characterize many agricultural markets.

The Market Origins of Political Bondage

Governments are interested not only in securing public revenues from export markets; they are also interested in securing foreign exchange. Toward this end, they tend to overvalue their currencies. One consequence is the taxation of export agricultural products for the benefit of those who seek imports: the industrialists (who seek cheap imports of plant and capital equipment) and the elites (who seek to gratify their tastes for imported products more cheaply). Another consequence of overvaluation is the generation of political power by establishing an excess demand for foreign exchange. At the artificially pegged price of the domestic currency, the market cannot allocate foreign exchange; the demand for it exceeds the supply. Those in charge of the foreign exchange "market" therefore become enormously powerful because they control the allocations of a scarce and valuable resource.

In this system, the beneficiaries are those in the Central Bank or those who make appointments to it. They are members of the foreign exchange

[51] See Robert H. Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981).

[52] See, for example, the data contained in Government of Uganda, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, "Pricing Policy and Agricultural Production," (Entebbe: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, August 1978).

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allocation committees and of the committees that allocate import licenses, or persons who designate the appointees to these committees. Those who receive import licenses also stand to benefit.

The losers in this system are those who are not located in positions of access to this scarce resource and who nonetheless must purchase imported goods. Typically, there are no peasant farmers in the Central Bank or on the committee that allocates foreign exchange or import licenses. Yet the farmers rely on imports. Farm implements such as hoes, cutlasses, sprayers, pesticides, ox ploughs and other tools, sacks and bags, milling machines, and so forth often have to be imported. Moreover, many consumer goods, such as shirts, shoes, blankets, soap, and batteries are imported, or are manufactured with imported equipment. But, in this administratively structured market, the farmers must, in effect, bribe their superiors to secure needed imports; they must pay the premium exacted by the excess demand for foreign currencies and imports to satisfy those who have sufficient political power to secure privileged access to foreign exchange or to the imports it can buy.

Overvaluation thus lowers the price of exports, increases the costs of farming, and raises consumer prices for farmers. And it does so while involving the farmers in a system of regulated foreign exchange markets in which they are subject to political and economic domination by persons with influence in the national capital.

An analysis that is based on the political manipulation of markets thus reveals three features of the conventional models of precapitalist societies. One is the withdrawal from markets; another—a virtual corollary—is the preference for subsistence; and the third is the powerlessness of peasants. Rather than posit these characteristics as three separate traits, I regard them as joint consequences of the way in which markets have been manipulated by states to extract resources from agrarian societies. The approach is more powerful than the conventional orthodoxies.[53]

Conclusion

In this paper I have summarized two of the dominant models of agrarian change and reviewed them in light of evidence drawn from rural Africa. The traditional approaches require initial conditions that

[53] Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, in writing about precolonial African societies, defined the African mode of production as one in which states did not directly control producers (e.g., through enserfment or slavery), but controlled and manipulated trade in order to accumulate resources from them. Her analysis is at least as applicable, in my view, to contemporary Africa as it was to the precolonial period, and very likely more so. See Coquery-Vidrovitch, "Recherches sur un mode de production Africain," *Le Penśee* 144 (1969), 61-78.

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have rarely existed historically. They are overly subjectivist, attributing the existence of institutions to preferences under circumstances in which these institutions have clearly been imposed. Moreover, they are overly economic, in that they place too strong an emphasis on the impact of the market on agrarian societies and too little on the impact of states. Time and again throughout this essay, an approach has proved fruitful that looks at the effect upon rural society of the demand for power and resources on the part of states under conditions in which people and wealth are concentrated in agriculture.

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Review Articles

HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: Complementary or Competing Concerns?

By JACK DONNELLY*

Keith Griffin and Jeffrey James, *The Transition to Egalitarian Development: Economic Policies for Structural Change in the Third World*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981, 128 pp.

Parvez Hasan and D. C. Rao, eds., *Korea: Policy Issues for Long-Term Development*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (for the World Bank), 1979, 538 pp.

Sylvia Ann Hewlett, *The Cruel Dilemmas of Development: Twentieth Century Brazil*. New York: Basic Books, 1980, 243 pp.

THE conventional wisdom of the sixties and early seventies held that, except in the very long run, rapid development and human rights are competing concerns. Development was viewed as a necessary condition for the effective implementation of human rights: the implementation of an extensive range of economic and social human rights was considered impossible in the absence of a relatively large GNP (which was seen as the principal product of development), and many civil and political rights were held to be of questionable subjective significance under conditions of gross underdevelopment. Furthermore, in many cases the exercise of human rights—economic, social, and cultural as well as civil and political—tended to interfere with or to slow the rate of economic growth and development. It was therefore argued that many, or even most, internationally recognized human rights[1] must be temporarily suspended.

* I wish to thank Rhoda Howard, Charles Brockett, and George Shepherd for their helpful suggestions for revisions of earlier drafts. I also wish to thank the National Endowment for the Humanities for support through its Summer Seminars for College Teachers program.

[1] For simplicity, I shall take as authoritative the list of human rights in the so-called International Bill of Human Rights—i.e., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The status of economic and social rights has been challenged on philosophical grounds. See, for example, Maurice Cranston, *What Are Human Rights?* (London: The Bodley Head, 1973); Charles Frankel, *Human Rights and Foreign Policy* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1978, Headlines Series No. 241), 38-41ff.;

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Three particular tradeoffs were widely advocated:

1. *The needs tradeoff.*[2] Rather than devote scarce resources to social programs in order to satisfy basic human needs (and associated human rights to, for example, food and health care), it is necessary to tolerate relatively high levels of absolute poverty (need deprivation) in order to maximize investment. The consumption forgone in the short and medium run, however, will be returned with interest in the additional production purchased through increased investment, thereby minimizing the total economic *and human* cost of overcoming mass poverty. What may be called a "strong" needs tradeoff would attempt to reduce, freeze, or otherwise control consumption in order to capture the largest possible share of total resources for investment. A "weak" needs tradeoff would simply exclude consideration of consumption-oriented human rights from development planning.

2. *The equality tradeoff.*[3] A "weak" equality tradeoff is based on the so-called Kuznets or (inverted) U hypothesis.[4] Average incomes and income inequality both tend to be lower in the "traditional" sector than in the "modern" sector. Therefore, during the transition to a modern economy, inequality in the size distribution of income will first increase, then be maintained at a high level, and finally recede at moderately high levels of national income (thus producing a U-shaped curve when inequality is plotted against per capita GNP).

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and A. I. Melden, "Are There Welfare Rights?," in Peter G. Brown, Conrad Johnson, and Paul Vernier, eds., *Income Support: Conceptual and Policy Issues* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1982), 259-78. Such arguments, however, have been subjected to trenchant criticism; see esp. Henry Shue, *Basic Rights: Subsistence and Affluence in U. S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). In any case, they are of little relevance to international action, since they have been officially rejected by virtually all countries, developed and developing alike.

[2] "An autonomous reduction in consumption . . . is the human price that must be paid for a rapidly growing domestic national product." Stephen Enke, *Economics for Development* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 181. "A conscious effort must be made to increase savings, either from existing incomes or by capturing a major share of the rising incomes that result from inducing greater effort and productivity." Bruce R. Morris, *Economic Growth and Development* (New York: Pitman Publishing Corporation, 1967), 306.

[3] "Equality, in other words, is a luxury of rich countries. If a poor society is to achieve anything at all it must develop a high degree of inequality—the small economic surplus must be concentrated in a few hands if *any* high-level achievements are to be made." Kenneth E. Boulding, *Principles of Economic Policy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 94 (emphasis in original). "There is likely to be a conflict between rapid growth and an equitable distribution of income; and a poor country anxious to develop would probably be well advised not to worry too much about the distribution of income." Harry G. Johnson, *Money, Trade and Economic Growth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 153. In contrast to Johnson and others, I use "equity" to refer to a combination of needs and equality. Thus, I will speak of an "equality tradeoff," reserving the term "equitable development" for development with minimal needs and equality tradeoffs.

[4] Simon Kuznets, "Economic Growth and Income Inequality," *American Economic Review* 45 (March 1955), 1-28.

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In a "strong" equality tradeoff, inequality is viewed as a contributor to, rather than just an unavoidable consequence of, development. For example, it is often argued that, since only the relatively well-to-do can afford to save and invest, and since investment is the key to rapid growth, inequality is in the best interests of the poor in the long-run. Inequality is also often justified as an incentive, and reward, for superior economic performance, and therefore desirable—so long as the resulting distribution is either Pareto-optimal (i.e., no one can be made better-off without someone else being made worse-off) or satisfies the Rawlsian difference principle (i.e., the resulting inequality benefits the least advantaged in society).

3. *The liberty tradeoff.*[5] The exercise of civil and political rights may disrupt or threaten to destroy even the best-laid development plan, and must therefore be temporarily suspended. For example, elected officials are likely to support policies based on short-run political expediency rather than to insist on politically unpopular but economically essential sacrifices. Freedoms of speech, press, and assembly may be exercised so as to create or inflame social division, which an already fragile polity may be unable to endure; free trade unions often merely seek additional special benefits for a labor aristocracy; elaborate and punctilious legal systems on the Western model may seem to be extravagant anachronisms; and so forth.

All three tradeoffs have been widely held to be not only necessary but *temporary and self-correcting*. The trickle-down theory of growth is a theory of eventual automatic returns to the poor, who must carry the burden of economic sacrifice. Likewise, the U hypothesis envisions an automatic, natural restoration of considerable equality. And, as was evident in programs such as the Alliance for Progress, growth and development were widely believed to be the key to establishing, maintaining, and expanding liberty in the Third World. So long as rapid growth was achieved—and development was regularly equated with growth, a confusion that further encouraged such tradeoff arguments—

[5] See, for example, David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); David H. Bayley, *Public Liberties in the New States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964); Robert Heilbroner, *The Great Ascent* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963); Jagdish Bhagwati, *The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966); and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53 (March 1959), 69-105. For a critical discussion of this literature, in the context of an intellectual history of postwar social and political development theory, see Richard A. Higgott, *Political Development Theory: The Contemporary Debate* (London and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983), chap. 2.

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it was expected that everything else, even the deep absolute and relative poverty of the masses, would take care of itself.

The books under review here, and the burgeoning literature on alternative development strategies they represent,[6] show this conventional wisdom to have been tragically misguided; the tradeoffs simply did not work out as envisioned. While some sacrifices of human rights may be unavoidable in the struggle for development, the categorical tradeoffs of the conventional wisdom are not merely unnecessary, but often positively harmful to both development and human rights. A concern for human rights must be incorporated into the heart of development planning, with development and human rights being seen as complementary and mutually reinforcing in all time frames.

I shall argue for this conclusion primarily through a comparison of the development experiences of Brazil and South Korea in the sixties and seventies. Both countries pursued relatively open, state capitalist strategies of dependent development. Both "succeeded" by the standard measure of growth of per capita GNP. Yet the human-rights consequences, at least in the area of social and economic rights, have been quite different, suggesting not only that the tradeoff theses are misguided, but that the consequences of growth and development are far more malleable, and much more a function of politics, than is often imagined.

Brazil: The Tragedy of Success

Brazil is a classic example of a country that has adopted a growth strategy prominently featuring the conventional human rights tradeoffs. Its performance, therefore, merits the careful examination that Sylvia Hewlett provides in *The Cruel Dilemmas of Development*.

During the sixties and seventies, growth in Brazil was rapid (an average annual increase in real per capita GNP of 4.8 percent); during the peak years of the Brazilian economic "miracle" (1968-1973), real GDP growth averaged a remarkable 11.5 percent per year (Hewlett,

[6] The seminal studies include International Labour Office, *Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya* (Geneva: ILO, 1972); Hollis B. Chenery and others, *Redistribution with Growth* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974); and Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1973). One of the best short summaries is Frances Stewart and Paul Streeten, "New Strategies for Development: Poverty, Income Distribution and Growth," *Oxford Economic Papers* 28 (November 1976), 381-405. The journal *World Development* is particularly closely associated with these new trends.

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Table 2). By 1979, Brazil's per capita GNP of $1780 was among the highest in the Third World.

This growth resulted in increased average real incomes for rich and poor alike, i.e., absolute poverty was reduced. But Brazil adopted a weak needs tradeoff—"Brazilian policy was characterized by inattention to the short-run poverty problem"[7]—as reflected in increased levels of material and social deprivation.

Urban wages and standards of living were stagnant throughout the sixties and seventies; during the 1960s, the urban standard of living actually appears to have declined (Hewlett, 166ff. and Tables 15 and 16). Social services were woefully inadequate. "Brazil has the second highest rate of illiteracy in South America and one of the worst infant mortality records in the region" (p. 122). The 1978 infant mortality rate of 92 per thousand live births was more than triple that of Costa Rica, which has virtually the same per capita income, and more than one-third higher than in Thailand and the Philippines, both of which had per capita incomes one-third that of Brazil. In fact, urban infant mortality *increased* steadily in the sixties and early seventies; in 1973 it was about 20 percent higher than in the early 1950s.[8]

This rise is in part attributable to significant levels of malnutrition. For example, in the first half of 1975 more than one-seventh of total urban hospitalizations involved children suffering from malnourishment (p. 127). The official data showing the 1977 daily per capita caloric supply to be 107 percent of the requirement[9] thus are seriously misleading, because this average figure fails to take into account the gross economic inequality that pervades Brazil. And it is here, in extreme relative deprivation, that the destructive consequences of the Brazilian strategy are most evident.

Although figures on income distribution in the Third World are notoriously unreliable,[10] there is general agreement that the Brazilian

[7] Gary Fields, *Equality, Poverty and Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 218.

[8] World Bank, *World Development Report, 1981* (New York: Oxford University Press, for the World Bank, 1981), Table 21; Lance Taylor, Edmar L. Bacha, Eliana Cardoso, and Frank J. Lysy, *Models of Growth and Distribution for Brazil* (New York: Oxford University Press, for the World Bank, 1980), Tables 10-11.

[9] World Bank (fn. 8), Table 22.

[10] See, for example, Indira Rajaraman, "Data Sources on Income Distribution in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka: An Evaluation," *Review of Income and Wealth* 22 (September 1976), 223-38; Benjamin White, "Political Aspects of Poverty, Income Distribution, and Their Management: Some Examples from Rural Java," *Development and Change* 10 (January 1979), 91-114; Gerry B. Rogers, "Demographic Determinants of the Distribution of Income," *World Development* 6 (March 1978), 305-18; Jeffrey B. Nugent and Robin Walther, "Short-Run Changes in Rural Income Inequality: A Decomposition Analysis," *Journal of Development Studies* 18 (January 1982), 239-69; and Fields (fn. 7), chap. 3.

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situation is particularly appalling. Hewlett (Table 13) places the share of national income of the bottom fifth of the population at just over 3 percent in 1976 (down from almost 4 percent in 1960); the bottom three-fifths received less than 19 percent (down from almost 25 percent in 1960). In contrast, over half of total national income went to the top tenth of the population (up from under 40 percent in 1960) and the one percent at the top alone received over 17 percent (12 percent in 1960), which was more than the total income of the entire bottom half of the population! The figures compiled by the World Bank show an even more lugubrious state of affairs: in 1972, a scant 2 percent of total income is estimated to have been received by the poorest fifth of the population, while the top fifth received twice the income of the bottom four-fifths combined.[11] Growth thus has made the poor significantly worse off in relative terms.

According to the conventional wisdom, Brazil has grown to the point at which benefits should be not merely trickling, but cascading, down to the poor. They are not. Likewise, according to the conventional wisdom, income inequality should be declining. It is not. And despite Brazil's relatively high GNP, political liberty seems at best fragile, although systematic state terror is no longer the rule and the prospects for continued political "decompression" are perhaps not entirely illusory.[12]

Hewlett argues, quite persuasively, that this situation is not surprising. Rather, it is the predictable result of the combined impact of the structure of the Brazilian economy and the economic and political objectives, programs, and policies of Brazilian governments going back at least to Vargas in the early 1930s.

Hewlett's account of the structural determinants of the consequences of growth in Brazil (chap. 3) is largely a dependency-theory analysis and need not be recounted here. But she also recognizes that, beyond external

[11] World Bank (fn. 8), Table 25. Much of the recent debate in the English-language literature on Brazil centers on Gary Fields, "Who Benefits from Economic Development?—A Reexamination of Brazilian Growth in the 1960s," *American Economic Review* 67 (September 1977), 570-82, in which he re-analyzes the data underlying Albert Fishlow's seminal 1972 study, "Brazilian Size Distribution of Income," *American Economic Review* 62 (May 1972), 391-402. Comments on Fields's paper, plus his reply, are in *American Economic Review* 70 (March 1980), 242-62. For a good review of the now voluminous literature on Brazilian income distribution, see Edmar L. Bacha and Lance Taylor, "Brazilian Income Distribution in the 1960s: 'Facts,' Model Results and the Controversy," in Taylor and others (fn. 8), chap. 10.

[12] The recent "*abertura*," symbolized in particular by the November 1982 elections, may mark the beginning of a welcome change—or it may be just another short-term, almost cyclical, swing toward the center. A sound assessment of the breadth, depth, and sincerity of these new overtures to political liberty must wait a few more years, and until at least one major systemic crisis has been experienced.

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and economic imperatives, growth has been substantially shaped by political decisions. In principle, all the structural constraints on balanced and equitable growth could have been overcome by concerted governmental action, at an acceptable *economic* cost. Instead, "the specifics of the industrialization strategy and the particular policies of modernizing regimes have served to aggravate the structural components" (p. 97), and "the cumulative effect of these policies was to rigidify and exacerbate" structural inequities (p. 40).

In addition to avoiding the trap of crude economic determinism, Hewlett also refuses to shift the blame to external actors. Although she details the negative consequences of multinational corporations in chapter 7, Hewlett recognizes that "it is wrong to place too heavy a burden of guilt on the shoulders of the multinationals. Multinational firms, in and of themselves, do not destroy national industry or cause poverty"; they are only one element in a comprehensive, integrated system of economic and political domination and exploitation by the Brazilian elite (p. 136).

I would stress the internal political elements in an explanation of the path of Brazilian development more than Hewlett does; political choice, rather than dependency-induced economic necessity, underlies inequitable growth.[13] For example, an effective redistribution of wealth or income would have encouraged growth by stimulating generalized demand for wage goods and industrial products at the same time that it reduced inequality. For rather obvious political (*not economic*) reasons, however, such a course was, and continues to be, rejected in favor of strategies compatible with maintaining, or even increasing, inequality.

From 1930 to 1964, when Brazil was making its first major push for industrialization, import substitution was the chosen "engine of growth." Because of political domination by a small elite and the distorted pattern of economic demand resulting from Brazil's skewed income distribution, industrialization was focused on the inefficient, protected (re)production of luxury goods (consumer durables). The effect was one of largely excluding the mass of the population from access to the benefits of industrial growth in the form of either jobs (production was not only

[13] Compare, however, Christopher Chase-Dunn, "The Effects of International Economic Dependence on Development and Income Inequality: A Cross-National Study," *American Sociological Review* 40 (December 1975), 720-38; Richard Rubinson, "The World Economy and the Distribution of Income within States: A Cross-National Study," *American Sociological Review* 41 (August 1976), 638-59; and Volker Bornschier, Christopher Chase-Dunn, and Richard Rubinson, "Cross-National Evidence of the Effects of Foreign Investment and Aid on Economic Growth and Inequality: A Survey of Findings and a Reanalysis," *American Journal of Sociology* 84 (November 1978), 651-83.

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inefficient but relatively capital-intensive) or reasonably priced wage goods.

During this period, the system was held together by a semi-populist government that assured its survival by buying off the industrial, landowning, and labor elites with the benefits of growth, thereby further exacerbating inequality—and inflation. When inflation became unbearable and the military took over in 1964 to impose economic discipline, the poor, who had been hit especially hard by both inflation and the policies that produced it, were forced to bear the burden of stabilization, now in the company of the previously favored urban working class.[14]

"Readjustment" did set the stage for the Brazilian "miracle." Its benefits, however, went to the rich; that is, to those who had prospered all along, rather than those whose consumption had been "deferred." Thus, the Brazilian strategy amounted to a trickle-*up* strategy of growth. The Brazilian elite did not even save and invest with any special vigor: gross domestic savings and investment in Brazil were only marginally above the average for middle-income, oil-importing countries in 1960, and slightly below the average in 1979.[15]

I stress the political components of inequitable growth because the orthodox tradeoff theses, which can and have been used to justify the Brazilian strategy, are blindly apolitical. All three tradeoffs aim to remove the political and moral constraints of human rights in order to free the state to direct a maximally efficient development strategy. The assumption seems to be that this liberated state apparatus will function as a neutral—or even a beneficent or altruistic—instrument of technocratic management.

In fact, though, the removal of the moral and political constraints of human rights has reinforced the power of established elites. The tradeoffs exclude the mass of the population but not the traditional elites, who, with their new allies in the bureaucracies and public enterprises, are given a free hand. The unchecked political influence of the elites then perpetuates and even reinforces the exclusion of the masses, and prevents the poor from receiving any major benefits in return for their sacrifices.

This is precisely what would be expected from the experience of the West, where workers and the poor had to demand, or try to take, their

[14] Hewlett, Table 13. Compare Alejandro Foxley, "Stabilization Policies and Their Effect on Employment and Income Distribution: A Latin American Perspective," in William R. Cline and Sidney Weintraub, eds., *Economic Stabilization in Developing Countries* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1981), chap. 6.

[15] World Bank (fn. 8), Table 5. For an account of savings which suggests that a higher marginal propensity to save on the part of the rich may be as much a *consequence* of unequal growth as a natural tendency, see Marian Krzyzaniak, "Savings Behavior of Poor and Rich in Taiwan," *Journal of Developing Areas* 11 (July 1977), 447-64.

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economic rights. Although these demands were frequently backed by the use or threat of force, the exercise of civil and political rights was often crucial. The liberty tradeoff, however, prevents the poor from using these important instruments to pursue their claims for a share of the benefits of growth, while the needs and equality tradeoffs tend to be used by those in power to invalidate even the concern of the masses for economic rights.

The return of the benefits of growth to the poor who have sacrificed to bring that growth about is a *political* consequence of the *distribution* of power and benefits. The benefits of growth do not trickle down to the poor automatically—at least not in defensibly large quantities. Likewise, decreasing income inequality is not a natural consequence of relatively high levels of per capita GNP—especially if, during the period of growth, an economic, bureaucratic, and political elite becomes firmly entrenched and convinced of its right to act without political constraints from below. In Brazil, the equality and liberty tradeoffs actually intensified over time; poverty, inequality, and repression systematically reinforced one another.

Rather than rapid growth *per se*, the culprit has been the particular strategy chosen by the Brazilian elite. Even a late-developing dualistic economy on the periphery of the world capitalist system is, at most, predisposed to inequitable growth. There is nothing "natural" or "inevitable" about the style or consequences of Brazil's development; it is "necessary" only to the maintenance of elite domination, and to economic growth with a grossly unequal distribution of its benefits.

We should not disparage the already noted *absolute* improvement in the real average incomes of the Brazilian poor; numerous other countries have accomplished far less. However, this relatively minor trickle-back-down would seem to be a function of Brazil's unusually high growth rate rather than a predictable consequence of the chosen strategy. Both common sense and the experience of less "successful" exponents of the tradeoff strategy indicate that, unless the elite is virtually awash in new money, little is likely to spill over and trickle down; that is, in the absence of "miracle growth," the Brazilian strategy probably would have been a complete disaster for all but the privileged few who were its direct beneficiaries. The tradeoff strategy is not incompatible with improvements in needs satisfaction of the masses. Such improvements, however, are a virtually unintended consequence that requires not only considerable economic good fortune but massive sacrifices of equality and liberty. Furthermore, nothing in the Brazilian case suggests that such sacrifices are *necessary* for either rapid growth or needs satisfac-

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tion—and the example of South Korea strongly suggests that rapid growth, needs satisfaction, and a high level of income equality can be achieved simultaneously.

Korea: A More Successful Success Story

If Brazil's growth was a miracle, South Korea's defies description. Between 1960 and 1979, real per capita GNP grew at an average rate of 7.1 percent a year; that is, nearly half again as fast as Brazil's. As late as 1965, South Korea's per capita GNP was about half that of Brazil; by 1979, it was $1480, or 80 percent of Brazil's.[16]

The structural transformation of the South Korean economy has also been remarkable. During the sixties and seventies, manufacturing registered a 17 percent average annual rate of real growth, a figure matched by no other country, developed or developing.[17] The share of manufacturing in GNP (in constant 1970 prices) rose from 11.7 percent to 35 percent in 1976, while agriculture dropped from 40.3 percent to 20.4 percent (Hasan and Rao, Table D.7). Moreover, all this was quite unexpected: twenty years ago, South Korea was widely viewed as an economic disaster, saved from complete collapse only by massive and seemingly endless infusions of American aid, which amounted to half the national budget.

Despite these changes, South Korea has maintained an income distribution that by international standards is very egalitarian.

As Table 1 shows, the income share of the bottom 40 percent of South Korea's population is comparable to that of Yugoslavia, and actually greater than that of the United States, while the relative gap between top and bottom quintiles in Korea is less than one-third that of Brazil.

Thus, while the case of Brazil shows that the equality tradeoff is easily derailed, that of South Korea suggests that there is no need to get on the track in the first place. Both absolute and relative poverty can be attacked while maintaining rapid growth. And since Taiwan, Israel, Japan, Yugoslavia, and China have achieved similar results through similar means,[18] the Korean experience merits close examination.

[16] World Bank (fn. 8), Table 2.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] This argument has been developed most forcefully by Irma Adelman and her colleagues. See Adelman and Morris (fn. 6); Irma Adelman, "Economic Development and Political Change in Developing Countries," *Social Research* 47 (Summer 1980); Irma Adelman, "Growth, Income Distribution and Equity-Oriented Development Strategies," *World Development* 3 (February-March 1975), 67-76; and Irma Adelman, Cynthia Taft Morris, and Sherman Robinson, "Policies for Equitable Growth," *World Development* 4 (July 1976), 561-82. Compare also Keith Griffin, "An Assessment of Development in Taiwan," *World Development* 1 (June 1973), 31-42; Shirley W. Y. Kuo, Gustav Ranis, and John C. H. Fei, *The*

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TABLE 1
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME: KOREA AND SELECTED COUNTRIES

	Income Share of Quintiles					*Ratios*	
	Bottom (5)	*Second (4)*	*Third (3)*	*Fourth (2)*	*Top (1)*	*1/5*	*1/5 + 4*
Korea							
(1970-71)[a]	7.2	11.4	15.5	22.3	43.8	6.0	2.4
(1976)[b]	6.3	11.4	14.9[c]	21.8[c]	45.8	7.3	2.6
Brazil							
(1970-72)[d]	2.8	6.2	10.4	17.1	63.6	22.7	7.1
USA (1972)[e]	4.5	10.7	17.3	24.7	42.8	9.5	2.8
Yugoslavia							
(1968)[f]	6.6	11.8	16.7	23.5	41.4	6.3	2.3
Sweden							
(1972)[e]	6.6	13.1	18.5	24.8	37.0	5.6	1.9

[a] Average of four estimates in Hasan and Rao, Table D.46; Montek Ahluwalia, "Inequality, Poverty and Development," *Journal of Development Economics* 3 (December 1976), Table 8.

[b] Average of two estimates in World Bank (fn. 8), Table 25; Hasan and Rao, Table 3.4.

[c] Hasan and Rao do not separate the third and fourth quintiles. Figures given are averages for the middle 40% in the two sources, distributed by quintile according to the proportions in World Bank (fn. 8).

[d] Average of three estimates in Hewlett, Table 13; World Bank (fn. 8), Table 25; Ahluwalia (fn. a), Table 8.

[e] World Bank (fn. 8), Table 25.

[f] Shail Jain, *Size Distribution of Income: A Compilation of Data* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1975), Table 80, col. 3.

Although the data in Table 1 are not suited to intertemporal comparisons,[19] the apparent rise in inequality in the 1970s would seem to be real, as a result of the fact that output and value added grew four

Taiwan Success Story: Rapid Growth with Improved Distribution in the Republic of China (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981); and Allen C. Kelley and Jeffrey G. Williamson, *Lessons from Japanese Economic Development* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).

[19] South Korean income distribution data, like such data for virtually all Third World countries (cf. fn. 10), are questionable in their details, at least because of the method of collection. However, as rough estimates, they do seem to present a relatively accurate picture which is probably no more distorted than is normal for countries at a similar level of development. For a fairly thorough discussion of income distribution in Korea, see Edward S. Mason, Mahn Je Kim, Dwight H. Perkins, Kwang Suk Kim, and David C. Cole, *The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea*, (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1980), chap. 12. See also Eddy Lee, "Egalitarian Peasant Farming and Rural Development: The Case of South Korea," *World Development* 7 (April-May 1979), 493-517; income distribution is discussed at pp. 497-505.

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times as fast in manufacturing as in agriculture (Hasan and Rao, 3-4, 20). But this change suggests only a minor weak equality tradeoff; uneven sectoral growth in no way implies that absolutely high levels of inequality are required. Less equal does not necessarily mean—and in the case of South Korea has not meant—grossly unequal.

Politics plays a central role in establishing a country's income distribution at *all* levels of development. For example, Ahluwalia, Carter, and Chenery find that on the upswing of the U, distributional policies are at least as important as growth *per se* in determining the incidence of poverty and inequality, and that any turnaround also is largely a political product.[20] On *economic* grounds it thus appears that, in at least some important cases, substantial income equality need not be sacrificed for rapid growth.

The case of South Korea also suggests that the needs tradeoff can be avoided. Between 1961 and 1975, real income rose for all rural and urban groups, and real total consumption of the bottom two-fifths of the population increased by 75 percent. Per capita food production grew by almost 1.5 percent per year from 1961 to 1976, and, in light of South Korea's income distribution, the per capita calorie intake in 1977 of 119 percent of the requirement indicates a relatively good basic nutrition situation.[21]

[20] Montek S. Ahluwalia, Nicholas G. Carter, and Hollis B. Chenery, "Growth and Poverty in Developing Countries," *Journal of Development Economics* 5 (1979), 299-341, at 322-23. While Kuznets himself is quite sensitive to the crucial role of policy (fn. 4, pp. 9-10, 17, 24), many later advocates of the U-hypothesis are not. See, for example, Felix Paukert, "Income Distribution at Different Levels of Development: A Survey of Evidence," *International Labor Review* 108 (August-September 1973), 99-125.

In general, recent studies tend to disconfirm the U-hypothesis. See especially Charles L. Wright, "Income Inequality and Economic Growth: Examining the Evidence," *Journal of Developing Areas* 13 (October 1978), 49-66. Cf. also Fields (fn. 7), 78-84; Wilfred Beckerman, "Some Reflections on 'Redistribution with Growth,'" *World Development* 5 (August 1977), 665-76, esp. 670-74; and David Felix, "Income Distribution Trends in Mexico and the Kuznets Curve," in Sylvia Ann Hewlett and Richard S. Weinert, eds., *Brazil and Mexico: Patterns in Late Development* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Humane Issues, 1982), 265-315. The remaining weak correlation is almost certainly better explained by political variables—particularly similarities in development strategy—than by the level or process of growth *per se*. William R. Cline, "Distribution and Development: A Survey of the Literature," *Journal of Development Economics* 1 (1975), 359-400, at 369-74, goes so far as to dismiss all economic theoretical explanations of income inequality. However, cf. Erich Weede and Horst Tiefenbach, "Some Recent Explanations of Income Inequality: An Evaluation and Critique," *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (June 1982), 255-82.

[21] See Hasan and Rao, pp. 4 and 23; World Bank (fn. 8), Table 22; Lee (fn. 19), 501-05; Ajit Ghose and Keith Griffin, "Rural Poverty and Development Alternatives in South and Southeast Asia: Some Policy Issues," *Development and Change* 11 (October 1980), 545-72, Table 10; Young Whan Kihl and Dong Suh Bark, "Food Policies in a Rapidly Developing Country: The Case of South Korea, 1960-1978," *Journal of Developing Areas* 16 (October 1981), 47-70, Table 1; and D. C. Rao, "Economic Growth and Equity in the Republic of Korea," *World Development* 6 (March 1978), 383-96, at 389.

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Adult literacy in 1976 was 93 percent, primary school enrollment in 1978 was virtually universal, and secondary school enrollment was over 70 percent. Infant mortality and child death rates (37 and 5 per thousand births, respectively) are about average for a country at Korea's level of development. The 1977 ratio of nurses to population of 1 to 550 was excellent by Third World standards (comparable to that of France and Austria in 1960), and indicative of an emphasis on primary health care (although there still is room for low-cost improvements). There is a significant shortage of doctors, especially outside the main cities, but it is not acute. In general, rural access to governmental services is relatively good.[22]

Just as growth and inequality have formed an integrated system in Brazil, growth and equality seem to have systematically reinforced one another in Korea: progress in alleviating absolute poverty in Korea has been sustained and dramatic, in contrast to the desultory improvements in Brazil. Furthermore, just as in Brazil, the human rights consequences of growth and development have resulted from the interaction of economic structure and strategy. At the risk of gross oversimplification, three significant elements of the South Korean strategy should be highlighted: (1) egalitarian rural development; (2) export-led, labor-intensive industrial development; and (3) education.

Throughout the Third World, the poor dwell primarily in rural areas. Therefore, any strategy for equality and the alleviation of absolute poverty must rest on a sound rural basis. Brazil focused its agricultural efforts on the support and expansion of commercial crops such as coffee. The result, not surprisingly, was a concentration of benefits in the hands of the larger farmers, who are best positioned to exploit market opportunities. In contrast, South Korea focused on food and directly attacked the basis of rural inequality: inequitable land tenure and ownership.

Half of the country's agricultural land was redistributed in the late forties and early fifties in a massive land-to-the-tiller program. The percentage of full owners rose from under 15 percent to 70 percent, and tenancy was reduced from almost 50 percent to about 7 percent; individual holdings were limited to about 3 hectares, and the average post-reform holding was less than one hectare. These transfers, combined with very low repayment burdens, resulted in a 20-30 percent increase in income for the bottom four-fifths of the population and an 80 percent decrease for the top four percent.[23] Land reform thus provided the basis

[22] World Bank (fn. 8), Tables 21 and 22; see also Hasan and Rao, Table 5.5 and pp. 73-74; Rao (fn. 21), 384, 389.

[23] Lee (fn. 19), 493-94, 507-8; Sung Hwan Ban, Pal Yong Moon, and Dwight H. Perkins,

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for mass rural self-sufficiency during the extended transition to a "modern" economy. It also laid the foundation for a rural mass market—which spurred and supported growth in manufacturing—and radically restructured agricultural incentives.

Inequality is a strong *dis*incentive for those at the bottom of the ladder, especially in traditional tenancy agriculture: landlords reap most of the benefits of increased production; peasants are generally too vulnerable to take risks in order to increase production or even to scrape together a surplus to be invested; credit and marketing discriminate against the peasant. In the absence of very large economies of scale—which must be demonstrated, not just assumed (and which don't exist in Korean agriculture)—rural inequality would thus seem to be unjustified on economic grounds, and even less justifiable when the human and social costs of needs deprivation are added to the account.

Land reform, however, only serves as a base for equitable development. Even radical reforms, unless they are vigorously supported, are subject to rapid erosion. For example, market forces tend to reestablish inequality by squeezing out the smallest farmers and increasing the relative rewards of the large or efficient. Small farmers are especially vulnerable to natural disasters and family calamities; they also face significant disadvantages in marketing, credit, and access to agricultural services and improved technologies. Natural population increases create surplus agricultural labor, which also tends to cause inequality. Yet such forces can be—and in the Korean case largely have been—modified or corrected by vigorous state action.[24]

If basic needs are to be satisfied in rural areas, land must remain productive enough to support its owners. Furthermore, rural life must remain attractive enough to prevent an uncontrolled and unabsorbable migration to the cities that would at best relocate poverty rather than reduce it. Here, too, South Korea has been remarkably successful: agricultural value added grew by 4 percent a year from 1961 to 1975, and real rural income and agricultural wages increased by one-half between 1963 and 1975 (Hasan and Rao, 3-4, 207, and Tables 1.12 and D.45). This growth appears to have been sufficient to permit the structural

Rural Development (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1980), chap. 10; Mason and others (fn. 19), chap. 7; George S. Tolley, Vinod Thomas, and Chung Ming Wong, *Agricultural Price Policies and the Developing Countries* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, for the World Bank, 1982), chap. 2.

[24] For example, enforcing the 3-hectare limit on holdings has prevented the development of a free market in land, thus providing very important protection to small farmers. In 1975, only 1.5% of all holdings (1.2% in 1965), encompassing only 7% of the total cultivated area, exceeded the limit; fewer than 8% of rural households were tenants. Lee (fn. 19), 508-9; Hasan and Rao, 205.

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transformation of the Korean economy to proceed in an orderly and relatively equitable fashion.

The Korean government, through its fertilizer monopoly and its dominant role in marketing (maintained by a policy of forced sales) has given teeth to national agricultural policy and exercised considerable control over the course and consequences of agricultural development.[25] While it used this dominant position in the fifties and sixties in order to extract an agricultural surplus to finance industrial development, the extraction was relatively moderate, and its effects were minimized and relatively equitably spread by land reform. Furthermore, because government pricing policies helped to moderate increases in food prices, the urban poor benefited. Most importantly, in the late sixties and early seventies—the period of most rapid industrial growth, when the urban-rural gap would have "naturally" increased quite dramatically—the government intervened to support farmers and actually succeeded in restoring agricultural terms of trade to levels above those of the early sixties.[26]

Equitable rural development, however, is unlikely to do more than prevent a serious deterioration in living conditions. For example, while the Korean labor force grew at the unexceptional rate of 3.4 percent a year in the sixties and seventies, agricultural employment increased by only 1 percent a year, despite the fine performance of the agricultural sector and the very low use of agricultural machinery (Hasan and Rao, 223-24, 228-29). Major industrial growth thus was necessary simply to avoid the accumulation of an impoverished and increasingly hopeless labor reserve army. In fact, South Korea not only absorbed these new entrants into the labor force, but it absorbed them with steadily rising real wages (p. 173 and Table D.38).

The South Korean strategy of industrial development, however, was no less exceptional than its agricultural strategy: it emphasized exports and domestic demand rather than import substitution.[27] From 1955 to

[25] Lee (fn. 19), 496; Ban and others (fn. 23), Tables 112 and 115.

[26] Sources differ on precise figures, but there is a clear consensus on the basic trend. Compare Hasan and Rao, 39-40 and Tables 1.13 and D.44; Lee (fn. 19), 510-12; Rao (fn. 21), 387; Ban and others (fn. 23), Tables 108-110; Kwang Suk Kim and Michael Roemer, *Growth and Structural Transformation* (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Relations, Harvard University, 1979), Table 37; and Parvez Hasan, *Korea: Problems and Issues in a Rapidly Growing Economy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, for the World Bank, 1976), 22, 45-46, and Table 12.

[27] See Charles R. Frank Jr., Kwang Suk Kim, and Larry E. Westphal, *Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: South Korea* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1975), and Wantack Hong, "Export Promotion and Employment Growth in South Korea," in Anne O. Krueger and others, *Trade and Employment in Developing Countries*, Vol. I: *Individual Studies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, for the National Bureau

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1968, import substitution produced only about 2 percent of the growth in manufacturing; between 1968 and 1973, import substitution in manufacturing was actually negative. Exports accounted for about one-fourth of growth, and increased domestic demand picked up the remainder. The vital role of domestic demand (which is in larger part a result of equitable development) can also be seen in the fact that, despite an average annual real increase in exports of 34 percent a year between 1965 and 1975 (so that exports constituted 36 percent of GNP in 1976), only 15 percent of total manufactures were exported in 1970; 25 percent in 1976 (Hasan and Rao, 4-6, 242-43, and Tables 8.3 and 8.4). Industrialization thus has been focused largely on satisfying domestic demand, thereby spreading the benefits of growth.

In a strategy of export-oriented development, exporters, rather than sell to a protected domestic market, must not only compete against the whole world, but overcome trade barriers and the costs of doing business at a distance. This fosters efficiency of production, from which domestic consumers benefit in the form of low world-market prices for goods that are also produced for export, lower prices for imports (because the need for tariffs and indirect protection is greatly reduced), and more jobs. One-third of all new employment in the 1960s came from production for export (Hasan and Rao, p. 250). Exports also generate foreign exchange, a shortage of which often presents a major development bottleneck. South Korea has even used export promotion to lay the basis for selective import substitution by pursuing backward linkages—for example, from textiles to synthetic fibers to petrochemicals (pp. 233, 242-43). And, since Korean exports consist of manufactured goods rather than primary products, production for export has actually fostered the structural transformation of the economy.

Export promotion, however, is no more natural or automatic than import substitution. Resources, especially credit, must be mobilized and channeled. The Korean government has done this rather effectively (Hasan and Rao, 365 ff., 387). Support and subsidies, at a level at least sufficient to assure that there is no disincentive to exports, are essential. In South Korea, they have been forthcoming. In particular, the temptation of an overvalued currency has generally been resisted (pp. 236-39, 266-69; Table D.43).[28]

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of Economic Research, 1981). For an interesting account of the positive consequences of the Brazilian shift toward export promotion, see José L. Carvalho and Claudio L. S. Haddad, "Foreign Trade Strategy and Employment in Brazil," *ibid.*

[28] For a fascinating case study (of clothing) see David Morawetz, *Why the Emperor's New Clothes Are Not Made in Colombia: A Case Study of Latin American and East Asian Manufactured Exports* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1980, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 368),

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But while export promotion was necessary for rapid growth, concentration on labor-and skill-intensive industrial production has been essential to the equitable distribution of its benefits (Hasan and Rao, 5, 9, 37, 249-50). Relatively highly-paid industrial employment has been maximized, diffusing the benefits of growth as widely as possible and preventing urban unemployment attributable to capital-intensive production. Korea's advantage in labor- and skill-intensive manufacturing, however, is also a product of social and political decisions, especially public and private investment in education.

Human capital theory has an unclear status in economics, and in much of the Third World education serves more as a screening device to maintain or increase inequality than as a rational investment in human capital.[29] Nonetheless, investment in education, especially mass primary education, has been essential to both growth and equity in Korea.

Whether because of its socializing effects or its impact on cognitive development, primary education and basic literacy are strongly associated with greater productivity.[30] The percentage of Korean workers with no education dropped from 45.5 percent in 1959 to 23.8 percent in 1970; for production workers, the drop was from 22.9 percent to 9.0 percent (Hasan and Rao, Table 5.8). Employers thus can draw on a rapidly growing pool of relatively well-prepared workers, a fact that helps to explain the more than 90 percent increase in real value added per worker, despite an essentially constant ratio of capital to labor (p. 19 and Table D.38).

Investment in basic education also has important equity benefits. Primary education improves access to agricultural extension services and new technologies, and greatly simplifies the dissemination of information concerning nutrition, health, and family planning. It also provides rural migrants with an entry into the better-paying (and in other ways more attractive) urban-industrial sector. And, since education is an important productive asset, universal primary education and very high secondary enrollments amount to a relatively egalitarian distribution of this key industrial resource, laying a foundation for further equitable growth.

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esp. 194-97. See also Anne O. Krueger, *The Developmental Role of the Foreign Sector and Aid* (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1979), 92-99, 172-98.

[29] See, for example, Mark Blaug, "The Empirical Status of Human Capital Theory: A Slightly Jaundiced View," *Journal of Economic Literature* 14 (1976), 827-55; Jagdish Bhagwati, "Education, Class Structure and Income Inequality," *World Development* 1 (May 1973), 21-36; Jean-Pierre Jallade, "Basic Education and Income Inequality in Brazil," *World Development* 10 (March 1982), 187-97; and Lois Weis, "The Reproduction of Social Inequality: Closure in the Ghanaian University," *Journal of Developing Areas* 16 (October 1981), 17-30.

[30] Christopher Colclough, "The Impact of Primary Schooling on Economic Development: A Review of the Evidence," *World Development* 10 (March 1982), 167-86.

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The benefits of education were thus magnified by labor- and skill-intensive industrialization—which education made feasible in the first place. Another important positive feedback has been the increased demand of the rapidly growing urban labor force for more, and more varied (and thus more profitable) agricultural goods, from which farmers benefit in much the same way in which the producers of wage goods and other manufacturers benefit from the larger rural market created by relatively egalitarian rural development.

Therefore, while Brazil pursued rapid growth through the exclusion of the mass of the population, the basic thrust of the Korean strategy—in industry as well as agriculture—has been to incorporate as much of the population as possible into the process of growth and the sharing of its benefits. (The exception is political participation, a serious deficiency to which I will return.) Although incorporation and exclusion would seem to be equally compatible with rapid growth, the consequences are quite different for human rights, or at least economic and social rights. Growth *can* be made to serve equality and the satisfaction of basic human needs, but only through a conscious and comprehensive political effort. Development can—and should—mean the growth of human beings, not just economies.

South Korea should not be romanticized. It has been, and shows all signs of remaining, an oppressive and often ruthless military dictatorship. It is still poor by Western standards; its success in alleviating poverty, dramatic as it has been by Third World standards, assures only that most of the poor are able to avoid extremely debilitating material deprivation, and have at least some hope for the upward mobility of their children. A growing gap between city and countryside is a serious problem; life expectancy is at best undistinguished; housing conditions are generally poor; industrial working conditions are often dismal; access to pure water is inadequate; women still face serious economic and social discrimination; and so forth.

To many observers one troubling aspect of the South Korean development strategy is its dependence on foreign capital and markets. This dependence is high, however, only in comparison to "self-reliant" strategies; compared to more orthodox state capitalist *and socialist* strategies, it is not extreme. And, as the case of China suggests, self-reliance, too, has major costs, even for a country with a relatively high objective potential for self-sufficiency (which Korea and most Third World countries simply do not have).

Is it worthwhile to sacrifice equitable growth for self-sufficiency? Perhaps. But in cases where dependence does not lead to poverty, ine-

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quality, unemployment, the adoption of inappropriate technologies, commodity concentration, declining terms of trade, and a host of other problems highlighted by dependency theory and the agenda of the new international economic order, one must at least pause before condemning dependence too strongly. On the face of it, only growth that is extremely inequitable would seem to be worth sacrificing. Self-reliant poverty may have its attractions, but if the alternative is a relatively prosperous dependence—and that may indeed be the choice facing many Third World countries—dependence, too, has its attractions, or at least its compensations.[31]

In generalizing from the Korean experience, however, we must stress three points particularly in order to guard against possible misreadings.

1. There is no single central element to the South Korean strategy, and no single part can be implemented in isolation with any hope of similar success; only the interconnection of multiple policy goals and instruments explains Korea's success at combining rapid growth and structural transformation of the economy, substantial alleviation of absolute poverty, and a relatively egalitarian income distribution. For example, the Korean economy's growth and development are based not just on its export orientation, but rather on its export-oriented *industrialization*—more precisely, *labor-intensive* industrialization, pursued in a context of egalitarian rural development.

2. The role of the state should not be minimized. Entrepreneurial freedom exists in Korea only within limits set by the government, which has played the central role in determining the direction and priorities of investment and of development in general. Furthermore, "restraint" in the workers' demands for higher wages and improved working conditions—a restraint that has contributed substantially to Korea's comparative advantage—is largely the result of government control and even repression.

3. South Korea has prospered by finding, and aggressively exploiting, a niche in the evolving world economy and "the new international division of labor."[32] Success in this strategy of what might be called

[31] South Korean dependence seems to have been relatively well managed, thus minimizing its costs. For example, labor- and skill-intensive production have kept capital needs relatively low, and the heavy reliance on foreign aid in the fifties and sixties allowed for industrial investment without squeezing farmers and workers too severely. Economic dependence, as measured by trade-partner concentration, debt-service load, product diversification, and industrial deepening, seems even to have declined with growth. See Hasan and Rao, Tables 1.6, 1.8, 3.1, D.13, and pp. 78-80, 251-53, 276-80, 431-35; Hasan (fn. 26), 117-20 and 130-38, Appendices C, D, and E, and Tables SA14 and SA15.

[32] See, for example, Folker Froebel, Jürgen Heinriks, and Otto Kreye, *The New International Division of Labor* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Bela Belassa, *The*

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"constructive engagement" in the world capitalist system requires the presence of a comparative advantage, such as that provided in South Korea's abundant, cheap, and disciplined labor force. In a recent paper, Richard Higgott argues persuasively that this condition is not met in most of Africa, and, by implication, in the rest of the "Fourth World."[33] Thus, although the Korean and similar cases refute simple core-periphery models of the global economy, they also undermine equally simplistic arguments for unrestrained, and virtually unthinking, integration into the reigning international economic order.

It is also essential to give due weight to special circumstances. Cultural homogeneity and a traditional emphasis on family and education have contributed to South Korea's achievements. Japanese colonialism, followed by World War II, occupation, and civil war, undermined the established indigenous elites and repressive social hierarchies. Korea was even "fortunate" in its colonial past: Japan wanted food—rice rather than coffee, cocoa, copper, sugar, or tin—and thus built up an agricultural system that was relatively easily converted to needs-oriented rural development. The process of land reform was eased by the presence of large Japanese landholding. Massive amounts of American aid permitted investment for industrial development despite an extremely low level of domestic savings. The security threat from the North increased social discipline; high population density facilitated the delivery of social services; the scarcity of natural resources prevented Korea from falling into the trap of commodity dependence; and so forth.

Most of these "advantages," however, had parallel drawbacks: the debilitating effects of colonialism do not need to be enumerated; partition, occupation, and civil war were economically, socially, and psychologically traumatic; aid in many countries has been squandered or has sapped initiative; the military threat required massive military spending (largely dissipating American aid on unproductive investments); population density put pressure on land, housing, and social services; and shortages of resources have held back more than one country. Furthermore, the political will to undertake a program of equitable development needs to be accounted for. Unique cultural and historical

Changing International Division of Labor in Manufactured Goods (Washington, D.C.; World Bank, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 329, 1979); Luciano Tomassini, "Industrialization, Trade and the International Division of Labor," *Journal of International Affairs* 34 (Spring 1980), 137-52; and James A. Caporaso, "Industrialization in the Periphery: The Evolving Global Division of Labor," *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (September 1981), 347-84.

[33] Higgott (Murdoch University, Australia), "Africa, the New International Division of Labor and the Corporate State," paper presented at the 24th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Mexico City, April 1983.

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factors alone would seem to be an insufficient explanation; I am, however, aware of no thorough and persuasive analysis, in the English language literature at least, of the political bases and dynamics of equitable development in South Korea.[34]

All things considered, while South Korea is undeniably a special case, its background is not radically different from that of numerous other (much less successful) Third World countries. At least part of its uniqueness lies in its success, not its starting point. At the very least, we must recall that 25 years ago, the only people who emphasized Korea's uniqueness did so to apologize for its failures. Therefore, while guarding against overgeneralization, we should give careful consideration to learning from, and perhaps even planning to emulate, the Korean model.

Implementing a Strategy of Equitable Growth

The stress on equity *during* growth is such a thorough departure from the conventional wisdom that thinking about the nature of this process, particularly about how to manage and implement it, is still in its infancy. One particularly interesting effort, however, is Keith Griffin and Jeffrey James's *The Transition to Egalitarian Development*. Despite the fact that they write from a socialist perspective and barely even mention South Korea in passing, their analysis is broadly compatible with the account of the Korean model presented above.

"It is the initial distribution of assets which sets the pattern for growth. If asset distribution is unequal, it is probable that the additions to income from growth will be distributed unequally" (p. 7). Income is in large measure a function of assets, of ownership and control of the factors of production. All other things being equal, having more assets produces greater income—and where all other things aren't equal, those with fewer assets usually are at a disadvantage. The market rewards those who are best able to cope with its demands, and the ability to cope is, again, in considerable measure a function of one's economic assets: in a market economy, the rich tend to get richer faster than the poor get less poor.

Markets, however, are a social product; neither they nor the inequality

[34] For the beginnings of such efforts, see Kim and Roemer (fn. 26), chaps. 1 and 2, and pp. 75-79; Mason and others (fn. 19), chap. 5; and L. L. Wade and B. S. Kim, *Economic Development of South Korea: The Political Economy of Success* (New York: Praeger, 1978), chap. 6. More generally, see Richard Higgott and Dick Robison, eds., *Southeast Asia: Essays in the Political Economy of Structural Change* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, forthcoming); William R. Cline, "Can the East Asian Model of Development Be Generalized?" *World Development* 10 (February 1982), 81-90; and Gustav Ranis, "Equity with Growth in Taiwan: How 'Special' is the 'Special Case'?" *World Development* 6 (March 1978), 397-409.

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they engender are "natural." The distribution of income and wealth in a country rests on structural features of the state, society, and economy that are in large measure susceptible to political control. Distributional issues thus cannot be avoided in development planning; in fact, important distributional decisions will be made, whether consciously or unconsciously, in any development strategy.

The Korean case shows that gross income inequality is not a necessary condition for rapid growth. Therefore, let us assume here that a relatively egalitarian income distribution should be, *prima facie*—at least in the medium-run—a major objective of any defensible development strategy; a strong equality tradeoff is unnecessary, and considerations of justice and human rights make it undesirable. The policy question, then, is whether "redistribution" should precede or follow growth. The conventional wisdom advocates "growth first." The preceding discussion of Korea, however, suggests many of the benefits of a strategy of "redistribution first."[35]

"Growth first" implies a capacity for redistributing afterwards. Quite aside from its political naiveté, such a strategy ignores the extremely strong, and probably overwhelming, resistance to *ex post facto* income redistribution.[36] Even nominally progressive direct taxes often prove to be neutral or regressive in practice, and indirect taxes, which for administrative and political reasons are widely used in the Third World, tend to reinforce inequality. Social services are also unlikely to be effective instruments of redistribution because of the serious disadvantages of the poor. In fact, public services are usually concentrated in the cities and rarely penetrate the countryside below the level of the relatively well-to-do, thus actually increasing inequality; even targeted benefits tend to trickle *up* in structurally unequal environments.

"Redistribution first" not only goes to the root of the problem, but Griffin and James argue persuasively (pp. 39-42) that it enhances the value and efficacy of other measures. Furthermore, it requires that future interventions merely hold the line; starting from relative equality at least reduces much of the structural resistance that plagues incremental and after-the-fact approaches. "Redistribution first" also makes a stab at

[35] Among academic economists, this strategy is particularly associated with the work of Irma Adelman and her colleagues (fns. 6 and 18). The so-called basic human needs strategy, as I see it, takes no stand on the timing of redistribution, and thus does not represent a distinctive approach to this issue.

[36] See especially Irma Adelman and Sherman Robinson, *Income Distribution Policy in Developing Countries: A Case Study of Korea* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, for the World Bank, 1978). Compare also Irma Adelman, Mike Hopkins, Sherman Robinson, Gerry B. Rogers, and R. Wery, *The Political Economy of Egalitarian Growth* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1976), and the studies cited in Cline (fn. 20), 378-87.

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remedying economically based rural powerlessness by weakening the hold of traditional landowning elites. And, beyond all speculative arguments, it has worked in at least a sizeable share of the cases in which it has been tried, *and* where the redistributed assets have been vigorously supported by later state policy. By contrast, no oil-importing Third World countries have successfully redistributed after growth.

Redistributing first also minimizes the need for the speculative and questionable tradeoffs underlying the conventional wisdom. Tradeoff arguments demonstrate a serious general problem in the policy sciences. Our "best" theories tell us that if A does x, y, and z, then he will suffer costs a, b, and c, and receive benefits q, r, and s. But, as we all admit in private or at professional meetings—but rarely when playing the role of policy scientist—there usually is only a loose connection between theory and current (let alone future) "reality." For example, scholars and planners with a mathematical bent are likely to be quite willing to plunge ahead with an r^2 that, even by the most charitable interpretation, means that they (literally) don't have half an idea of what's going on.

Since such theories are the best we have, they probably should be used, especially if the costs of error are relatively low. But the costs of the needs and equality tradeoffs are anything but low: they consist of major sacrifices by literally hundreds of millions of people. Furthermore, we should be particularly wary of tradeoff arguments in light of the prevailing environment of despotism and oligarchy, for under such conditions "tradeoffs" tend to involve circumstances in which people are *being* sacrificed rather than *making* sacrifices.

But even assuming that our theories are sound and the people are willing to shoulder the burden of implementing them, the standard procedure for justifying these tradeoffs is open to serious question. For example, there is a widespread failure to discount for uncertainty. The inability of most Third World countries to meet even modest goals for growth suggests that tradeoffs may not be justifiable once we take into account the (un)likelihood that present sacrifices will achieve the predicted future benefits—whether because of poor planning, inept or corrupt administration, insufficient information, or just plain bad luck.

A more serious problem is the standard assumption that the issue of who receives a benefit (or bears a cost), and when, is not a relevant one; that is, that all costs and benefits are equal, regardless of recipient or time frame. This proposition is quite implausible in the cases with which we are concerned. It may make all the difference in the world to a marginal peasant family whether they get an extra 100 calories per person a day now, or in five, ten, or twenty years: it may well be an issue of

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life or death; it certainly will at least be an issue of basic health. To another family, though, the extra calories may mean a full stomach rather than just barely enough to survive; meat instead of rice to a third family; and overweight to a fourth. Who receives what and when—and who sacrifices what and when—can radically alter our calculations.[37] The standard arguments for economic tradeoffs require magnified sacrifices from those least able to sacrifice, so that the "short-run" suffering may quickly come to outweigh any plausible long-run succor; or else we are faced with particularly problematic decisions such as sacrificing a generation or two for the future good.

The political opposition to redistributing first is of course sure to be great. However, incremental or after-the-fact redistributions are not obviously preferable even on such pragmatic grounds. For example, incrementalism leaves established elites relatively free to wage a sustained, and quite possibly effective, rearguard struggle against the erosion of their privileged position; by contrast, the Machiavellian strategy of disposing of all one's enemies in one quick initial strike has much to be said for it.

The problems of planning and administration that are posed by redistributing first are also great (although, again, no more daunting than those faced by more traditional strategies, which have fairly consistently failed to be implemented successfully). Because of the "natural" (i.e., market) tendencies toward the reassertion of inequality, substantial governmental intervention is necessary. Yet the allocative simplicity and efficiency of the market, and the proven inability of Third World bureaucracies to run a fully planned economy, require considerable restraint.

Griffin and James provide a valuable brief review of some of the most prominent options, and the problems likely to be encountered, in such selective interventions. In particular, they offer a fairly detailed discussion (chap. 4) of the use of price controls and rationing to suppress inflation while ensuring relatively egalitarian access to the available supply of wage goods. They then discuss the administrative problems of the strategy, stressing the need to husband scarce administrative resources, as well as the value of decentralization and devolution of authority. These measures, in addition to their potential administrative efficiency, can, if properly implemented, increase the power of the rural poor. Finally,

[37] One very rough way to incorporate such considerations into cost-benefit planning is through the use of "poverty weights," which assign different utilities to the same increment of income, depending on the group that receives it. See, for example, Chenery and others (fn. 6), chap. 2.

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they present very brief case studies of China, Cuba, and Allende's Chile (chap. 7) that complement the discussion of South Korea presented above. These case studies also implicitly underscore another major advantage of the strategy of "redistribution first": it is compatible with both socialist and state capitalist political economies.

Political Liberty, Civil Rights, and Development

The outlook for civil and political rights, at least at first sight, appears less hopeful. The South Korean government is a repressive and at times extremely brutal military dictatorship. In addition to the abrogation of political freedoms and civil liberties, its regular practices have included mysterious deaths, kidnapping, political imprisonment, and torture.[38] Other countries that have pursued a similar strategy of development do not provide much encouragement either. In Taiwan, remarkable economic equality is accompanied by an authoritarian military regime and a virtual caste system in politics. Yugoslavia is a totalitarian state—a relatively mild one with significant *economic* participation, but hardly a country where civil and political rights are widely implemented. Israel is a lively democracy, but its human rights record in the occupied territories and Lebanon hardly merits emulation. Only Japan respects a full range of civil and political rights, but this was not the case during earlier modernizing regimes, and the important role of foreign intervention in the postwar political system cannot be overlooked. While one may argue that, taken as a whole, these countries are no worse than average for the Third World, the picture is hardly promising.

Although the cases of Brazil and Korea show that repression is compatible with sustained equitable and inequitable growth, the mere compatibility of growth and repression is hardly sufficient to justify the liberty tradeoff. Is repression *necessary* to rapid growth or development? Does it even make a positive contribution, all things considered? The books under review do not address such questions. In part this is because of their primarily economic focus. In addition, though, there are special problems in evaluating arguments for a liberty tradeoff, problems that make a comprehensive human rights perspective on development a rarity, even today.[39]

[38] See, for example, Jerome A. Cohen, "Arms Sales and Human Rights: The Case of South Korea," in Peter G. Brown and Douglas MacLean eds., *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979), and *Amnesty International Report 1982* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1982), 209-13.

[39] The most important exceptions include Rhoda Howard, "The 'Full-Belly' Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority Over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa," *Human Rights Quarterly* 5 (Winter 1983); International Commission

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There is precious little experience on which to base our analysis: Third World regimes that respect a wide range of civil and political rights are a decided rarity, and the Western and Soviet experiences, while suggestive, hardly can be applied in any straightforward way to most contemporary developing countries. In fact, we lack even the relatively crude indicators available for economic and social rights, such as quintile shares of national income or health, nutrition, and literacy statistics. For example, the Freedom House map is far too crude, Amnesty International reports are too restricted, and United Nations sources are limited in scope by national sovereignty and the prevalence of ideological thinking.

But even if respect for (and violations of) human rights could be quantified, evaluating the tradeoff would remain extremely problematic. Human rights objectives that are associated with needs satisfaction or income equality can be roughly translated into economic terms. Consider, for example, the right to food: raising the caloric intake of group A to point x might be viewed as requiring y additional income per group member, at total cost z, which would have a roughly calculable effect on GNP. The theoretical and practical problems in such cases cannot obscure the fact that at least the broad outlines of an empirical cost-benefit evaluation are clear. By contrast, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to state the costs of the liberty tradeoff in monetary terms. We thus seem to be required to make a "tradeoff" between incommensurable items. At the very least, an evaluation of the liberty tradeoff—unlike that of the needs and equality tradeoffs—requires a rare combination of disciplinary perspectives.

Nonetheless, some preliminary generalizations may be put forth. The denial of civil and political rights is especially necessary under conditions of inequitable growth, since the exclusion of the masses from the benefits of growth will itself require substantial repression. The resulting justification is not primarily economic, however: such repression is required not for development, or even for growth, but rather to protect a particular inequitable distribution of goods, services, and power. The liberty tradeoff supposedly has its justification in growth or development. We would therefore seem to be justified in insisting that civil and political rights

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of Jurists, *Development, Human Rights and the Rule of Law* (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1981), especially the discussion paper by Philip Alston; and Robert E. Goodin, "The Development-Rights Tradeoff: Some Unwarranted Economic and Political Assumptions," *Universal Human Rights* 1 (April 1979), 31-42. Howard's article is particularly noteworthy for its strong arguments that civil and political rights are necessary for development, equity, and social order, and that their denial has been a major contributor to economic failure in Africa.

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be suspended only for genuine, and fairly concrete, growth or development objectives, and not—as is far too often the case—just for the ideological or political aims of an allegedly modernizing regime.

Similarly, we might suggest that only in conjunction with a strategy of "redistribution first" is the liberty tradeoff likely to deliver its promised benefits. Brazil and numerous other countries show that economic returns to the masses are not automatic. Unless inequality is addressed first, it is likely to combine with political exclusion to prevent the poor from receiving a reasonable return for their sacrifices.

Civil and political rights may even prove to be crucial instruments for turning a country toward equitable development; in many cases they are likely to be the only way, short of revolution or overwhelming external pressure, to bring about the transition. Even if bread does come first, civil and political rights may be the best (and usually the most peaceful) way to obtain bread, since poverty is in large measure a social and political rather than a natural phenomenon.

The long-run economic consequences of the liberty tradeoff raise further questions that are particularly relevant to the future of a country like South Korea. Can hard work, dedication, and labor discipline, which have been central to Korea's equitable growth, be maintained without political "decompression?" How long can the popular desire for freedom and self-expression be bought off with economic gains, even assuming that equitable growth can be sustained indefinitely in a repressive environment? Once a certain plateau has been reached, can material progress for the masses be expected to continue in the absence of civil and political liberties? Can a ruling elite maintain a commitment to social and economic equity into a second generation in the absence of civil and political rights? Increasing income inequality in South Korea in the seventies, as well as an apparent increase in corruption, makes these last questions particularly pressing ones. In the absence of civil and political rights, is there any way that power and privilege cannot help but breed corruption? While rhetorical questions such as these are no substitute for argument, they do raise the possibility that *continued* equitable growth requires civil and political rights.

It is also important to note that a blanket tradeoff of civil and political rights, whatever its economic effects, unjustifiably ignores the manifest diversity of these rights. For example, torture, disappearances, and arbitrary executions can almost always be eliminated with no costs to development; rights to nationality and to equality before the law would also seem to have very low development costs; due process is likely to be a bit more costly, but the burden seems bearable; and even such

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rights as freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and the right to vote, which have relatively high development costs, need to be assessed in light of particular empirical circumstances. In other words, tradeoffs of civil and political rights must be selective, flexible, and rather specific if they are to be justified at all.

Although we may safely conclude that the liberty tradeoff as ordinarily formulated is at best too crude to stand up to scrutiny, more consideration needs to be given to the question of the necessity, desirability, and justifiability of *particular* tradeoffs. For example, the economic rationale for labor discipline *may* be sufficient to justify substantial infringement of workers' rights. Likewise, it is undeniable that the short-term coalitions, logrolling, and horsetrading with special interests that are so dear to pluralists can threaten economic efficiency. The government's necessarily major role in economic management, however, does not require a full-scale abrogation of civil and political rights. Even if we admit that technical economic managers must be insulated from political pressures, the wholesale suspension of civil and political rights seems a particularly poor way to go about it.

In fact, there may be significant economic benefits to the exercise of many civil and political rights. For example, obtaining an adequate and timely flow of information is a major practical problem of economic management, especially in the Third World where even simple official statistical information tends to be of dubious reliability. Freedom of speech, press, association, and assembly, and the right to petition for redress of grievances, can be important channels of information. Electoral campaigns can also provide important information to planners, but only if there is true competition in relatively free, fair, and open (even if only one-party) elections. Imposed social discipline will usually engender inefficiency that at least partially cancels any gains derived from suspending civil and political rights.

For almost any conceivable benefit from the liberty tradeoff, there is a parallel cost.[40] Therefore, the liberty tradeoff must rest on a largely empirical claim that economic benefits outweigh economic costs by a great margin. (The margin must be considerable, or economic deprivation must be extreme, if the heavy human costs of suspending civil and political rights are to be justified.) Such claims require much stronger support than they usually receive from those advocating the tradeoff.

Finally, whatever the analytical and practical difficulties, it is necessary to keep civil and political rights always in the picture. The ultimate

[40] Cf. Goodin (fn. 39).

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purpose of economic (and political) development is to lay the basis for realizing human dignity. Whatever its other attractions, a strategy that assures material progress at the cost of political participation, the enjoyment of civil rights, and the unfolding of man's higher nature is radically incomplete. On moral grounds, at least, we must insist that development strategies strive to minimize any shortfall, rather than justify or even increase it. If the above arguments are correct, a more complete development is a realistic possibility.

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THE STUDY OF CHINESE POLITICS:
Toward a Third Generation of Scholarship

By HARRY HARDING

Lucian Pye, *The Dynamics of Chinese Politics*. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1981, 307 pp.

Frederick C. Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China*. White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1979, 730 pp.

I

THE study of contemporary Chinese politics in the United States has been suffering from a curious languor lately. At the end of 1982, it had been more than five years since the Joint Committee on Chinese Studies (formerly the Joint Committee on Contemporary China) of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies—traditionally the chief sponsor of research on modern China—had held its last conference on Chinese politics. Few books that are widely regarded as setting new directions for research have been published in the last half-decade. What is even more surprising, relatively few articles on post-1949 Chinese politics have appeared in the major journals in the field, including the *Journal of Asian Studies, Modern China*, and even *The China Quarterly*.[1]

The apparent exhaustion in the analysis of Chinese politics stands in stark contrast to the dramatic developments taking place inside China itself. The death of Mao Zedong, the purge of the "Gang of Four," the inauguration of the Four Modernizations, the movement to "seek truth from facts," the short-lived "Democracy Wall" and "Peking Spring," Deng Xiaoping's skillful demotion of Hua Guofeng, and the reevaluation of Mao Zedong—all these events have been just as dramatic and significant as the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s, but they have not stimulated as much scholarly analysis.

[1] Determining which articles fall into this category is, of course, a somewhat arbitrary exercise. But if, as seems reasonable, we exclude review essays, research notes, and trip reports, and if we also exclude essays not written by political scientists, we obtain the following results for the last five years: in *Journal of Asian Studies*, two articles, or 0.1 per issue; in *Modern China*, ten articles (two of which actually constituted a single essay which had been divided into two parts for publication), or 0.5 per issue; and in *China Quarterly*, eighteen articles, or 0.9 per issue.

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Why this intellectual malaise? One set of explanations is sociological and economic in nature. With shrinking job markets in the United States, particularly in area studies, graduate programs in Chinese politics are attracting fewer students; therefore, there are fewer doctoral dissertations and fresh research monographs. With tighter university budgets and the decline in foundation funding for Chinese studies, it is more difficult to obtain financial support for large research projects. The continuing lure of corporate consulting and government advising diverts some of the best scholars from academic research into activities that provide more money, status, and influence. All these elements create a situation in which less basic research is being conducted now than a decade ago, and (although this judgment may be more debatable) in which the research that *is* being done is of somewhat lower quality and lesser breadth than in the past.

But the causes of the current lethargy in study of Chinese politics are as much intellectual as they are sociological or economic. The basic thesis of this essay is that the study of Chinese politics is displaying all the symptoms of a transition between two generations of scholarship. The paradigms and concepts that informed the earlier generation have been challenged, but they have not yet been fully replaced. The data that provided the underpinnings of the earlier period have been exhaustively exploited, but new sources of information have not yet been systematically tapped to take their place.

Although the study of Chinese politics is in a state of intellectual depression, recovery may be just around the corner. A new generation of scholarship—the third since the early 1960s—is now beginning to appear in print. This new generation of research will be based on a significantly wider range of sources than its predecessors; it will include interviews and participant observation in China, provincial and ministerial publications, and perhaps archival information. In addition, the third generation may well be of a more comparative bent than the scholarship of the 1970s.

The two books under review here, Lucian Pye's study of factionalism and Frederick Teiwes's analysis of Party purges and rectification campaigns, are very much products of the current transition in the study of Chinese politics. Both works are firmly grounded in the generation of research that is now coming to a close. And yet both, in significant ways, move beyond that earlier period, identifying new directions for the field. In so doing, they provide some clues as to where the third generation of scholarship will be taking us.

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II

Research on contemporary Chinese politics can be divided into two fairly distinct generations since its initiation in the early 1960s. The first encompasses most of the studies of Chinese politics produced in the 1960s, when the field was starting to grow, but was not yet in its period of most rapid expansion. The second includes the scholarship of the 1970s, during which the field was strongly influenced by the Cultural Revolution in China and the dramatic growth of area studies in the United States. These two generations—as well as the third that is just beginning to emerge—can be differentiated above all by the breadth of their research, their sources of information, their level of conceptualization, and their relationship to the broader field of comparative politics.

Because the first generation was small, it produced relatively few landmark studies. These include Lewis's *Leadership in Communist China*, Barnett's *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China*, Townsend's *Participation in Communist China*, Schram's *Mao Tse-tung*, and, although not written by political scientists, Schurmann's *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, Vogel's *Canton Under Communism*, and Skinner and Winckler's article on "compliance cycles" in rural China.[2] All of these pathbreaking works were published between 1963 and 1969.

These seven studies, and other important works of the first generation, share several features that distinguish them from the scholarship of the later period. One is their breadth of inquiry. In a single book, for example, Franz Schurmann found it possible to deal with the content of ideology, the structure of the Party, the operation of government, the control of the bureaucracy, the management of factories, the administration of cities, and the reorganization of the village—a combination that no scholar of China has attempted since. Ezra Vogel produced a comprehensive history of a Chinese province between 1949 and the eve of the Cultural Revolution, an undertaking that has been replicated only once in later work. And Doak Barnett provided a magisterial overview

[2] John Wilson Lewis, *Leadership in Communist China* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963); A. Doak Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); James R. Townsend, *Political Participation in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); Stuart R. Schram, *Mao Tse-tung* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1966); Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); Ezra Vogel, *Canton Under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949-1968* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969); and G. William Skinner and Edwin A. Winckler, "Compliance Succession in Rural Communist China: A Cyclical Theory," in Amitai Etzioni, ed., *A Sociological Reader on Complex Organizations* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969), 410-38.

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of the operation of the Chinese bureaucracy at every level, from the central ministries to the rural production brigades.

Even the somewhat narrower works took on ambitious topics. Stuart Schram's book on Mao, for example, was a comprehensive biography of China's principal leader. John Lewis's study of Chinese leadership techniques provided a fairly complete overview of the official doctrine of the Chinese Communist Party. And James Townsend's monograph on political participation examined the relationship between the ordinary Chinese citizen and the organizational network created by the Party. In other words, the studies of contemporary Chinese politics produced by first-generation scholars were wide-ranging in scope, sometimes awesomely so.

They were mainly works of description, most of which eschewed any attempt either to build grand theories of Chinese politics or to compare China with other Communist systems. In the preface to *Canton Under Communism*, for example, Ezra Vogel acknowledged that he was writing a "socio-political history" of Guangdong province, and would leave any analysis of the structure and operation of Chinese organizations, let alone any general theory of Chinese politics and society, to a projected (but uncompleted) second volume.[3] Similarly, Franz Schurmann's *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, while full of details about Chinese bureaucracy and society, contained no concluding chapter that might have woven the author's insights about ideology and organization in China into an overall model of the Chinese political system. Only Skinner and Winckler produced a true theory of Chinese politics: a highly abstract, stylized model of the cyclical oscillation between mobilization and consolidation, produced by the interaction between a relatively unified Party leadership committed to "big pushes" toward collectivization and a peasant mass that rapidly became alienated from utopian attempts to change the status quo.

The first generation did not produce much comparative analysis. To be sure, the roots of the Chinese Communist system were traced back to traditional China, the revolutionary period, the Soviet experience, or the Party's Marxist-Leninist heritage. But there was little systematic effort to compare the Chinese experience with that of the Soviet Union or with other developing countries or Communist regimes. Although there were one or two conference volumes on comparative communism—including those edited by Donald Treadgold and Chalmers Johnson—they took the form of juxtapository comparison, in which chapters

[3] Vogel (fn. 2), viii.

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on one aspect of China were placed next to chapters on comparable aspects of the Soviet Union or some other Communist country.[4]

Rather than placing China in comparative perspective or building general theories of Chinese politics, then, most of the work of the first generation was self-consciously descriptive, relying primarily on official Chinese sources. Because Chinese society was closed to most Western scholars at the time, and the flow of information from China to the outside world was carefully controlled by the Chinese government, the most important source of data was the official Chinese press, including central newspapers, news services, and theoretical journals. During the 1950s, additional information was available from the provincial press and ministerial publications. In the early 1960s, after the distribution of provincial newspapers outside China was halted, scholars began to rely increasingly on monitored provincial radio broadcasts. Although interviews with Chinese refugees played a role in first-generation scholarship—providing a major source of information both for Vogel's study of Guangdong and for Barnett's analysis of the Chinese bureaucracy—the main source of information about China was whatever Chinese officials chose to make available.

Because of their reliance on official sources, first-generation scholars tended to describe Chinese politics in the same terms as did the Chinese Communist leadership. Thus, John Lewis's book was a masterful glossary of Chinese leadership doctrine, providing explanations of such concepts as the mass line, the theory of contradictions, and the theory of practice. Both Schurmann and Barnett identified the basic principles of Chinese organization—including the distinction between "branch" and "committee" organization, Party penetration of the state bureaucracy, the use of campaigns to implement policy, and the combination of "redness" and "expertise." In addition, Schurmann explained the analytical categories used by Communist leaders to describe their socioeconomic policy: the contradictions between industry and agriculture, the individual and the collective, production and accumulation, and so on. But for all their merits, these works were less an analysis of Chinese political practice than an exegesis of the formal doctrine of the Chinese Communist Party.

[4] Donald W. Treadgold, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differences* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967); Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1970). Richard Lowenthal's article in the Johnson volume, which compared competing political tendencies in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and China, is a major exception to this generalization; see Lowenthal, "Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy," *ibid.*, 33-116.

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III

This first wave of studies of Chinese politics, then, produced bold, groundbreaking works, setting a standard for breadth and range that has rarely been duplicated. By the end of the 1960s, however, it came under increasing criticism for formalism, overgeneralization, and underconceptualization. In retrospect, some of these criticisms appear a little exaggerated. Even so, they helped define the second generation of scholarship that began to emerge in the early 1970s.

One of the earliest charges made against the first generation was that its scholarship was disposed to formalism. Because of their reliance on official sources, the authors had been in a better position to describe Communist doctrine, policy, and organizational tables than to analyze the actual operation of the Party and the state. By extension, John Fairbank's remark, in his review of Franz Schurmann's *Ideology and Organization*, that the book is "less a record of what has happened in the Chinese revolution than of what the revolutionaries have tried to do,"[5] holds true of all first-generation scholarship. In the same way, there was little understanding of the factional and policy divisions among China's leaders. Kremlinological techniques were applied to the purges of Gao Gang, Rao Shushi, and Peng Dehuai, but so little contemporary information was available about these incidents that the accounts could only be tentative and speculative.[6] What is more, the small number of leadership purges led first-generation scholars to the conclusion that there was much more unity and consensus among China's leaders than actually existed.

Moreover, as Fairbank also noted in his review of Schurmann, first-generation scholars tended to write sweeping descriptions of all of China, without seeking to understand the variation between organization and organization, or between province and province.[7] Even when their focus was on a particular organization or a particular province, they regarded their object of inquiry as a microcosm of China as a whole. Thus, Erza Vogel examined Canton as a way of learning, not how it differed from the rest of the country, but rather how its experience illustrated the

[5] John K. Fairbank, "The State That Mao Built," *World Politics* 19 (July 1967), 664-77, at 669.

[6] See, for example, Harold C. Hinton, *The "Unprincipled Dispute" Within the Chinese Communist Top Leadership*, LS-98-55 (Washington: U.S. Information Agency, July 1955); Schurmann (fn. 2), 498-517; and David A. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai," in Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., *China Under Mao: Politics Takes Command* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), 20-33.

[7] Fairbank (fn. 5).

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broader political history of the People's Republic. And Doak Barnett studied "Ministry M" and "County X" not as unique entities, but rather as examples of all agencies of the Chinese government.

Although the criticisms were fully justified, the shortcomings were understandable. Without some comprehension of the whole, it would have been premature for first-generation scholars to study the parts in detail. Fairbank himself acknowledged that "to talk about 'China' as a holistic entity is the bane of China studies, yet it seems inescapable."[8] By the late 1960s, however, when the first generation had completed its preliminary mapping of Chinese politics, second-generation scholars proceeded to disassemble the Chinese political process and examine its individual parts.

Not only was the earliest generation of scholarship found guilty of overgeneralization, it was also accused of underconceptualization. Its critics charged that students of Chinese politics examined China as a unique case and failed to apply more general concepts and models from the broader field of comparative politics. In reviewing the three-volume compendium, *China in Crisis* (edited by Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, and published in 1968), Richard Wilson charged that the chapters making up the work were notable for their conceptual impoverishment, their ignorance of developments in the social science, and their stubborn adherence to a Sinological tradition. Taking the book as representative of the entire field, Wilson concluded that it was not only China, but also Chinese studies, that were "in crisis."[9]

Wilson's critique may have been appropriate for the Ho and Tsou compendium, but it was somewhat of an overstatement, even at the time, for the field as a whole. Of the seven works listed above as the landmarks of the first generation of scholarship on Chinese politics, several were noteworthy for their use of comparative concepts. Townsend applied the notion of political participation to the study of the relationship between elites and masses in China, and Skinner and Winckler applied ideas of compliance and power to the analysis of the same phenomenon. Schurmann's massive work was replete with references to sociological studies of organization and ideology. Still, first-generation scholarship was not noted for attempts at comparison or at the construction of general positive theory. Criticisms such as Wilson's did help to ensure that the next generation would be more self-consciously conceptual—if not, as we will see, necessarily truly comparative.

[8] *Ibid.*, 664.
[9] Wilson, "Chinese Studies in Crisis," *World Politics* 23 (January 1971), 295-317.

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IV

The late 1960s and early 1970s saw not only a Cultural Revolution in China, but an intellectual revolution in American scholarship about China. In those years, China studies expanded rapidly, large numbers of younger scholars were trained, and a virtual explosion of dissertations, books, essays, and monographs ensued. The Red Guard movement provided a wealth of new information, revealing facets of Chinese politics that the official publications, and even most refugee accounts, had concealed. Most important, there was an unexpected and unprecedented phenomenon, the Cultural Revolution, that demanded explanation. Since the first generation of scholars had failed to predict the Cultural Revolution, and since their assumptions of leadership unity and institutional stability were cast into doubt by the events of the late 1960s, the time seemed ripe for a new approach. In response to these developments, a new wave of younger scholars began to produce a second generation of studies on the politics of the People's Republic.

Where the first generation had been based largely on the official press, supplemented by interviews with refugees, the second relied principally on Red Guard materials—a rich if somewhat untrustworthy body of documents that purported to give outside observers, for the first time, a behind-the-scenes look at all levels of the Chinese political system. Red Guard newspapers and periodicals offered the first evidence that policy was made at central work conferences rather than at formal Central Committee plenums. They provided intriguing fragments from classified speeches and reports, and extensive collections of previously unpublished writings by Mao Zedong. They contained the raw materials for histories of the evolution of socioeconomic programs across a wide range of policy areas. And they offered tantalizing glimpses of life among the Chinese elite: the factional connections between central and local leaders, the maneuvers for power and influence during the Cultural Revolution, and the relations between Mao and his lieutenants throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. All this new information made it possible to move the study of Chinese politics from the general to the specific, and from the formal to the informal.

It was, therefore, the second generation of American scholars that began to disaggregate China. If the scholarship of the first generation had been characterized by breadth, the scholarship of the second was notable for its depth—or, at least, for its specialization. Although some general histories of the People's Republic were published in the 1970s,

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few of them were by Americans,[10] and these were written by historians rather than by political scientists.[11] And though some general textbooks on Chinese politics also appeared in the 1970s, only one—James Townsend's—was of a level of sophistication that advanced the field.[12]

China was dissected for scholarly analysis along three separate dimensions. The most fruitful of these was the examination of different areas of public policy. Inspired largely by the Red Guard materials, many of which contained histories of "two-line struggle" in various sectors of the bureaucracy, American scholars wrote a series of historical descriptions and analyses of the most important areas of socioeconomic policy in China: education, public health, agricultural mechanization and development, industrial management, science and technology, bureaucratic management, the rustication of youth, and so forth.[13] In the main, these were attempts to describe the evolution of policy over time and to learn whether there were enduring philosophical contradictions or organizational rivalries in the issue area under consideration.

A second dimension of disaggregation was geographic. The 1970s produced a plethora of studies of individual provinces and cities.[14] To

[10] The majority of general histories of the People's Republic were written by Europeans and Australians. See, for example, Jean Chesneaux, *China: The People's Republic, 1949-1976* (New York: Pantheon, 1979); Jacques Guillermaz, *The Chinese Communist Party in Power, 1949-1976* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1976), Jürgen Domes, *The Internal Politics of China, 1949-1972* (London: C. Hurst, 1973); Bill Brugger, *China: Liberation and Transformation, 1942-1962* (London: Croom Helm, 1981); and Bill Brugger, *China: Radicalism to Revisionism, 1962-1979* (London: Croom Helm, 1981).

[11] Maurice Meisner, *Mao's China: A History of the People's Republic* (New York: Free Press, 1977); James P. Harrison, *The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-72* (New York: Praeger, 1972); Richard C. Thornton, *China: The Struggle for Power, 1917-1972* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973).

[12] James Townsend, *Politics in China* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974).

[13] On education: Robert I. Taylor, *Education and University Enrollment Policies in China, 1949-1971* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973). On public health: David M. Lampton, *The Politics of Medicine in China: The Policy Process, 1949-1977* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1977). On agricultural mechanization and development: Steven Butler, *Agricultural Mechanization in China: The Administrative Impact* (New York: East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1978); Benedict Stavis, *The Politics of Agricultural Mechanization in China* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978). On industrial management: Stephen Andors, *China's Industrial Revolution: Politics, Planning, and Management, 1949 to the Present* (New York: Pantheon, 1977); Chong-wook Chung, *Maoism and Development: The Politics of Industrial Management in China* (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1980). On science and technology: Richard P. Suttmeier, *Research and Revolution: Science Policy and Societal Change in China* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974). On bureaucratic management: Harry Harding, *Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy, 1949-1976* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1981). On the rustication of youth: Thomas P. Bernstein, *Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages: The Transfer of Youth from Urban to Rural China* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). On national minority policy: June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People's Republic of China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976).

[14] Lynn T. White, III, *Careers in Shanghai* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Dorothy Solinger, *Regional Government and Political Integration in Southwest China, 1949-*

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a degree, these were the successors to Ezra Vogel's classic analysis of Canton and Guangdong province. But, compared to Vogel, the scholars of the second generation were interested in their localities not so much as examples of general nationwide trends, but rather as clues to understanding the political variety that exists in a nation of one billion people. Nor did they have the scope of Vogel's pathbreaking effort. Only one of these studies—Donald McMillen's analysis of Xinjiang—is a comparable attempt to chronicle through a single locality the entire history of the People's Republic. In some cases, studies were limited to either a specific time period[15] or a particular set of issues[16] in the locality in question.

For the sake of detailed analysis, contemporary Chinese political history was also divided into smaller time periods. One type of analysis characteristic of the 1970s was the intense investigation of a particular piece of contemporary Chinese history. Some of these were comprehensive analyses of discrete periods. Examples include Roderick MacFarquhar's work on the middle 1950s, Byung-joon Ahn's analysis of the early 1960s, and Thomas Fingar's study of the early 1970s.[17] Somewhat more narrow studies—focusing on one set of issues in a particular time period—include Vivienne Shue on agricultural policy during the middle 1950s, Richard Baum on rural organizations during the early 1960s, and Hong Yung Lee on the Red Guard movement of the late 1960s.[18]

In addition to moving their attention from the general to the specific, these scholars now shifted their focus from the formal to the informal. As we have seen, the first generation had examined formal structures and official doctrine in order to learn how the Chinese political system

1954: A Case Study (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Kenneth G. Lieberthal, *Revolution and Tradition in Tientsin, 1949-1952* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1980); Donald McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949-1977* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1979); Gordon Bennett, *Huadong: The Story of a Chinese People's Commune* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1978).

[15] Both Solinger (fn. 14) and Lieberthal (fn. 14), for example, limited their studies to the early 1950s.

[16] White (fn. 14) discussed the opportunities for personal mobility in Shanghai.

[17] MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, 1: Contradictions Among the People, 1956-1957* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Ahn, *Chinese Politics and the Cultural Revolution* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976); Fingar, "Domestic Policy and the Quest for Independence," in Thomas Fingar and the *Stanford Journal of International Studies*, eds., *China's Quest for Independence: Policy Evolution in the 1970s* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980), 25-92.

[18] Shue, *Peasant China in Transition: The Dynamics of Development Toward Socialism, 1949-1956* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Baum, *Prelude to Revolution: Mao, the Party, and the Peasant Question, 1962-66* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975); and Lee, *The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

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was supposed to operate. The second generation, relying on Red Guard materials and other sources from the Cultural Revolution, could now learn substantially more about the informal mechanisms and norms by which the Chinese political system worked in practice.

The exemplars of this genre include a series of studies of the central work conferences of the Chinese Communist Party.[19] Previously, scholars had assumed that political power in China rested primarily in such formal organizations as the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Party Secretariat. But materials from the Cultural Revolution suggested that, although these bodies were not unimportant, they were not the principal arenas in which major decisions were taken. Rather, policies were determined in a series of *ad hoc* central work conferences, which appeared in no constitution and on no formal organizational chart. A central work conference, attended by representatives of the central Party administration, the state bureaucracy, the military, and local Party committees, might either consider problems in a specific issue area, or establish guidelines for all major issues.

The materials that became available during the Cultural Revolution and during the struggle to succeed Mao Zedong in the mid-1970s also made it possible to analyze the flow of information within the Party and state bureaucracy. In particular, second-generation scholars produced pathbreaking studies of the process by which central Party documents (the so-called *zhong-fa* series) are commissioned by Party leaders, drafted by central Party staff, reviewed at central work conferences, and then circulated to lower levels of the Party and state bureaucracy.[20]

Finally, the second generation showed a substantially greater interest in conceptualization than had its predecessors. As if in response to Richard Wilson's accusation that the first generation of China studies had been "theoretically impoverished," scholars in the 1970s applied a variety of concepts and methods from the social sciences to the study of contemporary Chinese politics. Richard Solomon and Lucian Pye took up the analysis of Chinese political culture; Victor Falkenheim drew from the comparative study of political participation to identify

[19] Parris H. Chang, "Research Notes on the Changing Loci of Decision in the CCP," *China Quarterly*, No. 44 (October-December 1970), 169-94; Michel C. Oksenberg, "Policy Making Under Mao, 1949-68: An Overview," in John M. H. Lindbeck, ed., *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), 79-115; Kenneth Lieberthal, *A Research Guide to Central Party and Government Meetings in China, 1949-1975* (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1976).

[20] Michel C. Oksenberg, "Methods of Communication within the Chinese Bureaucracy," *China Quarterly*, No. 57 (January-March 1974), 1-39; Kenneth Lieberthal, *Central Documents and Politburo Politics in China*, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies No. 33 (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1978).

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the methods by which individual Chinese sought to pursue their political interests; Byung-joon Ahn used theories of political development in his analysis of the Cultural Revolution; Andrew Nathan applied models of patron-client relationships to his study of Chinese factionalism; and the present author used organization theory to analyze the ways in which Chinese leaders sought to manage their bureaucracy.[21]

Similarly, a small number of scholars began to employ more sophisticated analytical techniques. Solomon used thematic apperception tests to study attitudes toward authority; Cell employed Guttman scales to study the effectiveness of mass campaigns; Hiniker utilized content analysis to study changes in doctrine; Ting and Wong developed aggregate elite data to examine the composition of Chinese leadership; and Lowell Dittmer applied semiotics to an analysis of the Cultural Revolution.[22] More broadly, specialists on Chinese politics began writing in the language of social science: they developed "hypotheses" and "propositions," applied "data" and "methods," constructed "models," and tested "variables."

The second generation also passed beyond the mere accumulation of historical, ideological, and organizational data to construct more general models that could explain, or at least describe, the changes in policy and leadership between the establishment of the People's Republic and the onset of the Cultural Revolution. The late 1960s and early 1970s produced, in fact, a proliferation of models of the Chinese political process.[23] Through these models, scholars attempted to identify the fundamental actors and forces in Chinese politics—and the shifting balances among them which resulted in changes in leadership, doctrine, and socioeconomic programs.

One group of scholars argued that the principal actors in Chinese

[21] Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1968); Falkenheim, "Political Participation in China," *Problems of Communism* 27 (May-June 1978), 18-32; Ahn, "The Cultural Revolution and China's Search for Political Order," *China Quarterly*, No. 58 (April-June 1974), 249-85; Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics," *China Quarterly*, No. 53 (January-March 1973), 34-66; Harding (fn. 13).

[22] Solomon (fn. 21); Charles Cell, *Revolution at Work: Mobilization Campaigns in China* (New York: Academic Press, 1977); Paul Hiniker, *Revolutionary Ideology and Chinese Reality: Dissonance Under Mao* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977); William P. Y. Ting, "A Longitudinal Study of Chinese Military Factionalism, 1949-1973," *Asian Survey* 15 (October 1975), 896-910; Paul Wong, *China's Higher Leadership in the Socialist Transition* (New York: Free Press, 1976); Lowell Dittmer, *Liu Shao-chi'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Mass Criticism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); also see Solinger (fn. 14).

[23] For a somewhat longer summary of each of the models, see John Bryan Starr, "From the 10th Party Congress to the Premiership of Hua Kuo-feng: The Significance of the Colour of the Cat," *China Quarterly*, No. 67 (September 1976), 457-88.

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politics were personal factions, constructed by individual leaders in their attempts to acquire and retain political power.[24] Another group suggested that Chinese politics could best be described as a continuing conflict among different "belief systems" or "opinion clusters," which applied different values and priorities to the major issues of public policy.[25] A third set of models assumed that the Chinese political process was characterized by competition among various bureaucratic,[26] societal,[27] or geographic[28] interest groups, each of which sought to influence the distribution of scarce political and economic resources in accordance with its own interests. In a fourth approach, the main actors on the Chinese political stage were described as political generations which had passed through different formative experiences, and therefore had different outlooks on major policy issues.[29] Finally, there were the "Mao-in-command" models, which assumed that changes in socioeconomic policy, organizational structure, the composition of national leadership, and Party doctrine reflected the changing attitudes of a Party Chairman who remained very much in control of his country's affairs—at least until the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.[30]

V

The scholarship of the 1970s considerably advanced the understanding of China as well as the level of theoretical sophistication of the writings about China. Still, it was not without flaws. Indeed, the time has come

[24] Nathan (fn. 21); Tang Tsou, "Prolegomenon to the Study of Informal Groups in CCP Politics," *China Quarterly*, No. 65 (January 1976), 98-114.

[25] Michel C. Oksenberg, *China: The Convulsive Society*, Headline Series No. 203 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, December 1970); Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein, "The Chinese Political Spectrum," *Problems of Communism* 23 (March-April 1974), 1-13; Edwin A. Winckler, "Policy Oscillations in the People's Republic of China: A Reply," *China Quarterly*, No. 68 (December 1976), 734-50.

[26] William W. Whitson, "Organizational Perspectives and Decision-Making in the Chinese Communist High Command," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), 381-415; Lampton (fn. 13).

[27] Michel C. Oksenberg, "Occupational Groups in Chinese Society and the Cultural Revolution," in Oksenberg and others, *The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review*, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies No. 2 (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1968), 1-44; Alan P. L. Liu, *Political Culture and Group Conflict in Communist China* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Clio Books, 1976); Peter Moody, *Opposition and Dissent in Contemporary China* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1977).

[28] Frederick C. Teiwes, "Provincial Politics in China: Themes and Variations," in Lindbeck (fn. 19), 116-89.

[29] William W. Whitson, "The Concept of Military Generation," *Asian Survey* 8 (November 1968), 921-47; Michael Yahuda, "Political Generations in China," *China Quarterly*, No. 80 (December 1979), 793-805.

[30] Frederick C. Teiwes, "Chinese Politics, 1949-1965: A Changing Mao," *Current Scene* 12 (January 1974 and February 1974), 1-15 and 1-18.

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to identify those shortcomings clearly, so that the emerging generation can remedy them.

A number of critics have argued that the concepts that the second generation (and, to a lesser degree, the first) borrowed from Western social science were seriously misused in their application to China. Some even suggested that the study of social science theory had come at the expense of a sufficiently deep immersion in Chinese language and culture.[31] This accusation is valid—to a point. It is true that there is a tension between social science and area studies, that scholars who consider themselves to be social scientists are less likely to delve deeply into classical Sinology than those who do not, and that social scientists who study contemporary China may therefore miss some of the nuances of Chinese tradition and culture. Unfortunately, there has also been a tendency to apply to China concepts that originally emerged from the study of very different political systems, and that may therefore refer to structures and processes that have no counterpart in the People's Republic.

On balance, however, the charge that recent scholarship on China has relied excessively on concepts drawn from comparative politics falls far short of the mark. Indeed, it would be more accurate to suggest that the process of integrating China studies and comparative politics has not gone far enough. For one thing, the seeming sophistication with which concepts and techniques have been applied to the study of China has been more apparent than real. What are called "hypotheses" or "propositions" may actually not be statements that are to be rigorously tested, but simply impressionistic conclusions stated in a superficially "scientific" form.[32] Complicated statistical methods have been applied to data that are so partial, biased, and unreliable that the results can only be considered highly suspect.

While they have borrowed ideas from comparative politics, China scholars have yet to make a significant contribution in return. Not much of the second-generation scholarship has been truly comparative. Virtually none has sought to test systematically propositions or hypotheses

[31] Pi-chao Chen, "In Search of Chinese National Character via Child-Training," *World Politics* 25 (July 1973), 608-35; Frederick Mote, "China's Past in the Study of China Today—Some Comments on the Recent Work of Richard Solomon," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 32 (November 1972), 107-20; Tang Tsou, "Western Concepts and China's Historical Experience," *World Politics* 21 (July 1969), 655-91.

[32] This is true of an earlier version of one of the works under review here: Pye's *The Dynamics of Factions and Consensus in Chinese Politics: A Model and Some Propositions*, R-2566-AF (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, July 1980). The author showed good judgment in eliminating the propositional framework when revising his manuscript for final publication.

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drawn from the rest of political science. Concepts from comparative politics have been used to understand China, but China has not yet been used to help expand our understanding of comparative politics.

This continuing isolation from the rest of comparative politics stems in part from the remaining Sinological bias in China studies: the belief that China's history, culture, and politics are so complicated that they can be understood only by those who have devoted their entire careers exclusively to their analysis. In part, too, it is due to the fact that, as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the Cultural Revolution, China has appeared to be unique, and consequently not legitimately comparable with any other political system. As a result, second-generation scholars virtually abandoned the task of comparing China to other Communist systems, let alone to other developing societies.[33] China was believed to be a country that could only be understood in its own terms. In Michel Oksenberg's words, most second-generation scholars believed that "China is China is China."[34]

A second criticism of the scholarship of the 1970s has been that it was too greatly affected by the materials of the Cultural Revolution. It is said that second-generation scholars took Red Guard "revelations" at face value, and used them in a naive and uncritical fashion to revise our understanding of the first seventeen years of Communist rule. They are also accused of following the Red Guards in interpreting contemporary Chinese history as a series of struggles between the "proletarian" and the "revisionist" lines. As Andrew Nathan has summarized this kind of criticism, "That this drama [of two-line struggle] may have been written by Chinese polemicists and merely translated and edited by western scholars . . . does not alter its fictional character."[35]

This criticism could more appropriately be applied to the earlier studies in this generation than to later ones. It is true that, in their attempt to work through the mass of Red Guard revelations, specialists on Chinese politics did initially accept the Maoist version of contemporary Chinese history, even though they used more neutral terms, such as "transformation versus consolidation" and "revolution versus modernization," to describe the competing lines. Within a few years, how-

[33] Virtually the only exception was the collaborative work of Schapiro and Lewis comparing the roles of leaders in mobilizational systems: Leonard Schapiro and John W. Lewis, "The Roles of the Monolithic Party under the Totalitarian Leader," in John W. Lewis, ed., *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 114-45.

[34] Oksenberg, *A Bibliography of Secondary English Language Literature on Contemporary Chinese Politics* (New York: East Asian Institute, Columbia University, n.d.), iv.

[35] Nathan, "Policy Oscillation in the People's Republic of China: A Critique," *China Quarterly*, No. 68 (December 1976), 720-34, at 730.

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ever, there appeared careful attempts to subject the Red Guard accounts to a more critical evaluation.[36] Moreover, although some scholars did agree with Maoist interpretations that the controversies over specific policy issues in China could be combined into a few competing political tendencies, they frequently came to argue that these tendencies were not necessarily two in number, that they were not necessarily diametrically opposed on every issue, and that leaders could readily shift position from issue to issue or from year to year.[37]

A related and more justifiable criticism is that Western scholars took over the political standpoint of the Maoists as well as their data and their models of Chinese politics. That is, much second-generation scholarship on China was characterized by an idealism about the Cultural Revolution that occasionally verged on apology.[38] The prevailing interpretation was that Mao Zedong was engaged in a praiseworthy struggle to preserve equality, commitment, and organizational responsiveness in China, as well as to combat elitism, alienation, and bureaucracy, and that these ends justified whatever means Mao used to pursue them. Despite contemporary evidence to the contrary, there was little willingness to entertain the notions that Mao's diagnosis of the situation in the mid-1960s was exaggerated, that the means he chose (intensification of class struggle, mobilization of Red Guards) would lead to an unjust persecution of intellectuals and officials without achieving the intended goals, or that the costs of the movement far outweighed any gains.

Finally, the competing models of the Chinese political process, though representing an important preliminary effort to provide a general analysis of national policy making in China, nonetheless gave the field a bit too much analytical diversity. Some scholars employed several different models in the course of their research without explaining why they felt it necessary or desirable to do so.[39] Almost no effort was made to define the models precisely, let alone to establish their relative explanatory and predictive power. As a result, as we will see below, the emerging third generation of scholarship appears to be taking on the assignment of weighing the relative merits of these competing theories and models, and developing some synthesis among them.

[36] Dittmer (fn. 22).

[37] Oksenberg and Goldstein (fn. 25).

[38] This paragraph is based on the more detailed argument found in Harry Harding, "Reappraising the Cultural Revolution," *Wilson Quarterly* 4 (Autumn 1980), 132-41.

[39] William Whitson's monumental study of the Chinese military, *The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71* (New York: Praeger, 1973), employs, variously, factional analysis, generational analysis, tendency analysis, and bureaucratic analysis.

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VI

The study of contemporary Chinese politics is at present in a period of transition to a third generation of scholarship. The two books under review reflect the changes that are taking place.

In a number of ways, both are firmly grounded in the second generation of scholarship. Like most of the studies of Chinese politics that were written in the 1970s, they rely primarily on the revelations about the victims of political purges that have appeared in both the official and unofficial Chinese press. Teiwes's book, which deals with the period from 1949 to 1965, is based largely on materials published during the Cultural Revolution; Pye's work, which focuses mainly on the 1970s, draws upon the criticisms of the "Gang of Four" that were published after their purge in 1976. To illustrate the conclusions, Pye relies substantially—and Teiwes occasionally—on interviews with refugees.

Like much second-generation scholarship, too, neither Pye nor Teiwes draws heavily on, or seeks to contribute to, the general corpus of literature in comparative politics. In his discussion of factionalism in China, Pye cites theoretical work on patron-client relations by such scholars as James Scott and Samuel Popkin, but he does so only to deny its applicability to the study of China. And though Teiwes, in his work on rectification and purges, is concerned with such broad issues as the control of a bureaucracy and the circulation of political elites, he makes little effort to draw on the comparative or conceptual literature available. Both Pye and Teiwes, in short, seem to regard China as a unique case, the study of which has no bearing on our understanding of any broader comparative questions.

Above all, both works reflect the orientation of second-generation scholarship in their attempts to describe the informal operation of Chinese politics at the national level. In *The Dynamics of Chinese Politics*, Pye argues that Chinese politics is essentially factional, formed of groups whose main purpose is less the adoption of policy than the search for power and who are bound together less by common opinions than by personal loyalty to the same set of leaders. Factional politics, Pye maintains, reflects the deep-seated Chinese need for protection and security in a world that is traditionally viewed as highly dangerous and competitive.

Pye also suggests that factionalism helps to explain some of the style and tone of politics in China. Chinese political culture does not encourage the open expression of divergent opinions; it favors conformity and consensus instead. As a result, each competing faction must claim to

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represent the interests of the entire community, and must accuse its opponents of threatening the unity and harmony of the social fabric. Factional politics is, accordingly, highly rhetorical politics; and Pye argues that factionalism in China has helped to create a situation in which the careful consideration of detailed policy programs is replaced by the adoption of hyperbolic slogans, followed by "compulsive initiatives," followed in turn by "paralysis" (p. 180).

In similar fashion, Teiwes submits to careful scrutiny the official organizational norms concerning decision making and discipline—the norms that played so important a role in the formalistic scholarship of the first generation. He concludes that, between the creation of the People's Republic and the onset of the Cultural Revolution, there was a gradual erosion in the Party's standards. In the first eight years of the PRC's existence, national policy making was characterized, as Party norms required, by collective leadership, minority rights, and a low rate of purge of high-level officials; rectification involved the use of persuasive methods, leniency for errant cadres, and tight control over mass participation in rectification campaigns.

Between 1957 and 1965, however, these norms came under mounting stress. In Beijing, Mao's increasingly "arbitrary and despotic" behavior (p. 616) led to the collapse of collective leadership, the infringement of the rights of dissenting minorities within the leadership, and the identification of policy-making officials as the targets of purges. Elsewhere, rectification campaigns became ever more coercive as restraints on mass participation were loosened and lower-level cadres were blamed for carrying out the policy directives of higher-level leaders now under attack.

In many ways, then—in their reliance on the revelations of the Cultural Revolution decade, in their desire to reach behind the formal surface of Chinese politics to discover the informal political mechanisms by which leaders rise and fall and decisions are made, and in their general disregard for the concepts and theories of comparative politics—Pye and Teiwes are very much representative of second-generation scholarship on contemporary Chinese politics. In other ways, however, both authors hint at some new directions that should be of increasing importance in the study of China in the 1980s. In so doing, they demonstrate that senior specialists can play a leading role in identifying fresh approaches for a field of study. Lucian Pye, after all, began his career as one of the leaders of the first generation, and Frederick Teiwes is one of the best of the large number of second-generation scholars trained in the United States during the mid- and late 1960s.

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In what new directions are Pye and Teiwes leading the field? Both of their new volumes are wide-ranging and ambitious—much more reminiscent of the breadth of the 1960s than of the narrower focus of second-generation scholarship. Pye's purpose is no less than to provide, as the title of his book indicates, a general theory of the "dynamics of Chinese politics." And Teiwes's book is a study of every principal Party rectification campaign between 1949 and 1965, and of the purge of every major Party leader. Because rectification and purge lie at the heart of Party politics in China, Teiwes has, in effect, written the most detailed and well-documented history yet published of elite politics in the People's Republic.

Second, both volumes represent important first efforts to provide some systematic comparison, testing, and synthesis of the competing models of Chinese politics that were developed in the 1970s. The authors have approached this task in very different ways. Pye rejects every model except factionalism as an inadequate description and explanation of contemporary Chinese politics. Teiwes, in contrast, suggests that all of the models have some validity, but that their relative applicability depends very much on the particular period of contemporary Chinese history under consideration.

In *The Dynamics of Chinese Politics*, Pye tests several of the competing models—bureaucratic politics, geographic politics, generational politics, tendency analysis, and factional politics—against the events of the late 1970s, and finds all but factionalism to be wanting. Bureaucratic cleavages, he concludes, are not a major feature of Chinese politics, since bureaucracies have not been sufficiently institutionalized to have stable organizational interests. What is more, the expression of organizational interests by the heads of bureaucratic agencies, or the articulation of regional interests by provincial and municipal leaders, is actively discouraged by the emphasis that both traditional political culture and contemporary Party norms place on consensus and selflessness. Pye believes that Chinese political culture is more tolerant of generational differences, but the utility of generational models is vitiated by the fact that members of the same generation often hold widely divergent views on major policy issues. And Pye suggests that the apparent debates over socioeconomic programs, so central to Western tendency analysis, do not really reflect genuine differences over policy within the Chinese elite, but rather serve merely as mechanisms by which competing leaders "test loyalties and force people to choose sides" (p. 162). Pye's conclusion, in short, is that Chinese politics is essentially factional, reflecting the "primacy of power" over policy preference and group interest in Chinese political culture.

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Frederick Teiwes's theoretical synthesis is only implicit in *Politics and Purges in China*. It is presented more explicitly in a review article he published in 1979 in *Problems of Communism*[40]—an article that, in fact, would have been a more stimulating conclusion for the book than the actual final chapter. In contrast to Pye, who sees Chinese politics as reflecting enduring themes in Chinese political culture, Teiwes presents a picture of a changing China for which different models are necessary in order to understand the transformations of national politics over time. Thus, according to Teiwes, models of bureaucratic and geographic politics are more appropriate to periods of relative political stability and leadership unity, such as the mid-1950s. Tendency models—which identify fundamentally different approaches to socioeconomic policy—work best in periods of policy debate such as the early 1960s. Factional models and analyses of societal interest groups are needed to explain the workings of politics during periods of intense struggle and upheaval, such as the Cultural Revolution and the early 1970s. Teiwes presents a dynamic model in which changes in the intensity of conflict and the degree of political institutionalization help determine which political cleavages will be most salient.

Pye's analysis is persuasive for the period he has analyzed, and provides some characteristically breathtaking insights into Chinese political culture. But Teiwes's more mundane approach is actually more successful as a general model of Chinese politics. Pye's evidence and examples are nearly all drawn from the mid- to late 1970s—a period of intense conflict when one would expect the rise of factions to provide leaders with political support and security. It is not clear whether Pye's factional model would be equally appropriate to periods of relative political stability. Indeed, in describing the more institutionalized situation that has emerged in China after the death of Mao and the purge of the Gang of Four, Pye begins to slip into the kind of bureaucratic analysis that he has denigrated elsewhere: he lists the "military," the "rural cadres," the "educational establishment," "propaganda cadres," and "economic planners" as bureaucratic interest groups that might "affect factional strife" (pp. 29ff.).

VII

If, as Pye and Teiwes suggest, the study of Chinese politics is indeed on the verge of a third generation, it is time to identify the directions that this new wave of scholarship should follow.

[40] Teiwes, " 'Rules of the Game' in Chinese Politics," *Problems of Communism* 28 (September-December 1979), 67-76.

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To begin with, the third generation has an *explanandum* that is fully comparable in drama and significance to the Cultural Revolution. The reforms proposed by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s—including the liberalization of intellectual and cultural life, the restructuring of the economy, the democratization and legalization of the political system, and the rejuvenation of the Chinese bureaucracy—constitute a program for social, economic, and political change that is at least as sweeping as that proposed by the Maoists during the Cultural Revolution. The analysis of the content of these reforms, the sources of their support, their modification in the face of political opposition, the pattern of their implementation across the country, their ability to improve the economic and political performance of the Chinese system—the analysis of these and related issues will be a major task of the scholarship of the third generation.

Second, the new generation can utilize sources of information that have not been available in the past. These include the opportunities for field work and archival research, the greater range and variety of official publications now obtainable from China, and the official revelations in connection with the purge of the Gang of Four and the reassessment of Mao Zedong. These sources of information should provide much greater insight into the details of Chinese politics, both past and present. It will now be possible to observe the Chinese political process directly, to conduct interviews with Chinese officials and ordinary citizens, to gain a better understanding of the operation of particular bureaucracies, to delve more deeply into the problems that China faces in particular policy areas, and to use historical data to improve our knowledge of both traditional and revolutionary China. The third generation, in other words, should be able to produce further in-depth studies of localities, institutions, individuals, and policies, continuing the process by which China was disaggregated by the second generation.[41] To do so effectively will require the compilation of better bibliographic guides to the new books, periodicals, encyclopedias, and compendia now being published in China, as well as the development of research guides to the archival materials now open to foreign scholars.

[41] Examples of recent works based on field research in China include Tang Tsou, Marc Blecher, and Mitch Meisner, "Organization, Growth and Equality in Xiyang County: A Survey of Fourteen Brigades in Seven Communes," Part I, *Modern China* 5 (January 1979), 3-40; Part II, *Modern China* 5 (April 1979), 139-86; and Suzanne Pepper, "China's Universities: New Experiments in Socialist Democracy and Administrative Reform—a Research Report," *Modern China* 8 (April 1982), 147-204. The kind of information that can be obtained from interviews with Chinese officials is evident in Michel Oksenberg, "Economic Policy-Making in China: Summer 1981," *China Quarterly*, No. 90 (June 1982), 165-94.

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Third, the emerging generation of scholars should continue the task of intellectual synthesis and generalization begun by Pye and Teiwes. This will entail synthesizing the insight and detail of the specialized scholarship of the 1970s into broad overviews of the political and institutional history of modern China, much as is being done by the contributors to the post-1949 volumes of the *Cambridge History of China* under the editorship of John Fairbank and Roderick MacFarquhar. It will also involve, along the lines identified by Teiwes and Pye, a continued sorting, testing, and amalgamation of the competing models of Chinese politics that were produced in such profusion by the second generation.

Fourth, the new generation should see to it that the study of Chinese politics will gradually become better integrated with the rest of comparative politics. Chinese exceptionalism—one of the factors that inhibited the comparative study of China in the second generation—has largely disappeared. Indeed, developments since the death of Mao have virtually compelled comparisons of reforms in China with similar efforts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, while China's attempt to tap foreign technology and capital can be examined in light of such undertakings by other Asian nations. In addition, the declining fortunes of area studies within political science have been balanced by a greater demand for scholars whose work is truly comparative. It is a welcome development, therefore, that the SSRC conferences on Chinese politics scheduled for the summers of 1983 and 1984 will study the post-Mao reforms: first, by applying hypotheses derived from the literature on policy implementation in the Third World and the West, and second, by comparing those reforms with similar efforts in the Soviet bloc.

Finally, the new generation should study Chinese politics in an interdisciplinary manner. The Chinese themselves have now repudiated the Maoist slogan, "politics takes command." In so doing, they are implicitly acknowledging that the requirements of their economy and the demands of Chinese society now have an increasing effect on the Chinese political system. This means that the study of Chinese politics, in turn, must increasingly become the study of China's political economy and political sociology. Third-generation scholars will need to devote greater attention to the emergence of social differentiation and economic cleavages in rural and urban China and their effects on Chinese politics, as well as to the way in which the technical problems of economic modernization and economic reform constrain political choice.

In pursuing these goals, it will be necessary to be on guard against some intellectual pitfalls that are already becoming apparent. To begin

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with, while the idealistic and utopian interpretations of much of the 1970s should be avoided, they should not be replaced with an equally emotional and one-sided cynicism.[42] Despite its considerable virtues, Lucian Pye's book seems to suggest that debates over policy in China rarely reflect sincere differences of opinion over socioeconomic problems, but are simply mechanisms by which competing leadership factions can mobilize and measure support from below. To Pye, the Chinese policy process is little more than the manipulation of rhetoric in the service of personal power. Although it may well be true that Chinese leaders are not the selfless "statesmen" they were frequently portrayed to be during the Cultural Revolution, it is as great an exaggeration to describe them as selfish "conservers" and "climbers," interested solely in the preservation and maximization of their own status and power.[43]

In addition, there is a need to avoid the pseudo-sophistication that was characteristic of much second-generation scholarship: the use of concepts from comparative politics without a thorough grounding in their meaning and without a careful consideration of their applicability to China. The new generation must understand the limits of the available information about China, and be sure not to imply, through the application of complex statistical techniques, that the data are more reliable than is actually the case.

While seizing the opportunity to use the new sources of information about China, scholars also need to understand their bias. Much of this information will be drawn from what the Chinese leaders choose to reveal about their political history since 1949. The revelations thus far—notably the reassessment of Mao Zedong, the criticism of the Gang of Four, and the memoirs and speeches of veteran Party leaders—suggest the possibility of a significant reinterpretation of the entire period from 1959 through 1976, particularly the origins of the Cultural Revolution and the struggle for power by the Gang of Four. The danger, however, is that the new revised version of official Chinese history may be uncritically accepted, translated into English, and presented as independent scholarship—much as the Red Guard materials were initially treated fifteen years ago. No matter how plausible the revelations seem to be, their validity must be checked against contemporary evidence. In other words, the same critical standards must be applied to the Dengist critique

[42] For a fuller development of this point, see Harry Harding, "From China with Disdain: New Trends in the Study of China," *Asian Survey* 22 (October 1982), 934-58.

[43] This typology of leaders is drawn from Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), chap. IX.

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of Maoism that Lowell Dittmer applied to the Maoist critique of Liuism in his biography of Liu Shaoqi.[44]

Another source of bias lies in the nature of the sources available to foreign scholars. Because opportunities for fieldwork will continue to be limited, political scientists will be driven into narrow studies of local political processes, at the expense of broad-gauged studies of national level politics. Since it is only historical records that are open to foreigners, archival research may improve our understanding of the past at the expense of our knowledge of the present. And, as the new journals are generally technical in nature, they may say more about the implementation of particular programs than about the formulation of broad national policy. In short, the new sources may encourage scholars to know more and more about less and less. Reliance upon them may lead to neglect of the broader and more sensitive questions of national policy that cannot be studied so readily in China, and may retard the development of stimulating and provocative generalizations that provide intellectual life to the field.

Perhaps the greatest challenge, however, is rooted not in China but in the United States. The development of a third generation of scholarship on Chinese politics will not be fueled by a rapid expansion in the size of the field, as was the case with the second generation. At best, the size of the China-studies community will remain relatively constant; at worst, the growing skepticism about the value of area studies to political science may mean that senior scholars will not be replaced on their retirement, and that the field will actually shrink. The fact that scholarly productivity is often inversely related to age and rank—that many scholars produce little of note beyond their dissertation or their first book—does not bode well. If the study of Chinese politics is to remain as lively as it deserves, ways will have to be found of sustaining the vitality and productivity of established scholars, as well as of maintaining a steady if limited flow of younger specialists into the field.

[44] Dittmer (fn. 22).

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

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

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

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

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